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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Kreisky Meeting With Qaddumi Reported (MA'ARIV, 8 Mar 81).....	1
Chambers of Commerce Agree on Economic Integration (KUWAIT TIMES, 7 Feb 81).....	2
Palestinian Group Criticizes Italian Secret Service (ANSA, 3 Mar 81).....	3
Briefs	
Iraqi Loan to Mauritania	4
Kuwaiti Loan to Mauritania	4

ALGERIA

Energy Talks With Italy Promote Economic Cooperation (EL MOUDJAHID, 6-7 Feb 81).....	5
Belkacem Nabi in Rome	
Algerian-Italian Talks Begin	

BAHRAIN

Gulf Investment Company Profits (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 9 Feb 81).....	8
Briefs	
Gulf International Bank Profits	9

EGYPT

Ministry of Interior Budget Discussed (Muhammad Fawi 'Usr; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Jul 80).....	10
Interior Ministry's Training Facilities, Programs Examined (Jamil Farajallah Khalil; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Jul 80).....	21

Development of Public Relations Department Traced (Fakh-al-Din Khalid 'Abduh; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Apr 80).....	26
Centralized, Decentralized Police Training Systems Discussed (Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasabu; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Jul 80).....	40
Central Prisons System Labeled Failure (Edward Jaras Bishay; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Oct 80).....	45
New, Old Laws Governing Village Mayors, Chiefs Compared ('Abd-al-Latif Siddiq; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Apr 80).....	52
Procedures Governing Election of Village Mayors, Chiefs Explained ('Abd-al-Latif Siddiq; AL-AMN AL-'AMM, Oct 80).....	60
IRAN	
Universities Must Fulfill Social Needs (Ali Shariatmadari Interview; KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 23 Feb 81).....	68
Adobe Construction Indicates Return to Simpler Lifestyle (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 23 Feb 81).....	70
IRAQ	
Briefs	
Technical Cooperation Minutes	73
Saudis Reportedly Help Iraq	73
ISRAEL	
Rafi Leader Assesses Dayan's Position (THE JERUSALEM POST, 27 Feb 81).....	74
Third Major Party Seen as Misguided Alternative (Yoel Marcus; HA'ARETZ, 6 Feb 81).....	77
Former DMC Activists Assess Position (Robert Rosenberg; THE JERUSALEM POST, 20 Feb 81).....	80
New Party Takes Centrist Religious Position (THE JERUSALEM POST, 2 Mar 81).....	82
Life in Gush Emunim Settlements Analyzed (Yosef Goell; THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE, 30 Jan, 13 Feb 81)...	83
Umm al-Fahm Residents View Religious Extremism (THE JERUSALEM POST, 27 Feb 81).....	91

Levinson's Economic Plans Viewed (A. Schweitzer; HA'ARETZ, 6 Feb 81).....	92
Lavi' Engine Contract To Go To Beit Shemesh Engines (THE JERUSALEM POST, 19 Feb 81).....	95
Deployment of Neutral Sinai Force Viewed (Uzi Ben-Zion; HA'ARETZ, 6 Feb 81).....	96
Soviet Immigrants Face Stress, Insecurity (Yakov M. Rabkin; THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE, 20 Feb 81).....	99
Hebron Jews Discuss Relations With Arabs (Uosef Goell; THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE, 27 Feb 81).....	103
Haifa Avoids Coal Unloading (THE JERUSALEM POST, 5 Mar 81).....	106
Thousand of Dunams Seized on West Bank (Joshua Brilliant; THE JERUSALEM POST, 26 Feb 81).....	107
Research, Development Personnel Seen in Short Supply (THE JERUSALEM POST, 11 Feb 81).....	109
Alternative Site Planned for Elat Airport (THE JERUSALEM POST, 19 Feb 81).....	110
Briefs	
Muslim Fundamentalists Versus Rakah	111
Advanced Merkava To Be Produced	111

KUWAIT

'Diwaniyah' Praised as Native Democratic Institution (AL-MAJALLAH, 21-27 Feb 81).....	112
Self-Sufficiency in Food Planned (KUWAIT TIMES, 18 Feb 81).....	113
Briefs	
French Loan	114
Gabon President	114
British Insurance Shares	114
KFAED Loans	114
Solar Energy Experiments	115
KIIC Gold Bond Deal	115
Fund for Tanzania Project	115

LIBYA

Al-Humaydi Addresses School Group (THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL, 7 Feb 81).....	116
---	-----

Mutually Beneficial Trade Grows With Turkey (Annie King-Underwood; 8 DAYS, 14 Feb 81).....	117
Briefs	
Warehouse Contracts	119
PERSIAN GULF AREA	
Briefs	
Kuwaiti Loan to Oman	120
SUDAN	
Central Region Announces Ministry Setup (AL-SAHAFAH, 10 Jan 81).....	121
Oil Pipeline Development Reported (AL-SAHAFAH, 10 Jan 81).....	122
Progress of Agricultural Development in al-Jazirah Reviewed ('Umar al-Amin Interview; AL-SAHAFAH, 10 Jan 81).....	123

KREISKY MEETING WITH QADDUMI REPORTED

TA081406 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Mar 81 p 2

[Text] "Faruq Qaddumi has reiterated to me that the PLO's firm position is that it will be willing to negotiate with Israel provided that the latter recognizes the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people." This is what Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky has told MA'ARIV correspondent Ben Segenreich, following Kreisky's second meeting with the PLO "foreign minister."

The Kreisky-Qaddumi meeting took place on the evening of 5 March in Kreisky's office. Afterwards Qaddumi met Austrian Foreign Minister Dr Willibald Pahr and then flew back to Beirut on Friday.

According to Chancellor Kreisky, the reason for the PLO's refusal to set up a Palestinian government in exile, in the spirit of President al-Sadat's proposal, is the PLO's unwillingness to place Palestinians residing in Arab countries in a dilemma. According to Qaddumi, the Palestinians who live in Jordan, for example, will encounter difficulties in adopting Palestinian citizenship. Kreisky added, however, that al-Sadat's idea could be realized at a later stage.

Kreisky admitted, contrary to his previous expectations, that he has not reached an understanding with Qaddumi over the cancellation of clauses calling for the destruction of Israel in the "Palestinian charter." According to the Austrian chancellor, the reason for the PLO objection to the cancellation is its reluctance to let go of its major negotiating asset before it has gained some kind of a concession from Israel.

CSO: 4820

CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AGREE ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 7 Feb 81 p 2

[Text]

REPRESENTATIVES of 13 Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture who met here this week have resolved to intensify their role in efforts for economic integration among Arab states.

In a bid to foster their co-operation, executives of the Arab Chambers recommended the formulation of a trade index and agreed to set up an arbitration council for settling internal trade disputes.

The meeting also recommended on new measures for up-dating trade statistics and standardised price reductions.

BONDS

The Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry presented two working papers "An Interlude to Arab Chambers" and "Future Aspects of Services Provided by Chambers". Both papers were viewed by the Arab delegates as effective contribution towards a better understanding of the role of Chambers, a spokesman for the conference said.

The meeting decided to submit the two papers to the forthcoming annual general meeting of the Arab chambers in Beirut.

The two Kuwaiti papers dealt with means of creating stronger bonds and better linkage between Arab Chambers and a medium-term plan to promote the human resources of those Chambers.

EXCHANGE

The meeting recommended on the creation of qualified cadres in fields of economics, industry, statistics, marketing and law to cope with technological needs of the Chambers.

It endorsed a proposal for the provision of training facilities for Chambers staff in a bid to promote general standards.

The meeting recommended the exchange of expertise and further communication with international counterparts through joint conferences and meetings.

The meeting extended co-operation with other Arab technical agencies and assigned Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry to establish an information centre.

The executives resolved to utilise training opportunities provided by Chambers of the industrialised world.

The meeting was attended by delegates from Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. -- Kuna.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN GROUP CRITICIZES ITALIAN SECRET SERVICE

AU030856 Rome ANSA in English 0820 GMT 3 Mar 81

[Text] Beirut, 3 Mar (ANSA)—The Palestinian People's Liberation Front (PPLF) has levelled new charges against the Italian Secret Service "for cooperating with the United States intelligence service to discredit the Palestinians."

In a communique released to ANSA, the spokesman of the PPLF, whose leader is George Habash, said that "several Italian figures cooperate with the CIA and Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service, Ed.) to sabotage good relations between the Italian and Palestinian peoples."

Spokesman Mahmud (Suhuri) disclosed that his movement knows that "a colonel of the Italian Secret Service, accompanied by other officers, was in Lebanon a few weeks ago and made contact with Lebanese fascists linked to Mossad.

"We know all the details of this affair and will reveal them in due time."

A first round of charges against the Italian Secret Service was made Saturday by another PPLF spokesman.

Some reports which appeared recently in the Italian press linked the Palestinian People's Liberation Front with the Italian Red Brigades urban guerrilla organization.

The PPLF also made serious accusations against the Italian ambassador in Lebanon, who just recently completed his tour of duty here, charging that he is a "fascist."

The diplomat, Stefano d'Andrea, has declined to comment on the charges.

Monday's communique reiterated that the Habash-led Palestinian movement has "absolutely nothing to do with the Red Brigades."

"However, we will always be happy to say that we have excellent relations with all the democratic and progressive forces in Italy," (Suhuri) added.

CSO: 4820

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IRAQI LOAN TO MAURITANIA--Dr Louleid O. Weddad, minister of water resources and housing, arrived in Nouakchott Saturday evening after a working visit of several days to Iraq. While in Iraq the minister signed a \$35 million (more than 1.5 billion Mauritanian ouguiyas) dollar loan agreement. The loan is being made to our country by Iraq. The loan will finance hospital, school and other educational-social institution types of construction. The minister also indicated that during the visit an agreement was struck with the Iraqi development fund to finalize the terms of carrying out programs in our country financed by Iraq within the framework of bilateral cooperation. The minister praised the cordial and fraternal atmosphere surrounding the activities of the Mauritanian-Iraqi mixed commission. He expressed his thankfulness for the warm welcome shown him during his visit by the Iraqi authorities. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 16 Feb 81 pp 1, 4]

KUWAITI LOAN TO MAURITANIA--The Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA) indicates in a dispatch datelined Kuwait that the Kuwaiti economic development fund has resolved to concede a 4.2 million Kuwaiti dinar loan to our country. The agency notes that the loan will be used to finance the highway from Espoir Nouakchott to Nema. It is repayable in 25 years. The loan falls under the excellent cooperation ties that link our country and the fraternal government of Kuwait. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 17-18 Feb 81 p 1]

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

ENERGY TALKS WITH ITALY PROMOTE ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Belkacem Nabi in Rome

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 6-7 Feb 81 p 1

[Text] Algeria and Italy are preparing to strengthen their cooperation in the energy field. Italy will receive 12 billion cubic meters of Algerian gas per year.

During a press conference held Friday in Rome Mr Belkacem Nabi, minister of energy and petrochemical industries, said Algeria would supply Italy with 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year and that this amount could be increased during current negotiations.

But Mr Nabi did make it clear that this quantity would only be reached according to transport capabilities and multilateral relations with other European countries.

Mr Nabi also said during the press conference that substitute sources of energy were discussed during the Algerian-Italian talks.

Finally the minister referred to the objectives of the quite exemplary cooperation between the two countries, the very heart of which is the energy field.

We note that Mr Belkacem Nabi will be received this morning by Mr Sandro Pertini, president of the Italian Republic, with Mr Omar Oussedik, Algerian Ambassador to Rome.

Mr Belkacem Nabi is also to meet the Italian prime minister Mr Forlani and the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs.

It may also be mentioned that the Algerian delegation will be invited today to a lunch given by the president of the Italian Republic.

Algerian-Italian Talks Begin

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 6-7 Feb 81 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS) Mr Belkacem Nabi, member of the central committee, minister of energy and petrochemical industries, left Algiers Thursday morning for Rome

on an official visit to Italy from 5-7 February at the invitation of Mr Pandolfi, Italian minister of industry.

Mr Belkacem Nadi, who is leading a large delegation, will have talks in the Italian capital with a view to extending and strengthening cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the field of petrochemical industries, and will meet important personalities in the Italian government. This visit follows those made to Algeria in 1980 by the minister of industry and the president-general manager of ENI [National Fuel Agency].

Beginning of Algerian-Italian Talks

Rome (APS) The Algerian-Italian talks between Mr Belkacem Nabi, member of the central committee and minister of petrochemical industries, and Mr Piloppo Maria Pandolfi, Italian minister of industry, began last night in Rome.

Before taking up the key issue in the talks, the price of gas, the two ministers reviewed the cooperation between the two countries and expressed the hope of developing it further, in the interests of both countries, the more so since a solid political and economic basis already exists. In this connection Mr Belkacem Nabi said this meeting simply continues the dialogue which has already begun, and that the two countries have reason to be proud of the achievements each has attained. These include something quite unique in the world: the Algerian-Italian gas duct via Tunisia, which allows the two countries to best solidify the relations that can exist between Africa and Europe.

Mr Nabi said the gas duct, which extends nearly 2500 kilometers including an underwater section of 1588 km, is far from considered a traditional commercial operation. It allows the two countries to strengthen existing relations and direct their cooperation toward projects where the two countries can meet in both bilateral and multilateral contexts.

While during the talks the energy sector was considered as the fundamental element of Algerian-Italian relations, it is nonetheless true that the two parties have decided to direct their cooperation toward the future and to base it on and build it around these strong points of trade. Thus the two ministers decided on the principle of forming working groups to find ways to diversify trade, since Mr Pandolfi indicated during the talks that the plan for founding an Algerian-Italian bank is well under way and that Italy can offer financial and technical facilities in connection with developmental assistance.

Mr Pandolfi also recalled Italy's position concerning the north-south dialogue and said Algeria and Italy were an example which other countries could follow.

Taking up the question of the price of gas during the frank discussion, the two parties decided to seek formulas best adapted to their interests which reflect the facts of the international market. Thus the formula of requested prices [prix recherche] should be a lever for the two national economies.

This formula ought to provide, on the one hand, a guarantee to preserve national wealth and an investment opportunity, and on the other hand it ought to ensure Italy secure consumption.

The two ministers in common agreement referred to the SONATRACH experts and to experts of the Italian company "ENI" [National Fuel Agency] the task of finding a balanced formula concerning the price of gas. The experts were to meet Friday (yesterday) in Rome.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Mr Omar Oussedik, Algerian ambassador accredited to Rome, attended the talks.

It is also to be noted that Mr Belkacem Nabi, accompanied by a ministry delegation, is also to have talks with several Italian authorities, in particular Mr Demitchelis, minister of Italian state participation, and Mr Manoa, minister of foreign trade, and finally Mr Grandi, general manager of the Italian company "ENI."

This visit falls within the framework of the negotiations for setting up in early 1981 a large agreement for cooperation between the two countries.

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CSO: 4400

GULF INVESTMENT COMPANY PROFITS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Feb 81 p 12

[Text]

The Gulf Investment Company (GIC) has announced a profit of \$44 million for the period from October 23, 1979, to the end of 1980. It was in October 1979 that GIC became Bahrain's most heavily over-subscribed company, when it put \$4 million worth of shares on the market and attracted \$8 billion worth of bids (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, January 12).

The company said in Bahrain last week that in lieu of paying cash dividends to its investors from the profits, it would give a bonus share for every ten held, and thus increase its paid-up capital from \$125 million to \$137.5 million. GIC directors said this had been decided in order to conserve the company's liquid assets for future investment.

Some of GIC's major investments since it started operations 14 months ago include real estate purchases in Paris, where GIC has a 30 per cent stake in a Kuwaiti holding in the Rhône-Poulenc complex on the Champs-Élysées (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 1, 1980). GIC has also bought a 10 per cent stake in United Gulf Bank, has set up an exempt company in Bahrain and has acquired 48 per cent of the Bahrain Light Industries Company.

GIC's total assets stand at \$195 million, up \$70 million from the original figure. These assets are reported to include \$75 million in profits from trading in silver. About 2,000 investors from Kuwait own 70 per cent of the \$100 million in privately-held capital, while 50 shareholders from Bahrain own another 20 per cent.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

GULF INTERNATIONAL BANK PROFITS—The Bahrain-based Gulf International Bank may announce profits of \$20 million or more for 1980, its fourth year of operation. Last November GIB announced nine-months profits of \$11.3 million, and the bank's general manager has been quoted as saying recently that the figure will be "almost double" for the whole year. Last month GIB called up additional investments to bring its paid-up capital to \$180 million, as it seeks to consolidate its position as a leader in the syndicated loan market. Owned by the seven Gulf Arab states, the bank is managing loans worth a total of \$11 billion, allowing GIB to claim that it ranks 37th in the world. At the end of 1980 the bank's position looked as follows: \$1.58 billion in deposits at interest and certificates of deposit, compared to \$807 million a year earlier; \$90 million in the bond portfolio against \$45 million in 1979; \$1.32 billion in loans, up from \$542 million the previous year; \$2.64 billion in time deposits against \$1.25 billion; subscribed capital of \$265 million, compared to \$106 million in 1979; paid-up capital was at \$106 million, increasing to \$180 million in January; total assets stood at \$2.9 billion against \$1.14 billion, the previous year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Feb 81 pp 11-12]

CSO: 4820

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BUDGET DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM [Public Security] in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 75-80

[Article by Maj Gen Muhammad Fawi 'Umr: "State's General Budget and Ministry of Interior's Budget"]

[Text] Definition: The state's general budget is the financial framework for a specific fiscal year--a framework including all the revenues expected to be collected and all the estimated expenditures. The fiscal year consists of 12 months,⁽¹⁾ begins with the first day of July and ends with the last day of the following June.

General Principles on Which General Budget Is Based:

In view of the importance of the general budget in the state system and activity and in implementing the state plans in such a manner as to give them an effective and positive role, it has been agreed that the budget should be based on four principles, namely:

1. Duration: A full year is the right duration for the budget. The start and end of the year differ from country to country, depending on the agricultural production conditions and the conditions involving other kinds of production. Therefore, it is wrong for the [general] budget to cover a half year or one quarter a year.

Comprehensiveness: Because the budget includes all the revenues expected to be collected and expenditures estimated to be spent, the state revenues list should include all the state revenues, regardless of how varied, and the expenditures list should include all kinds of expenditures. On the basis of this principle, it is not permissible to collect a certain revenue in order to meet a certain expense.

For example, the wages of workers in a certain department may not be disbursed from the revenues accruing from the sale of certain papers or applications which this department sells.

3. Clarity: It means that the budget must be clear and divided into accurate and regular units and charts so as to make it easy to find any figure in the budget and to learn the purpose for including the figure and the goal it seeks to realize.

4. Flexibility: This principle is intended for dealing with all circumstances and eventualities. This is why the budget includes appropriations through which sudden and unexpected expenses not taken into consideration at time of preparation of the budget can be dealt with.

(1) Law No 104 of 1980.

Phases of Preparation of State's General Budget

The constitution defines the powers exercised by the government, including the power of preparing the draft general budget.

This draft is presented to the legislative authority in the name of the government and is considered an embodiment of the government's policy and a declaration of the program that the government intends to carry out.

The financial regulations concerning the budget and its calculations have summed up the phases through which preparation of the state's general budget passes until it reaches its final legal form in the following:

First, the annual revenues and expenditures are estimated with the knowledge of the heads of the departments and of the ministries and are then presented to the Ministry of Finance to examine them and combine them in a single book.

Second, the general budget—the revenues and the expenditures—are divided into chapters approved by the legislative authority (the People's Assembly) and the chapters are then divided into provisions. This division is decided upon with the knowledge of the Ministry of Finance and no modification may be introduced to it without the permission of the Ministry of Finance.

The provisions are then divided into categories and shifts and modifications within these categories are within the power of the departments, ministries and the financial comptroller.

Third, estimates of the revenues are presented to the Ministry of Finance in statements outlining the kinds of revenue, the allocations tied to them in the current budget, the allocations required to be tied to them in the following year and the reasons for the difference, if such a difference exists.

It is to be noted that the estimates should be based on the value of the original revenues without subtracting the collection costs.

These estimates must also be coupled with a statement of the statistics on whose basis the estimate is made, with reference to the factors that may affect the estimates during the year.

Fourth, estimates of the expenditures are also presented to the Ministry of Finance in statements outlining the kinds of expenditures, the sums allocated for them in the current budget and the sums required to be allocated for the next year, the reasons for the job positions to be introduced or abolished and the reasons for increases or reductions in the allocations made for the expenditures.

Fifth, revenue estimates must reach the Ministry of Finance at the beginning of February and expenditure estimates at the beginning of March, keeping in mind that the Ministry of Finance may assess the expenditures received after the set date on the basis of the current year's budget and of the modifications introduced to it.

Sixth, the Ministry of Finance presents to the People's Assembly the final accounts of the state's general budget, including the revenues and the expenses, at least 2 months before the end of the fiscal year so that the Assembly may discuss and approve

them ⁽¹⁾. If the new budget is not approved before the end of the current fiscal year, the rules governing the old budget will continue to be observed until the new budget is approved. ⁽²⁾

Seventh, after ratification by the People's Assembly and after the president issues a law binding the state's general budget, the Ministry of Finance sends each budget to the department concerned, outlining the expenditures in chapters, sections, provisions and so forth.

Budget of Ministry of Interior

After the preceding introduction, we will try in this part to present a simple review of the Ministry of Interior's budget insofar as only the expenditures are concerned.

This review will cover the powers of the Ministry of Finance, the common mistakes, the budget chapters, as well as a simplified review of the various provisions and categories.

By perusing the state's general budget book, we find that the budget is divided into several sectors, each of which consists of several sections covering similar activities.

The budget of the Ministry of the Interior is within the defense, security and justice sector and forms a part of their budget.

The ministry's budget is divided into three branches:

First branch: The General Bureau

Second Branch: Security and Police.

Third Branch: Prisons.

Each of the first two branches is divided into several chapters, as follows:

Branch 1, General Bureau:

This branch covers 10 chapters arranged as follows:

Chapter 1, the General Bureau (which includes the minister's office, the assistant ministers' offices, the inspection and planning offices, the officers' affairs, the personnel affairs, the general administrative affairs department and other agencies and departments not included in the following sections.

Chapter 2: The Police Academy.

(1) Article 76 of the constitution.

(2) General circular by Ministry of Finance No 57/45/13M, Renewed and repeated on 28 December 1957.

Chapter 3: Civil Status Affairs.

Chapter 4: The Travel, Immigration, Passport and Citizenship Documents Agency.

Chapter 5: The Criminal Investigation Agency.

Chapter 6: The Civil Defense Agency.

Chapter 7: The State Security Agency.

Chapter 8: The Public Security Agency.

Chapter 9: The General Department for Police Supply.

Chapter 10: The Training Agency.

Branch 2: The Security and Police:

This branch includes the following three chapters:

Chapter 1: The Police [Department] which includes the security directorates.

Chapter 2: The Port Security Agency.

Chapter 3: The Central Security [Department].

Chapter 1 of Branch 1--the General Bureau--is divided into the following four sections:

Section One

This section includes two groups:

A. Group one which includes the cash wages and allowances.

B. Group two which includes the in-kind and cash benefits.

Section Two

This section includes three groups:

A. Group one which is concerned with commodity requirements.

B. Group two which is concerned with service requirements.

C. Group three which is concerned with current remittances (covering taxes, fees on goods and rent).

Section Three

This section is concerned with the investment allocations for the ministry's investment projects, including:

- A. Armament.
- B. Means of land transportation.
- C. Means of water [presumably river and marine] transportation.
- D. Equipment and furnishings.
- E. Buildings.
- F. Horses.

Section Four

This section concerns the capital remittances and is divided into two divisions, one concerned with repaying local loans and their interest and the second concerned with repaying foreign loans and their interest.

The remaining chapters of Branch 1 and all chapters of Branch 2 and Branch 3 include only two sections each, namely section one and section two, as already pointed out.

In view of the fact that each of the aforementioned groups contains several provisions and each provision several categories, we will cite them very briefly, coupling each group with its special budget number so that it may be found easily when necessary and may be used soundly:

First, Branch 1, Chapter 1:

Section One

A. Group One (cash wages and allowances) which includes the following provisions:

Provision 1: Permanent jobs.

Provision 2: Comprehensive remunerations.

Provision 3: Personnel on loan whose salaries are shouldered by the budget.

Provision 4: Costs of academic leaves of absence and of training grants.

Provision 5: Remunerations.

Provision 6: Salaries and allowances.

B. Group two (in-kind and cash benefits) which includes two provisions:

Provision 1: In-kind benefits.

Provision 2: Cash benefits.

Section Two

A. Group one-Commodity Requirements:

Provision 1: Raw materials, including:

Category 1: Main raw materials.

Category 2: Auxiliary raw materials.

Provision 2: Fuels, Oils and Motive Forces, including:

1. Engines. 2. Oil derivatives. 3. Lubrication and oiling materials.

Provision 3: Equipment spareparts, including:

Category 1: Spareparts and maintenance materials. Category 2: Various equipment and materials.

Provision 4: Packaging and wrapping materials (one category).

Provision 5: Stationary and books, including four categories: 1. Stationary, 2. Books, magazines and library documents. 3. Notebooks. 4. Other printed materials, such as file books and account books of small value.

Provision 6: Water, lighting, electricity and gas, including: Category 1: Water. Category 2: Lighting.

Provision 7. Small equipment and furnishings.

Because of the importance of this last provision and of its varied categories, we will mention in the following the categories of the provision concerning the ministry:

Category 1: Furniture.

Category 2: Office supplies.

Category 3: Iron safes and filing cabinets.

Category 4: Teaching equipment and audio-visual aids.

Category 5: Typewriters.

Category 7 [no 6]: Computers and statistical machines.

Category 8: Printing machinery.

Category 9: Scales.

Category 10: Heating and cooling equipment.

Category 11: Gardening tools.

Category 12: Photography equipment.

Category 13: Musical instruments.

Category 14: Athletic equipment.

Category 15: Fire control equipment.

Category 16: Tents and field equipment.

Category 18 [no 17]: (Food service utensils).

Category 20: Medical equipment.

Category 21: Animals and birds [livestock and poultry].

Category 22: Other furnishings.

B. Group 2 (service requirements) including:

Provision 1: Maintenance costs consisting of the following categories:

Category 2: Building and installation maintenance and repair work and minor works in government buildings.

Category 3: Maintenance of facilities and networks.

Category 5: Equipment and machinery maintenance.

Category 6: Maintenance of means of transportation.

Category 7: Maintenance of office equipment.

Provision 2: Research and experimental services.

Provision 3: Publication, advertising, propaganda and reception, including:

Category 1: Publication and advertising costs.

Category 2: Public affairs and public relations costs.

Provision 4: Printing costs, including:

Category 1: Printing costs.

Category 2: Subscriptions to magazines and newspapers.

Category 3: Purchases of copyrights.

Category 4: Encouraging writers and writing.

Category 5: Costs of publishing cultural magazines and publications.

Provision 5: Public transportation, transfers and communications, including:

Category 1: Transportation of equipment by railroad.

Category 2: Public transportation of personnel and others by railroad.

Category 3: Public transportation and transfers by other means.

Category 4: Transfer allowances.

Category 5: Telephones.

Category 6: Teleprinter.

Category 7: Ticker [sic].

Category 8: Mail.

Provision 6: Leasing equipment and transportation means including:

Category 1: Leasing statistical and computer equipment.

Category 2: Leasing tents and chairs.

Category 3: Leasing transportation means.

Provision 7: Costs of services of agencies and organizations.

Provision 8: Foreign subscriptions, taxes and fees.

Provision 9: Costs of cultural relations and foreign cooperation.

Provision 10: Service costs for non-personnel, including:

Category 2: Social and athletic activity for non-personnel.

Category 5: Awards and medals.

Provision 11: Costs of training programs.

Provision 12: Unexpected and confidential costs, including:

Category 1: Confidential costs.

Category 2: Unexpected costs.

Provision 13: Varied service costs, including:

Category 1: Insurance.

Category 2: Costs of holidays and celebrations.

Category 4: Costs of holding fairs, museums [sic] and conferences at home.

Category 6: Burial costs.

Category 7: Varied other service costs and illiteracy eradication costs.

G. Group 3: Current remittances, including:

Provision 3: Rent (category 1 for land and category 3 for warehouses, garages and buildings).

Category 4: Local interest payments.

Provision 5: Foreign interest payments.

Section Three

Its projects have already been explained and they include no provisions or categories.

Section Four

This section concerns capital remittances and is divided into two divisions, one for repayment of local loans and one for repayment of foreign loans.

We also wish to remind that the other chapters of Branch 1 and all the chapters of Branch 2 and Branch 3 include only two sections, namely sections 1 and 2, as already explained. Each section includes groups, each group provisions and each provision categories, according to the above details.

Financial Authorities to Dispose of Budget Appropriations

First, Agency Heads:

A. The heads of agencies may dispose of the sums allocated for each provision without permit and in accordance with the agency needs, provided that the estimated total appropriation allocated for the provision involved is not exceeded.

B. Agency heads may be permitted to exceed the appropriation for a provision by one tenth the sum of the appropriation or 1,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, provided that the excess doesn't surpass 10,000 pounds and provided that the other provisions of the section contain a sufficient surplus.

Second, General Director of Financial Control:

(Shall have the power to spend whatever sums exceed the power of an agency head) up to one quarter a provision's allocations or 5,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, provided that the quarter does not exceed 25,000 pounds and with the same conditions [sic].

Third, the Ministry of Finance shall have the power to license spending whatever sums exceed this limit.

As for transfers from one section to another, the People's Assembly approval must be acquired for such transfers. The same applies to every expense not listed in the budget or exceeding its estimates.

General Restrictions

1. No additional appropriations may be made unless the need arises and only after the Financial Center examines the original allocations, finds it impossible to avoid the request and secures an equal surplus to cover the additional appropriations from the total appropriations and provided this is subject to the control of the Central Accounting Agency.

No commitment shall be made to an expenditure until the additional appropriation is approved by the legislative authority. Such a request [for additional appropriations] must be submitted 3 months before the end of the fiscal year.

2. Insofar as new activities are concerned, a permit may be given for exceeding the total estimate listed in the budget for a new activity in return for an equal reduction in the total estimate for other activities.

It is within the power of the general director of financial control to issue such a permit if the excess is no more than one tenth the estimate or 1,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, so that the tenth may not exceed 10,000 pounds [sic]. The Ministry of Finance shall issue the permits for any excess greater than this sum. As for new works listed in the budget and not handed over or completed in the year in which they are expected to be completed or handed over, the undersecretary concerned may deduct the estimated expenses of such activities in that particular year from the budget of the following year, even if no allocations are made for these activities in the new budget. However, it is conditional that the expenses permitted in this manner be within the limits of the costs previously approved for these activities in the preceding budget and provided that such a permit does not result in exceeding the total appropriation for the section concerned.

3. The government may not conclude a contract or make commitments to a project resulting in the spending of state treasury funds in a future year or years without the approval of the People's Assembly.

4. Regarding the employment, leasing, maintenance and supply contracts, they may be concluded for a period of no more than one year, provided that they do not result in increasing the appropriations of the provisions concerned in the subsequent fiscal years and provided that a contract's duration does not exceed 3 years, unless the prior permission of the Ministry of Finance is acquired.

5. Contracts extending beyond the fiscal year may be concluded for works whose implementation lasts more than one year when such works are indivisible, provided that the value of the contracts concerning them does not exceed the total expenditures listed in the budget and approved by the legislative authority and provided that the contracts are concluded with the approval of the Ministry of Finance.

6. Contracts for divisible works shall be confined to the part permitted by the appropriation in the budget of the year in which this part is carried out. Should the need arise for concluding a contract for a part of the work that lasts beyond the fiscal year and if the sum contracted exceeds the appropriation, then the contract shall not be concluded without the approval of the Ministry of Finance.

7. No request for additional appropriations shall be accepted in the last 3 months of the fiscal year. Therefore, the authorities concerned must examine what they need in advance and must take the necessary precautions to submit requests of the kind to the Ministry of Finance before this date.

8. Bonded appropriations in the budget and additional appropriations not spent by the end of the fiscal year shall become null and void.

Further Powers and Instructions

1. The state's general budget instructions concerning the Ministry of Interior permit the transfer of allocations from the provisions of section two to the three branches.

2. The same applies to the instructions pertaining to the recreation expenditures listed within category 17--varied other service expenditures--as follows:

The recreation spending for the second class forces shall be within the limits of the total revenues collected from (canteen) rents "after exclusion of (similar rents), the music band, the (food) sold and seven percent of the revenues collected from the use of the noncommissioned officers and second class soldiers in private parties for each unit separately [sic].

3. The seniority of officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers and civilian personnel shall be the same in the ministry's various branches.

8494

CSO: 4802

INTERIOR MINISTRY'S TRAINING FACILITIES, PROGRAMS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 100-103

[Article by Col Jamil Farajallah Khalil: "Futuristic View of Ministry of Interior's Training Organizations"]

[Text] Preface

On 28 November 1966, ministerial decree No 156 was issued, setting up and organizing the Central Training Department which was then raised to the level of agency by republican decree No 1287 of 1967 so as to combine the training organizations in a single central outfit. In the middle of 1975, law No 91 of 1975 on the Police Academy was issued, entrusting this academy with the powers of training the police officers while maintaining the quality of centralized training at the ministry. Will the future bring further development and in what direction?

Group Specialization:

What law No 91 of 1975 added insofar as the Police Academy is concerned is the entrenchment of group specialization, considering that it combined the police officers' educational and training activities in a complete organizational structure that guarantees greater coordination in the policies of educating and teaching police officers, provided that the training agency exercise the same powers insofar as the noncommissioned officers, policemen and civilian personnel of the police authority are concerned.

We are not about to evaluate here the role of each of the central agencies concerned with training affairs, meaning the Police Academy, the Training and Development College and the Training Agency. What we are concerned with in this regard is to underline the signs of an expected transformation in the organizational map of the ministry's training structure—a transformation resulting from the change in the general atmosphere which engulfed the creation of the Central Training Department in 1966. This transformation can be predicted and summed up in a single phrase, namely the "inclination toward localization" while preserving a limited degree of centralism in a manner different from what is prevalent at present.

Requirements of Transformation From Centralism:

In 1966, the material training resources, such as sites and equipment, were considered a nucleus capable of growth and expansion. The planners of training activity believed that this activity was destined to flourish at the central level whereas training at the local level was to continue to be embodied in some refresher

courses that would not go beyond the limit of short-term refresher programs. But the actual circumstances led the training systems to a path different from that estimated for them in the bureaucratic planning. This was due to the following reasons:

First, the conditions of the extensive construction development and of the housing crisis led to rising land prices in the capital and to obstructing the expansion of training sites, except in remote areas and only to a limited degree. The sites thus remained relatively unchanged and became inadequate for the growing training needs of the ministry's agencies.

Second, the change in the workforce structure after the October 1973 war and the accompanying manifestations embodied in the decreasing numbers of (cadets), the citizens' refrainment from taking up the jobs of noncommissioned officers and policemen, the acceptance of increased numbers of illiterates to the jobs of noncommissioned officers and policemen and the expanded use of recruits in activities other than those of guard duty and of breaking up demonstrations.

All the above needs training requirements. They also require greater technical, moral and material resources to meet them than is currently available at the central level.

Third, the scientific and technological development in the security utility's equipment has been accompanied by similar expansion in the purely technical and specialized training programs which are impossible to implement except on the work site. The use of the same modern equipment and apparatuses far from the work site would be futile even if the latest training means and aides are used to simulate such equipment.

Fourth, the ministry's tendency in the early 1970's to implement the policy of resettlement for the officers and policemen of the police agency in the security directorates. This approach contributed to the emergence of increased numbers of students [in the police force] who declined to come to the capital to receive training. This manifestation was further compounded by the existing problems of residence, transportation and communication, not to forget the travel expenses shouldered by the student--expenses that have multiplied in recent years.

Fifth, the state's tendency to apply the system of decentralization and the accompanying executive decrees issued by the Ministry of Interior, of which the most outstanding is perhaps the decree dividing the security directorates into geographic districts, each headed by an assistant minister of interior.

Sixth, the country's march toward the phase of peace after suffering from a series of wars requires, as a consequence, developing the training policies in a manner that is concerned with studying the geographic districts, especially the liberated parts of the homeland, with finding the indicators of the needs of each district separately and with establishing and carrying out training courses compatible with the social and criminal manifestations in each district.

Seventh, taking into consideration the group denied training, especially civilian female workers whose family circumstances prevent them from moving from the remote security directorates to the capital to receive training.

Because of all of these reasons and of other considerations which cannot be reviewed here, the futuristic view of the training activity should require this training to be compatible organizationally with the expected changes.

Available Alternatives and Solutions:

The Ministry of Interior's training plan is faced with the presence of the following alternatives:

1. Determining the training priorities in light of the available resources and in a manner that responds to the urgent training requirements while postponing the other requirements until the resources become bigger. This is a hope whose realization may take long.
2. Shorten the duration of the training programs being implemented in order to make the opportunity available for conducting the largest number possible of training courses.

The obstacle facing this alternative is one connected with the fear of undermining the training efficiency and of increasing the number of officers and personnel members withdrawn for training purposes, thus placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of the agencies concerned with operational affairs.

3. Resorting to firmness in dealing with the manifestation of students declining to attend training courses.

This course is flawed by its incompatibility with the scientific rules of education which dictate that the student have the desire and the motive to learn and to be trained. However, what we are facing at present is a humanitarian problem primarily and it is better to deal with it objectively.

4. Turning toward localization and conducting specialization training courses in the local training agencies.

But it is impossible scientifically to implement this alternative in an absolute manner. Transferring the entire burden to the local training agencies means nothing other than saddling these agencies with a heavier burden than they can shoulder and without realizing any progress in training at that.

Proposed Alternative:

In view of all of the above considerations which are becoming increasingly acute with time and to avoid the undesirable consequences resulting from these considerations--consequences that may not be possible to obviate in the future--we will present in the following our futuristic view of the organizational conditions of the training agencies of the Ministry of Interior:

Local Agencies:

The local training agencies include a training center, a section for the security forces and a training department, section or unit. Therefore, it is better to unite the efforts of adjacent directorates and to combine their resources so that they may undertake implementing the specialization training programs in which students can enroll from among the personnel of these directorates. The resources for conducting these programs can be made available at the level of the district and not the directorate and the human expertise for conducting them can be secured, especially since regional universities have spread throughout the republic and since it has become relatively easy to enlist the help of university professors. The help of expert veteran officers, personnel and commanders in each district can also be enlisted.

The matter will require no more than preparing and developing a training center in every district, building a number of suitable lecture halls and securing the financial appropriations needed for paying instructors and spending on training activities.

The higher administration of the training complex will be entrusted to a board of directors including the directors of security in each district and headed by the district's assistant minister of interior.

The progress of work in the training complex will be supervised by a director with the right rank and aided by a number of qualified training officers, provided that they follow administratively the technical office of the assistant minister of interior in the district. This realizes the following:

Deeper study of the manifestations of each province.

Realizing the meeting of students [trainees] with the security and local government leaders, thus making the training realistic and strengthening the various forms of cooperation between the police and the local government.

Making residence and transportation easier for the students as a result of the short distance between the training complex and the security directorates from which they come.

Spreading and entrenching training awareness as a result of participation by the leaders in formulating the executive policies for the training activity in each district.

Proceeding to conduct specialization training courses in the manner compatible with the needs of each district.

Lifting the burden from the shoulders of the central training agencies whose role must be developed in the following manner:

Central Training Agencies:

A. Educational Installations:

It is more appropriate for the development to include:

A change in the quality of the training courses so that they may complement those conducted at the regional level and so that they may become more specialized.

Conduct the training courses that require material and technical resources exceeding the equipment, facilities and technical expertise available at the local level.

Gather trainees from the various districts for the training courses that cannot be held at the training complex due to the small number of trainees in each district.

B. Central Agencies:

In light of the above visualization, the logic of affairs requires combining and integration of the central agencies in charge of planning and designing programs

and formulating training policies for the various groups. This logic also requires the presence of technical supervision over the progress of central and local training, securing training assistance, preparing the references necessary for training, reviewing the reports of instructors and providing guidance and control, provided that the powers of the agencies in charge are purely technical. As for administrative supervision over the training installations, it should be as limited as possible and should exist only to the degree that guarantees sound implementation and coordination of the training programs of the various groups in the different districts.

It is worth noting that the concept of training complexes is in force in the United Kingdom where more than one county [muqata'ah] participate in building a modern complex for training police members. I had the opportunity to stay in one of these complexes and to familiarize myself with its various sections throughout an entire week when I was sent to this complex on a training scholarship at the beginning of 1972. It was an experience worth studying and researching.

To conclude, the futuristic view of the training organization in the Ministry of Interior reflects an objective view in this regard. I have dealt with some broad lines and main ideas of a proposed general framework that can later dwell on numerous details.

8494

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DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT TRACED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 89, Apr 80 pp 43-50

[Article by Brig Gen Fakh-al-Din Khalid 'Abduh, director of Public Relations Department; "Creation and Development of Organizational Structure of Public Relations Department"]

[Text] What is meant by organization of the Public Relations Department is to combine the responsibilities within the public relations jurisdiction and of the same nature in one of the Public Relations Department's sections or units.

There are three main methods to organize the Public Relations Department:

First Method:

The method of the means of communication or the functional method: What is meant here is to distribute the responsibilities and the work among the various sections and units of the Public Relations Department according to the kind of work or function with which each section or unit is concerned.

There is the press section, the radio section, the cinema and television section, the symposiums section, the fairs section, the protocol section and so forth.

Second Method:

Method of Mass Groups:

What is meant here is the distribution of responsibilities among the public relations sections and departments on the basis of communication or relations with the various groups of the masses who have relations with the organization within which the public relations outfit operates. There is the internal relations section which is concerned with the organization's personnel, the consumer relations section which is concerned with the public that consumes the commodity produced by the organization, the suppliers relations section, the press relations section and other sections, each of which is concerned with a certain public connected with the organization.

Third Method:

This is what we may call the combined method. What is meant here is that kind of method of organization which combines the two aforementioned methods and that distributes the work between sections that are concerned with a certain function, such

as information, and other sections that vary with the various relations with different kinds of public, such as the internal public section and the external public section.

These are the methods on whose basis a public relations department can be organized. It remains for us to review the creation and development of the organizational structure of the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Interior.

Creation of Public Relations [Department] in Ministry of Interior:

On 28 January 1953, the Council of Ministers issued a decree setting up public relations offices in the various ministries on the strength of a memorandum submitted to the council by the Ministry of National Culture and Guidance.

On February 1953, the then minister of interior issued a decree setting up a public relations office at the Ministry of Interior with the responsibility of contacting the papers and supplying them with the ministry's news and of facilitating the task of journalists in getting the data and information they wanted.

This office acted as a liaison between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Culture and Guidance, represented in the Public Information Authority.

It is evident that these offices were not public relations offices in the currently acknowledged technical and scientific sense of the word. Rather, they were more of press offices in each ministry. The most important responsibilities actually carried out by those offices were:

Disseminate news pleasing to the public.

Receive journalists and try to contain their activities in the ministries so that they may not get hold of any news or reports which a ministry was eager not to make known.

Carry out some protocol activities, such as receptions, parties and so forth.

It is evident from the above that there was no sound understanding of the public relations message and that the wrong practices underlined the wrong understanding of the role of public relations. This is still one of the major problems being experienced by public relations in our society.

On 11 January 1962, a ministerial decree was issued raising the office to the level of a department. The Public Affairs Department was thus set up and its components were defined as follows:

The planning and followup section.

The information and moral guidance section.

The foreign relations section.

The management and secretariat section.

On 11 October 1962, another ministerial decree was issued annexing the complaints office to the Public Affairs Department and considering that office one of the department's sections.

A ministerial decree was then issued on 20 April 1964 annexing the People's Assembly Affairs Office to the Public Affairs Department. Even though the public relations outfit is eager to have constant contact with the tendencies and opinions developing among the people's representatives and with the discussions in the parliamentary council concerning the Ministry of Interior, yet the function of the People's Assembly Affairs Office is of a particular nature that is outside the interests of the Public Relations Department.

Though annexation of the complaints office to the Public Relations Department has a definite practical benefit--namely that through analyzing these complaints, the Public Relations Department can be in touch with some of the masses' inclinations and can put its finger on some of the public opinion pulses--the nature of this office's work falls primarily within the core of the jurisdiction of the control agencies from which the public relations can get indicators of the public opinion.

Practically, the protocol functions, embodied in receptions, parties and in arranging the minister's movements and appointments, continued to predominate the activity of the Public Affairs Department in its new form of organization.

However, right signs did appear on the path and the scientific and technical concept of public relations began to get gradually clear to the minds of those in charge of the work. A somewhat sound exercise of public relations emerged, considering that public relations are a common language between an organization, those working in it and those dealing with it. Through this common language, public relations have to create a state of social adaptation between the organization and its workers and then between the organization and those dealing with it--adaptation based on mutual understanding and trust to insure the organization's success and progress.

Interest in studying and analyzing the public opinion then started and this interest urged the organization to find out the rational public opinion tendencies, considering that this is the cornerstone in building sound relations between the organization and society and between the organization and its workers.

However, we can now say that the action was [not] based on the planned and well-studied scientific method but relied on the personal capabilities and opinions of those in charge of the work and on their certain desire to develop and enhance the work.

Reorganization of Public Affairs Department in 1965:

As a result of the good efforts exerted by the Public Affairs Department personnel, the Ministry of Interior generally and the police agency in particular began to feel the importance of the public relations and of the work they carry out. Moreover, action and the desire to learn and to develop gave the department personnel extensive experience and created in them the desire to organize the department on a sound basis. This wish received the support of the ministry leaderships and ministerial decree No 969 of 1965 was issued to reorganize the Public Affairs Department in the following manner:

First, the Director.

Second, sections and units:

1. Information Section:

The radio, cinema and television unit.

The press and publication unit.

2. The Internal Relations Section:

The social relations unit.

The cultural relations unit.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

Society's Relations unit.

The Foreign Relations unit.

4. The Financial and Administrative Affairs Section:

The administrative affairs unit.

The financial affairs unit.

The secretariat unit.

5. The Complaints Section. 6. The People's Assembly Affairs Unit. 7. The Technical Research Unit.

Establishment of Moral Guidance Section at Department:

On 23 December 1966, ministerial decree No 168 was issued establishing a new section in the department, namely the Moral Guidance Section.

Change of Department's Name to Public Relations Department:

On 23 July 1971 and in the wake of the correction revolution, ministerial decree No 1219 was issued to organize the Human Relations Department of the Ministry of Interior. Some of the functions of the Public Affairs Department were transferred to this department. In accordance with the decree, the name of the Public Affairs Department was also changed to that of the Public Relations Department.

Organization of Department in 1971:

On 5 August 1971, the Public Relations Department was reorganized in accordance with ministerial decree No 1398 which set up the department's organizational structure as follows:

First, Department Chairmanship.

Second: Administrative divisions:

1. The Information Section:

The radio, cinema and television unit.

The press and publication unit.

2. The Internal Relations Section: This section's functions are restricted to implementing the department's plan in the sphere of the activities connected with the cultural relations concerning officers, policemen and (civilian) personnel of the police agency and to proposing the development and strengthening of this plan whenever the need arises.

As for the social relations activities, they were transferred to the Human Relations Department.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

Society's relations unit.

The foreign relations unit.

4. The Administrative and Financial Affairs Section:

The administrative affairs unit.

The financial affairs unit.

The secretariat unit.

5. Technical Research Unit:

It is noticed that the Complaints Section and the People's Assembly Affairs Unit are excluded from the organizational structure of the Public Relations Department and that the first has been annexed to the Public Inspection Department and the second to the control of the minister's office.

Thus, the public relations began to exercise their scientifically acknowledged functions.

However, it later became evident from action that there was an urgent need to re-organize the Public Relations Department once again for the following reasons:

1. When the department was organized, decree No 1398 of 1971 forgot to set up the second supervisory level of the department chairmanship and thus the department lacked an agency to manage the public relations.

2. Insofar as the Internal Relations Section is concerned, its activity became restricted to the department's cultural relations plan, dropping the department's moral guidance activity whereas this activity is closely connected with the department's work in the sphere of educating the police members.

It is needless to say that what is meant by the department's activity for the cultural welfare of the police agency members is that activity that seeks to enlighten

them as to the ideal means of dealing with the citizens, to make them aware of the positive and negative factors that affect this relationship with the citizens either positively or negatively and to stress the concept of public relations in their minds.

3. Insofar as the protocol activities are concerned, they were not entrusted under the aforementioned organization to a particular section or unit and this caused this function to spread in all the administrative sections. This approach caused the protocol activities at times to predominate the department's other activities because the protocol activities are most often connected with the ministry's leadership.

Insofar as the foreign relations section is concerned, it has been noted that it included a unit for society's relations and another unit for foreign relations whereas the acknowledged tradition, insofar as the expression foreign relations is concerned, is that these relations always mean those relations that extend beyond the homeland.

Moreover, society's relations are of major significance insofar as relations generally are concerned and insofar as the policeman in particular is concerned. This is why these relations should be elevated to the level of a section.

5. It has also been noted that the attention given to the Information Section led to ignoring the other means of communication with society--means that are beyond the mass communication means. Therefore, an urgent need developed to set up a section for society's relations to undertake this task.

For all these reasons, it was deemed necessary to reorganize the Public Relations Department. So, decree No 2412 of 1976 was issued, taking into consideration most of the previous observations. Following are the articles of this decree:

Article 1. The Public Relations Department is one of the agencies under the control of the minister and is concerned with exerting efforts to strengthen the good relations between the police agency and the masses and to gain the masses' confidence so that it may attain stronger cooperation between these two sides. The department shall also exert efforts to develop police awareness among the citizens so as to guarantee the curbing of crime and the apprehension of crime perpetrators.

The department is also concerned with taking care of the cultural and recreational affairs of the police officers and members by developing the bonds of friendship and cooperation among them in a manner that guarantees the good progress of work within a framework of cooperation and amity.

Article 2. The organizational structure of the Public Relations shall be formed, its work shall be carried out and its jurisdiction shall be divided as follows:

First, Department Chairmanship:

The department shall be chaired by a director who will have the power to supervise the department's various administrative sections. The director shall also supervise technically the public relations units in the ministry's agencies, its general administration and in the security directorates and shall coordinate their efforts in this sphere. The director shall also supervise directly the planning and follow-up unit.

Second, Department's Deputy Chairman:

The second level supervision shall be entrusted to a deputy director who shall assist the director in supervising the department's sections and who shall deputize for the director when the former is absent.

Third, Administrative Divisions:

The Department shall include five sections and a major unit, namely:

1. The Information Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's information plan, with the help of all the available information means, the radio, the television, the press, the cinema, fairs and publications.

This section shall include the following subsidiary units:

The radio unit:

This unit shall be concerned with whatever pertains to the radio activities connected with the police, including:

Preparing radio recordings concerned with highlighting the police efforts and with familiarizing the citizens with the police services.

Offering technical advice on radio programs connected with or affecting the Ministry of Interior.

Preparing the programs connected with developing police awareness among the masses and exerting efforts to broadcast such programs on various occasions.

Supervising the special radio programs concerned with serving the police goals.

Strengthening the relations with those in charge of the radio agencies and gaining their confidence and cooperation.

Cinema and television unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's plans through the cinema and television, including:

Producing the cinema and television films necessary to bolster the relations between the police and the masses, to familiarize the masses with the services offered them by the ministry and to strengthen police awareness among the masses to fight crime.

Producing training and educational films that seek to raise the efficiency of the police officers and policemen and the ministry personnel.

Encouraging organizations and firms to produce propaganda films that highlight the police message and that strengthen awareness of the police services.

Offering advice on the script of television programs and cinema films that deal with the police so as to make sure that whatever undermines the police and police workers is avoided.

Discussing participation by the police forces and agencies in cinema and television scenes that enhance the prestige of the police and highlight the police development, all in accordance with the instructions regulating such activity.

Organizing recreational and educational movie shows for the police forces.

Exchanging movie films with other countries in order to enhance the benefit and to familiarize these countries with the modern development of the police agency.

Developing the relations and ties with those in charge of the cinema and television agencies in order to gain their confidence and cooperation.

Proposing purchase of the projection equipment, laboratories and instruments necessary for implementing the department's plan in this sphere.

Filing and preserving the books, recordings and movie films which the department deems fit to be preserved in order to be used when the need arises.

The press and publication unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's information plan, with the help of the press and the various means of publication. This activity includes:

Preparing a daily summary of what the papers and magazines publish on the activities of the ministry and its branches.

Preparing replies to the articles, complaints or commentaries published by the press.

Organizing conferences and press interviews to highlight the police efforts and the police services to the masses.

Bolstering the relations with those working in the press in order to contribute to their understanding of the police message and to enhance their contact with those working in the various police magazines so as to increase the topics of publication.

Preparing informational, scientific and literary materials and publishing them in the form of pamphlets or of wall posters that are beneficial to spreading information on the police.

Exchanging printed materials and educational books concerned with the police activities with the internal and foreign sides concerned.

Designing and producing guidance posters concerned with the police message so as to facilitate offering police services to the masses.

Preparing and carrying out propaganda campaigns that strengthen police awareness among the masses.

Recording important occasions in photographs and providing such photographs to the information media.

2. The Internal Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for the cultural and recreational welfare of the ministry's personnel, including officers, policemen and civilians, and shall exert efforts to bolster the ties of amity and friendship among them in order to raise their morale.

This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The cultural welfare unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan to develop cultural awareness among the officers, policemen, and civilian personnel. This includes:

Exerting efforts to establish libraries in the ministry and its branches and to supply them with cultural and scientific books so that they may be available to all the agency's personnel.

Following up the intellectual movement and keeping up with what the various information media say about the state's domestic and foreign policy so as to include this material in the police agency's national education plan.

Preparing cultural and religious symposiums for the police agency on the various national and religious occasions.

Organizing meetings between the ministry's leaderships and workers through which the police leaderships can understand the problems of the broad base and its proposals for developing the methods of work and also can formulate solutions for the police personnel.

Preparing public opinion reports for the ministry's internal public.

Caring for officers and troops sent abroad on scholarships, supplying them with whatever binds them to their homeland and exerting efforts to solve their problems.

Exchanging cultural books and publications with libraries in and outside the Arab Republic of Egypt and with the various ministries and authorities.

The recreational affairs unit:

Prepare for and organize camps and tourist trips.

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's recreation plan for the officers, policemen and workers and for bolstering amity and friendship among them. This activity includes:

Organizing the showing of recreational movie films in the gathering places, such as the officers, noncommissioned officers and policemen's clubs and the stations of the security forces.

Preparing the proper programs for entertaining the forces on the religious, political and social occasions and taking whatever measures are necessary in this regard.

Keeping up with the living and working conditions of the police agency personnel and exerting efforts to solve the problems they encounter and to improve their living conditions.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for foreign relations between the police agency of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the foreign police agencies. This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The foreign affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with bolstering the relations with the foreign police agencies and with looking after the welfare of visiting delegations. This activity includes:

Implementing the ministry's plan for communication with the Arab and foreign police agencies and exchanging the training programs which the ministry prepares at the Police Academy and at the various training institutes.

Exchanging the pamphlets and publications published by the department with the police agencies of the various countries so as to familiarize them with the development realized by the Egyptian police.

Following up the results of the training of visitors and notifying their countries of these results.

Preparing the proper plans for establishing permanent relations with the visitors after they conclude their training and return to their countries.

Translating from and to Arabic and arranging and organizing meetings with the foreign delegations required for the department's activities.

Protocol unit:

This unit shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing the itineraries of the Arab and foreign police delegations invited by the ministry.

Receiving the police delegations invited by the ministry, supervising their stay and preparing all the means for making their visits successful.

Contacting the ministry's various agencies to coordinate itineraries with them with the aim of presenting the agency in an eminent manner and confirming with these agencies the dates of visits and whatever changes may occur in them.

Supervising the protocol procedures in the celebrations and occasions held by the ministry.

4. Society's Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for the development of the police agency's relations with society's various sectors, with the armed forces, with the judiciary, prosecution, lawyers, press and information people, with the student, worker and peasant sectors, with the women's sector and with others.

This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The unit for developing relations with the society:

This unit shall be concerned with bolstering the ties between the police and society's various sectors. This activity includes:

Preparing and organizing the ministry's participation in the special occasions of the various sectors, such as the armed forces day, the teachers day, the peasants day, the workers Mayday and other occasions.

Inviting society's various sectors to visit the police utilities to familiarize themselves with the police activities and services to the masses.

Organizing sports rallies and competition days between the police and these sectors.

Exchanging membership between the police agencies and clubs and the sectors whose regulations permit such an exchange.

Organizing film shows at clubs and unions to explain the police message and its role in serving society.

Holding symposiums and organizing lectures in the various schools with the aim of gaining confidence in the police work among the future generations.

Preparing the proper programs for the police's annual celebration of 25 January so as to bolster the police relations with the society and to have the masses participate in this occasions.

Taking part in the national holidays which the country celebrates.

Police friends unit:

This unit shall be concerned with developing the ties of friendship and cooperation between society's various sectors and the police agency members. This activity includes:

Exerting efforts to spread the system of the police friend groups in the schools and universities and to form student groups that participate with the policemen in performing some services, such as traffic control, carrying out civil defense plans, plans to guard against fires and so forth.

Organizing symposiums and meetings in clubs, unions and public places with the aim of developing among the masses elements that take part in disseminating police awareness among the citizens.

Exerting efforts to apply the voluntary police system by developing among the masses elements that contribute to realizing the police message by taking part in police activities in the cities and villages, in the tournaments held between athletic clubs and in the national and public celebrations, thus contributing to the control of security.

Exerting efforts to develop among the rural population elements that contribute by helping the police control the phenomenon of revenge and of village fires and that also contribute in reconciling disputants and foes, thus bolstering security and curbing crime.

Following up implementation of the volunteer preparation and training programs and volunteer utilization methods in cooperation with the various agencies of the security directorates.

5. The Administrative and Financial Affairs Section:

This section shall be concerned with the department's administrative and financial activities and shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The administrative affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with:

Preparing the services for the members of the police agency and for the department personnel and with supervising the implementation of these services.

Organizing the movement of vehicles and of the information means according to the daily program of the department and of its various sections, making sure that the vehicles and information means are adequate and carrying out maintenance work on them.

Organizing service affairs for members of the police agency and of the department personnel in accordance with the laws and instructions regulating this aspect.

Carrying out clerical work.

Recording and distributing the department's incoming and outgoing mail.

Organizing the general instructions unit and the periodic circulars and publications.

The financial affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing the department's draft budget, supervising the spending from this budget's allocations during the fiscal year and dealing with the ministry's central agency regarding the procedures to permit extra spending and to acquire additional allocations when necessary.

Writing disbursement forms.

Controlling spending from the financial resources given to the Public Relations Department for spending on various purposes.

Preparing lists of the department's (requirements) and contacting the various agencies to carry out the contracting and purchase procedures.

Engaging in purchases within the limits of the powers of the department director and taking part with committees in [purchases] exceeding this power.

Carrying out warehousing works, examining the trusts in the warehouses, working to complete their salaries of the various types [sic] and keeping account and warehousing books in accordance with the regulations organizing this aspect.

Contacting the ministry's central agency in regard to the questions of the Accounting Office and to answering these questions.

Keeping account of the paper money and stamps trust and making lists of them.

Supervising the fuel disbursements for the department's vehicles.

Establishing, organizing and keeping the cards, books and records necessary for these activities.

6. The Planning and Followup Unit:

This unit shall be under the direct supervision of the department director and shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing technical studies connected with developing the department's work.

Studying the annual plan of the specialized sections and proposed amendments to it in preparation for its approval at the ministry's higher levels.

Following up implementation of the different phases of the plan in the various specialized sections and presenting periodic reports on the outcome of the followup.

Writing and publishing the department's orders, instructions and periodic circulars and taking the necessary measures to gather and preserve them.

Following up the security situation and the criminal manifestations with the various means and proposing the propaganda plans to confront these manifestations and to enlighten the citizens as to the means to which criminals resort.

Establishing Relations Department and Putting Public and Human Relations Under Its Control:

When the Ministry of Interior was reorganized in July 1979, ministerial decree No 1460 of 1979 was issued amending the organizational structure of the Ministry of Interior and redistributing supervision among the ministry's various specialized sectors and geographic districts. The decree states that the minister's office shall be headed by an assistant minister and shall control the following agencies:

The Officers Affairs Public Department.

The Relations Department which branches into the following departments:

The Public Relations Department.

The Human Relations Department.

The Medical Services Department.

It is noticed that this decree has subjected the abovementioned three departments to single administrative supervision headed by the director of the Relations Department. The decree has thus codified the actual practice which was in force before its issuance, considering that when personnel transfers were made in August 1978, the minister of interior issued Decree No 653 of 1978 appointing a director for the Relations Department to supervise the Public Relations Department and the Human Relations Department. It is evident that ministerial decree No 460 of 1979 added to them the Medical Services Department.

8494

CSO: 4802

CENTRALIZED, DECENTRALIZED POLICE TRAINING SYSTEMS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 111-114

[Article by Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasabu: "General Training of Police Members Between Centralism and Decentralization in Third Training Conference"]

[Text] For several years now, training has been gaining increased attention and has been preoccupying the minds of reformers who believe in the worth of the Egyptian man and in his ability to accomplish and to improve the level of performance in all spheres of work when prepared and trained by faithful hands.

The importance of training escalates if today's society in which we live has decided to develop its means and methods, to adopt everything new and to march forward to a future filled with hopes, stability and prosperity.

The policeman is a part of this developing society. Rather, he is a symbol and a manifestation of this society. If society has adopted learning as a means of progress and of realizing what it aspires for, then it is our duty to continue to develop the method of preparing the policeman who represents the broad police base and to train this policeman to face his responsibilities and duties in a manner compatible with his society's requirements and development.

The Ministry of Interior has devoted attention to training and has set up training colleges, institutes and centers at both the central level and the local level in the various security directorates. The ministry has also allocated the funds necessary for training in its capacity as an investment that yields to society the stability and security which enhance work and production in an atmosphere of reassurance.

In view of the fact that the members of the broad police base--represented by the first class policeman who join the police agency service in the various sites and specializations and by the recruits who spend the military training period in the police agency--reflect the basic front of relations between the police and the public, the police agency has begun to rely on these members for many of its activities and services, such as the public security, traffic control and riot control patrols, skilled work, such as driving vehicles and motorcycles and other skills needed by the police agency, in addition to the numerous other spheres of security to which their help is employed or in which it is deemed necessary to use their help. This is why it has been inevitable but to devote all attention to these members and to focus our studies and research on the means capable of enhancing their educational standard, especially since most of them are illiterate, and to training and preparing them to confront whatever security services are entrusted to them--services that

accompany the age of science and the society of prosperity and progress. This is what our study--The General Training of Policemen Between Centralism and Decentralization, presented to the third training conference--focused on.

The study covered the following aspects:

First, studying the concept and goals of the basic training of new policemen and the development that this training has undergone, discussing the comparative virtues of carrying out this training at the central level in Cairo, in training complexes located in the republic's geographic districts or at the local level in the security directorates, underlining the benefits and drawbacks of each system and ending with the ideal visualization for such training.

Second, discussing and evaluating the proposal to set up centers in the geographic districts to receive new recruits and to provide them with basic training.

Third, evaluating local training in its present form and the means to develop this training.

The study concluded with a number of recommendations that may light the way toward introducing the development necessary to prepare the members of the broad police base and develop in them the efficiency, ability and preparedness to face the requirements of the age.

First: Training New Policemen

Considering that the policeman is the trustee of the country's and the citizen's security and the refuge and the aide to anybody with an honest need and in view of this policeman's standard when he joins the service currently--especially his inability to read and write and his low educational standard--and in light of the conclusions reached by the study concerning the basic preparation and training of this policeman, of the current and desired goals of this training, of the advantages and drawbacks of carrying out this training centrally or of decentralizing it and in light of the ideal visualization of this training, it may be more beneficial to:

1. Set up a central policemen's training center in Cairo as one of the educational outfits controlled by the Training Agency in accordance with the decree governing the agency's current organizational structure and in a manner similar to what is followed in training the police officers and noncommissioned officers. This center should be able to absorb those who join the service every year and should have the necessary buildings and training resources until training complexes are set up in the republic's geographic districts to undertake this task.

2. Develop the method and means of training the new policemen so as to provide for:

Eradicating their illiteracy and enhancing their cultural standard.

Familiarizing them with the concept of political and criminal security and with the method of dealing with the masses.

Focusing on the proper use of the weapons in their hands and providing them with actual training on target shooting, including fixed, moving, fleeting and night targets.

Bolstering their spiritual, ethical and disciplinary values and familiarizing them with the patterns of sound conduct that must be followed and with the consequences of the failure to abide by such conduct.

Training them to read maps, how to recognize the sphere of their work accurately and easily and how to direct the citizens or tourists to the places that they want.

Providing them with practical training on how to approach a crime scene, on how to assist the specialized agencies, such as the traffic police, the firemen and rescue squads, the criminal investigation police and the ambulances, and on how to recognize explosives and render them safe and harmless to people.

Training them to write simple reports on information connected with their work and to conduct an initial examination of the scene of an accident.

Training numbers of them to drive vehicles and others to ride motorcycles and to make any simple repairs they may need.

Teaching them the elementaries of English and some phrases used to help the foreign tourists who come to the country in response to the open-door policy and investment in all spheres of this policy.

Giving them systematic military training, developing their physical ability to endure the hardships of a policeman's work and putting stress on their ability to confront outlaws.

Providing them with cultural training on the legal, police and national aspects.

3. The duration of this kind of training should not be less than 6 months for every batch. This is the minimum time required to train the modern policeman who can realize the desired goals.

4. Lay stress on the types of general training that the policeman receives periodically at the work site in order to continue to enhance the policeman's cultural, disciplinary and police level. This is in addition to laying stress on the courses qualifying policemen for promotion and specialization courses in the various spheres of work.

Second: Receiving, Preparing and Training Recruits:

In view of the increased numbers of recruits joining the police and of the inability of Cairo Security Forces Training Center to accommodate, prepare and train the current numbers--a fact which forces the center to assign most of the recruits to the security directorates to provide them with the basic training as soon as the enrollment procedures are completed--in view of the evident inadequacies and drawbacks in the resources and training standards of the security forces sections in the security directorates, not to mention the fact that the commands of the directorates resort to using the recruits in various public security services before their training is completed, and in view of the ministry's inclination to use and employ the recruits in various public security operations, it is urgently required that the attention be focused on preparing and training the recruits in a manner that makes it possible to raise their performance level and to utilize them to the degree possible. This should be done in addition to preparing the recruits to return to the various production and service sectors at the end of their service as citizens with a degree

of education and ability that guarantees their taking part in shouldering their responsibilities and duties toward the progress, prosperity and welfare of society.

The factors that help realize all this are focused in the following:

1. Set up centers to receive and train security forces in the geographic districts by selecting sites for these centers in the republic's conscription districts--Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia or al-Sharqiyah and Asyut.
2. Provide the resources necessary to receive, accommodate and train recruits in each center in a manner that permits preparing them to perform their role in the fields in which they work or in which they will be assigned to work immediately upon the conclusion of their training.
3. Each center should undertake the following tasks:

Receive recruits from the conscription district and do the necessary to give them the various medical tests, to check their criminal records and to register them.

Feed the recruits and provide them with medical and social care throughout the period of their training at the center.

Provide basic training to the forces of the security directorates and of the police units within the district's jurisdiction. This is followed by higher or vocational training for groups designated to perform the following tasks:

- A. Demonstration and riot control groups.
- B. Platoons for the pursuit of gangs.
- C. Public security patrols, guard duty, traffic police, criminal investigation police and other specializations for which the resources are available at the center.
- D. Skilled work: Car driver, motorcyclist, mechanic, mason, painter, carpenter, plumber and so forth.

Eradicate the illiteracy of the illiterate recruits during the period of basic, advanced or vocational training which the recruit spends at the center.

It is worth noting that to realize the benefit desired from training these recruits, the training centers or the commands in charge should not employ the recruits throughout the aforementioned training period in anything other than the center's internal services.

Tasks of Security Forces Sections in Directorates

There is no doubt that every policeman, especially the recruit, needs to continue his training throughout the period of his service in the agency so as to guarantee his fitness and his ability to face and shoulder the requirements of the work entrusted to him.

Here emerges the role of the current security forces sections in the directorates. After training the recruit and preparing him to carry out the tasks of the work

to be assigned to him, the forces are distributed to the security directorates and units in light of the specialized or vocational training they have received at the training centers in accordance with a plan drawn up for the purpose and taking into consideration the advanced training or [sentence incomplete].

Accordingly, the role of the security forces sections is confined to:

- A. Feeding the recruits and providing them with health, social and cultural welfare.
- B. Providing the recruits with periodic training and with constant daily training for those [word indistinct] from the service.
- C. Prepare the forces necessary for the various security services and regulate their departure from and return to the sections.
- D. Use the skilled workers and set up the workshops necessary to benefit from their skills.

There are numerous views and opinions developed as a result of experience and of actual training action and these views and opinions have resulted in measuring the yield of training. There are also the experiences gained as a result of the actual application of all kinds of training at the central and local levels. There is also what on-the-spot followup has revealed in regard to the condition and capabilities of the local training agencies and in regard to the drawbacks and inadequacies resulting either from the lack of training requirements, which the ministry is sparing no efforts or funds to meet, or from the lack of training awareness among some local commands. This is what we seek and hope to eliminate through constant inspection and through spreading awareness of the importance of training and of its effect on the level and accuracy of performance.

I have seen it fit to confine myself here to what we aspire for in terms of preparing the members of the broad police base to meet the requirements of the age, exploiting in this regard the sincere desire of our leadership to elevate the police agency to the level to which every sincere member of this agency aspires and which is sure to realize security for whoever lives on the soil of the beloved Egypt and for every grain of sand in our immortal land.

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CENTRAL PRISONS SYSTEM LABELED FAILURE

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 91, Oct 80 pp 81-85

[Article by Edward Jaras Bishay, first inspector in Prisons Administration and Secretary of Higher Advisory Council for Prison Affairs; "Central Prisons in Scale"]

[Text] Introduction:

In accordance with the provisions of law No 396 of 1956 regulating prison affairs, prisons are divided into four kinds:

- A. Penitentiaries [liman] which currently include the Abu Za'bal Penitentiary, the Turrah Penitentiary and Turrah Farm and the Desert Road Penitentiary between Cairo and Alexandria.
- B. General prisons which exist wherever there is a court of first instance.
- C. Central prisons which exist wherever there is a district court.
- D. Special prisons which are established by presidential decrees defining the types of prisoners to be detained in them, the method of treating them and the conditions for their release.

In accordance with the above law No 396 of 1956, the central prisons remain under the management and supervision of district officers until they are annexed to the Prisons Administration. This is why central prisons are attached to the buildings of police stations and precincts and why their management is entrusted to their officers. It is evident that even though nearly a quarter century has passed since the promulgation of law No 396 of 1956, the Prisons Administration has not yet exercised its natural jurisdiction over the central prisons because they have not been annexed to this administration.

However, we are interested in drawing attention to the fact that a central prison consists in fact and practice of a room in police station premises in which convicts sentenced to a short prison term (3 months or less), prisoners kept under precautionary custody and at times convicts sentenced to more than 3 months, when the remaining period of the sentence they are serving is 3 months or less, are jailed. People being interrogated by the district prosecution or due to appear before the district court are also jailed in these prisons at times.

As a result, a strange mixture of people are gathered in a central prison despite the age differences, criminality, type of crime committed and the environmental, cultural or social circumstances of the jailed because the nature of the place does not permit separating those incarcerated in it. Moreover, a central prison lacks all the basic elements required for a proper human dwelling, considering that this prison is always crowded to the degree where the required degree of ventilation and the living facilities, such as sleeping, eating and even relieving natural functions (whether standing or squatting) are affected.

It is natural, therefore, that such a prison can serve no penal or social purpose and cannot be hoped to reform anybody. This being its condition, it is rather impossible to adopt it in any modern means of penal reform. I should also not forget to note that a prison of the kind represents an additional burden to the police stations officers despite the heavy burdens they shoulder in fighting crime and maintaining public security, not to mention the annually increasing sums allocated to meet the expenses of the (growing numbers) of central prisons. Moreover, there is the almost daily work on the requests submitted to the Prisons Administration director to approve transfers from the central prisons to the general prisons in implementation of the provisions of article 6 of the bylaws of the prison law, considering that the [central] prisons can absorb no more.

In view of the fact that the administrative revolution means that no failing system should remain as it is and that it should be torpedoed and eliminated immediately and in view of the fact that the central prisons system is, in our opinion, a penal system that realizes no sound penal purpose on the one hand and is, on the other hand, a center for hatching crime and criminals because of the tight space and of the presence of a various mixture of human beings that facilitates criminal contacts and agreements, it is necessary to reconsider the presence of the central prisons in their present state.

Essence of Problem:

The essence of the problem is embodied in the short-term imprisonment and this motivates us to define this kind of imprisonment.

Meaning of Short-Term Imprisonment: There is no set criterion defining the period to which the phrase "short-term" applies.

This is why the opinions vary in this regard. There are those who say that this term doesn't exceed one year whereas others stress that it should not exceed 6 months. A third group restricts this period to one month and a fourth believes that it shouldn't exceed 3 months.

None of these opinions has been backed up by a legal or realistic support.

It is our opinion that we should always go back to the origins because this is the scientific way that always gives correct and decisive results.

If we go back to the prison regulations issued on implementation of the provisions of article of the bylaws of law No (396) of 1956 on prison organization, we find that these regulations state that a prison term of up to 3 months is considered a short jail term.

Therefore, we believe that a short jail term is a term that doesn't exceed 3 months.

The said article also stipulates that short jail terms be served in central prisons. However, this article takes precautions in this regard and states that convicts serving short jail terms "may, with the approval of the general director of prisons, be placed in a general prison if it is closer to the prosecution or if the central prison runs out of space to accommodate them."

Thus, the talk about carrying out short-term imprisonment and about the penal suitability of central prisons for this kind of imprisonment becomes compatible.

Nature of Short-Term Imprisonment:

It is acknowledged that what the legislator means fundamentally by imprisonment is isolating the convict from society for a certain period of time so as to avert his danger on the one hand and to reform the convict on the other. This mainstay must be always present when a convict is jailed, otherwise the imprisonment becomes some kind of nonsense and of torture.

The legislator is above both nonsense and torture and the era when the prisons were a place for torture and oppression and a means to merely hurt the convict without any reformatory or social purpose has gone. This being the case, all prison term penalties must be based on the purposeful mainstay of reforming the convict and of releasing him a corrected element that contributes to building society and enhancing production.

But action and practice have revealed that this mainstay is lagging behind the rules of short-term imprisonment.

Because the prison term is short, it doesn't enable the officials to confront it with any reformatory or curative programs that rehabilitate the convict in any way.

Also because the term is short, it creates indifference toward the criminal penalty. It is very easy for the beginner criminal to withstand this penalty which passes quickly and ends with his release. As for the veteran criminal, the short prison term represents to him a recreational penalty and, at times, even an opportunity to be exploited. Under the prison term, the convict enjoys the rights of a prisoner and the food, clothing and healthcare which the prison administration offers him. On the other hand, the convict may exploit the prison term as a golden opportunity to meet with beginners in jail life and select from among them a fat catch which this veteran criminal embraces upon his imminent release and which he enlists in the criminal organizations or in the smuggling, robbery, prostitution and drug gangs.

To put it briefly, in addition to proving futile, short-term imprisonment has also prove to be very dangerous and to form an extremely important factor in hatching crime and criminals in the accursed crucible of the central prison.

Solutions to Problem

Now that the present state of the central prisons has become very clear, consideration must be given to a modern penal system that leads us away from the dilemma of clinging to the central prisons which have proven to be a definite and absolute failure in the penal sphere.

Salvation from this condition can be realized only through doing away with short-term imprisonment.

If we consider carefully, we will find that rescue will come to us from one of two sources:

A. The fine Penalty.

B. Protective Custody.

First Source—Fine Penalty:

In addition to lifting from the shoulders of the public treasury all the costs and expenses spent on the central prisons, this penalty yields at the same time a profitable revenue to the state. What is more, the state profits even more by overcoming the drawbacks of short-term imprisonment and by preserving the dignity of those sentenced to short-term imprisonment. This kind of penalty may even constitute for the convict a starting point for a decent life and honorable work.

Forms of Fine:

Basically, a fine is tantamount to payment by the convict of a sum of money to the state treasury.

This is the traditional form of the fine. A fine is considered a flexible means which the judge or the executive authorities, led by the public prosecution, adapt to realize the goal behind a criminal penalty.

To put it in detail, this means that the judge is always able to discern the ability of the convict standing before him. If the convict can pay the fine in a lump sum, then the judge rules accordingly. But if the judge finds that it is impossible for the convict to pay the fine in such a manner or if he realizes that such a sentence would create problems in the convict's life, especially if the convict is a small vendor or a poor worker, then the judge can divide the fine into installments easy for the convict to pay.

Perhaps the continued implementation of this fine would constitute a constant reminder to the convict of the crime he has committed and would urge him not to repeat his crime.

Moreover, there may be destitute and sick convicts at times. In accordance with the provisions of the law and of the principle of equality among citizens before the law, such a convict cannot but be fined. However, in view of the convict's financial and health circumstances, the judge may rule that terms of the fine be made easy, in the sense that the fine is kept hanging over convict's head through the legal period and that he is made to pay it when he becomes capable of doing so, for instance in case he gets an inheritance, a gift or a grant during the legal period. In any case, the fine is dropped with the termination of the period set for dropping the penalty. In this regard, a fine is different from debts owed to the state which drop only when the legal period set for the right [to collect] in the civil law ends.

One of the modern and beneficial methods of collecting the fine is to make the convict work for it in a work camp. We urge the state in the era of the revolution of

building and construction to expand this form of penalty implementation because it yields profitable wages to the convict and gets him used to honorable and productive work which helps him to earn an honest living at the end of his compulsory employment which may turn into optimal employment if the convict wishes to continue his work.

Moreover, this form also supplies the building and construction circles with enormous and constant manpower that helps to complete the tasks undertaken by the state.

We would like to stress here our refutation of the statement that this system of penalty implementation may create the feeling that it is system of "forced labor. There is a big difference between the two systems. The proposed system adapts the individual and society to engage in productive work, regardless of how unskilled, and gives the convict wages equal to those of similar unconvicted workers. All the state does in this regard is to collect the fine levied on the convict by deducting a small and convenient part of the wages he collects.

Meanwhile, forced labor is not concerned with the wish of the prisoner to do the work compatible with his abilities and is carried out in return for no wages and without any consideration for the simplest duties of human or humanitarian decency toward the person pressed into forced labor.

Therefore, there is no place here for bringing up the question of forced labor.

It is our opinion that the opportunity should be made available [to the convict] in any honorable site acknowledged by the state, be it a work camp, a state workshop, a public sector enterprise or even a private sector enterprise because what is important is to get the convict used to honest work at proper wages and to have the state collect its rightful fine.

Second Source-Protective Custody [al-tadbir]:

The present prisons suffer from the oldness of the buildings in which they are housed and even from the collapse of parts of these buildings in some areas, not to mention the fact that they are crowded with their inmates whose numbers are almost double the numbers determined to be healthy when the prisons were first built.

All this has spread a network of difficulties and complications that cause the immediate waste of most of the efforts exerted to realize the real goals of punishment which are embodied in reform and correction.

Perhaps the most evident example in this regard is the impossibility of separating the prisoners in order to implement the principle of punishment separation which is the mainstay and one of the elementary principles of modern [criminal] reform. Here is where the idea of resorting to protective custody instead of punishment for certain crimes emerged.

It can be said here that a complete and integrated penal policy is applied, especially since protective custody provides flexibility of application which doesn't exist in the sphere of applying penalties. This kind of custody is not tied to the guarantees involving penalties, such as termination of the penalty through amnesty, lapse of time or the need for a final sentence to carry it out.

This protective custody is based on the policy of defending society against those who have actually committed crimes and those expected to commit crimes at any moment, such as instinctive and habitual criminals (as in the case of drug crimes). Protective custody is established for anybody whose condition warns of criminal danger, i.e. for anybody who is in a psychological condition that makes him likely to commit a future crime. In criminal law, this state is reflected in the phrase "readiness to commit crime."

This criminal state is discerned from the character of the criminal, his criminal record, his life and behavior and his family and social conditions.

The law has its means of taking precautionary measures, of which the most well-known are:

1. Foiling the criminal's perpetration of a crime by seizing his weapon or by preventing him from residing in a certain place, such as preventing a person apprehended for drunkenness from frequenting drinking places and preventing a person apprehended for gambling from frequenting gambling clubs, and so on.
2. Preventing the criminal from engaging in a certain profession or vocation, such as preventing a rash driver apprehended for speeding from working as a driver.
3. Limiting residency to a certain area.
4. Deportation to the place of origin.
5. Exerting efforts to prepare the criminal for an honest and normal life in society and getting him used to the love of work and to interest in work to earn a living by enrolling him in a work organization.

It is also acknowledged that as a penal institution, a prison represents an indivisible whole. According to the law and to the administrative and social concepts, a prison is a place to serve a penalty. Therefore, no part of a prison can be set aside for protective custody. Any statement to the contrary means collapse of the legal controls and watering down the penal policy, thus putting distance between this policy and the goals that the legislator seeks by establishing the precautionary measures. To make the matter clear, it must be pointed out that protective custody is not a penalty imposed in return for a crime committed by a person but rather consists of a number of measures that are not intended for punishment but to prevent the continued presence of the danger of the [potential] criminal to society. Protective custody is not a punishment that requires depriving this individual of (his rights), which is something by which a penalty is characterized.

Accordingly, many minor crimes which are dealt with at present by meting out short-term jail sentences can be dealt with by applying the system of protective custody.

It is fortunate that the application of protective custody is easy due to the presence of reform establishments and institutes controlled by the Ministry of Social Affairs. These can be exploited ideally by being set aside for implementation of protective custody against criminals committing such crimes.

Conclusion:

The preceding review underlines the following facts:

1. The central prisons were set up to accommodate convicts sentenced to short jail terms.
2. Short-term imprisonment is a penalty that realizes no reformatory goal.
3. Short-term imprisonment is costly to the state.
4. Short-term imprisonment is a seed of crime and criminality.
5. In their current state, the central prisons can realize no sound penal goal.
6. A fine to be paid in a lump sum, in installments or on easy terms is a proper alternative to short-term imprisonment.
7. Employment [of convicts] in work camps, in state workshops, in the public sector or even in the private sector yields numerous benefits to the state and to the person employed.
8. Protective custody is a better punishment in dealing with crimes for which short-term jail sentences are meted out and the application of protective custody is easy in the reform establishments controlled by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

With this quick discussion, I have perhaps focused the light on actual and scientific facts which we hope will be beneficial.

8494

CSO: 4802

NEW, OLD LAWS GOVERNING VILLAGE MAYORS, CHIEFS COMPARED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 89, Apr 80 pp 34-38

[Article by Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Latif Siddiq: "New Law on Village Mayors and Chiefs"]

[Text] Introduction:

Article 34 of law No 58 of 1978 concerning village mayors and chiefs stipulates abolition of law No 59 of 1964 concerning village mayors and chiefs. We will review generally in the following what the new law has introduced in comparison to the old law, according to the arrangement of the law's articles and sections.

Section One

General Rules

Article one stipulates that each village shall have a mayor and that the post of mayor shall be abolished in any village having a police post.

In implementation of this article, it is compulsory to abolish the post of mayor in a village containing a police post whereas this abolition was optional in accordance with article one of the abolished law which stated that the minister of interior had the power to abolish the post of mayor in any village containing a police post and had the power to issue a decree reinstating such a post. This is understood from the phrasing of the article because in the new law, the phrase "shall be abolished" is used in a manner that makes the abolition mandatory whereas the article in the abolished law used the phrase "the minister of interior shall have the power to abolish," thus restricting the right to abolition or lack of thereof [to the minister of interior].

Section Two

Conditions To Be Met by Whomever Is Appointed Mayor Or Village Chief

Article 3 defines these conditions and we will point out here the amendments introduced to the conditions in comparison to the abolished law:

1. Age: It is no less than 30 years in the new law whereas it was no less than 25 years in the abolished law.

2. The director of security may relieve the candidate for the post of village chief from the condition of literacy if he is an only candidate. To make it possible to permit this exception, the abolished law required the presence of at least one candidate meeting the condition of literacy.

3. Insofar as the condition of ownership of cultivable land or of having a monthly pension is concerned, the new law makes conditional that whoever is nominated for the post of mayor own 5 feddans within the jurisdiction of the village or of neighboring villages or have a steady monthly income of no less than 20 pounds monthly from landed property. The minister of interior may disregard this condition if all the candidates, when there is more than one, cannot meet this condition. The abolished law made it conditional that whoever was appointed to the post of mayor or village chief had to have land holdings in the village, regardless of the area and of whether the holdings are in the form of owned or leased land, or be entitled to a monthly pension of no less than 20 pounds from a public treasury insofar as the mayor is concerned and no less than 5 pounds insofar as the shayk (village chief) is concerned.

It is concluded from the above that the new law requires the candidate to the post of village mayor to own land in the village and that his ownership be no less than 5 acres. The land holdings may not be in the form of leased lands. The new law has also added an alternative to the condition of land ownership, namely a fixed monthly income of no less than 20 pounds from landed property. This is in addition to the other conditional alternative of a monthly pension of no less than 20 pounds.

The law does not stipulate this condition for a candidate to the post of village chief. Consequently, such a candidate is not required to own cultivable land or to have a pension salary or income. The law also empowers the minister of interior to disregard this condition for the post of mayor when all candidates, if there is more than one, fail to meet it or when they are running for the post in non-agricultural areas.

4. The new law does not stipulate that whoever is appointed village chief must not be a marriage or four-times-removed blood relative of the village mayor. This condition was stipulated in the abolished law.

Section Three

On Appointment of Mayor or Village Chief

Date to Present Candidacy Applications:

Article 4 of the new law stipulates that candidacy applications for the post of village mayor shall be presented to the security director and candidacy applications for the post of village security chief shall be presented to the district officer until the end of the 20th day following the opening of the door of candidacy. This means that this law permits the submission of candidacy applications during the period in which the decision to open the door of candidacy is under review, namely the period of 10 days following the issuance of this decision and the next 10 days. The abolished law permitted the submission of these applications in the 10 days following the period in which the decision to open the door of candidacy was under review and did not permit their submission during this period.

Appeals Against Candidate Lists:

Article 5 of the new law stipulates that the requests for registration in and omission from the candidates list shall be submitted to the security director. The abolished law stipulated that they be submitted to the security director insofar as the post of mayor is concerned and to the district officer insofar as the post of village chief is concerned. The new law has thus unified the authority to which these requests are submitted insofar as both posts are concerned.

The new law has also unified the committee to examine the requests submitted for both posts under the chairmanship of the security director whereas in accordance with the abolished law, there was one committee headed by the security director for the post of mayor and another headed by the district officer for the post of village chief.

Article 6 of the new law stipulates that the decision on the candidacy applications for both the posts of mayor and village chief shall be made by a committee comprised of the security director or his deputy, in case of the director's absence, as chairman, and a judge appointed by the general assembly of the court within whose jurisdiction the village concerned is located, a prosecution attorney appointed by the head of the prosecution office concerned and two members of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee, one of them representing the district, as members. The committee meeting shall lack quorum unless four members, including the chairman, attend. The committee decisions shall be issued by vote majority and the party concerned shall be notified of them. Any applicant whose name is excluded may appeal the committee's decision to the minister of interior within 15 days of receiving or being notified in writing of the committee's decision. The minister of interior may issue within one month as of the date of his being notified of the appeal the decision he deems fit. The directorate shall be notified of this decision in order that it may in turn notify the person concerned. Otherwise, the committee's decision in this regard shall be considered null and void and the name of the applicant concerned shall be included in the list of candidates.

It is evident from this article that in addition to unifying the committee for reviewing the candidacy appeals for both the posts of mayor and village chief, this article has also introduced the right to appeal against this committee's decisions and has set a date for issuance of the minister of interior's decision on such an appeal. Should this date pass without the issuance of this decision, then the appeals committee's decision is considered void and the name of the plaintiff is included in the candidates list. Article 6 of the abolished law stipulated that the decisions of this committee were final and were to be conveyed to the district for implementation.

Formation of Election Committee:

Article 8 of the new law stipulates that the voters shall express their opinion on the election of a mayor before one or more committees comprised of a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class two as chairman, of a representative selected from the village voter lists for each of the candidates and a civil servant with job grade of no less than class four as secretary. A general committee shall also be formed to supervise the election and shall be comprised of an officer with the rank of no less than a colonel and of two members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee. Insofar as the election of a village chief is concerned, this committee shall be formed of a police officer with a rank of no less than major, of a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists and of a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class four as committee secretary.

A change has been introduced to the committee supervising the election of a mayor, considering that such a committee is now headed by a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class two whereas in accordance with the abolished law, such a committee was headed by a police officer with a rank of no less than lieutenant colonel, its membership excluded any member of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee and the most senior village chief. The new law has also included in the membership of this committee a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists instead of the 3 voters registered in the village voter lists who were included as members of this committee in accordance with the abolished law.

A change has also been introduced to the committee supervising the election of village chiefs by excluding from its membership the most senior village chief and the 3 voters registered in the village voter lists who were included in this committee in accordance with the abolished law. The new law adds to this committee's membership a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists.

The new law has also introduced a general committee to supervise the election and to be formed of an officer with a rank of no less than colonel and of 2 members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee. Article 15 of the executive regulations of this law state that this committee will supervise the process of election for the post of mayor or village chief and that the security director will issue a decision forming the committee and designating its headquarters. The regulations also state that the duties and powers of this committee include the following:

1. Notify immediately the district or subdistrict officer and the security director of the start and end of the election process.
2. Secure order within the election committees.
3. Answer the committees' queries during the progress of the election process.
4. Guarantee neutrality in all the election committees.

Formation of Vote Counting Committee:

Article 9 of the new law stipulates that the vote counting committee shall be formed of the head of the election supervision committee as chairman and of the 2 members of the supervision committee, of the chairmen of the elections committees and of the candidates or of their representatives as members. Article 16 of the executive regulations on this law stipulates that the secretary of the First Election Committee shall be the secretary of the vote counting committee.

This law includes in the membership of the vote counting committee the candidates or their representatives and excludes from it the senior village chief who was included as a member of this committee in accordance with the abolished law. The new law also includes in its membership two members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee (who are also members of the committee supervising the elections) whereas the abolished law included in the vote counting committee one member of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee.

Date of Appointment of Village Mayor or Chief:

Article 11 of the new law stipulates that the mayor or the chief must be appointed within a period of 3 months of the election, else the mayor or chief shall be considered legally appointed by the end of the said 3 months. This provision has no equal in the abolished law and it requires that the appeals against the election be examined quickly and that the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee convene quickly to issue its decision appointing the mayor or the chief. The provision also requires the Ministry of Interior to issue its decision in this regard quickly and before the lapse of 3 months on the election date, else the mayor or chief will be considered legally appointed by the end of this period.

Appeals Against Election:

Article 12 of the new law stipulates that whoever has applied to the candidacy of the post of mayor or chief and has had his application accepted shall have the right to appeal against [the results of] the mayor's or chief's election and shall do so in writing to the security director within one week of the date of election. The appeal must explain all the reasons on which it is based and no complaint or appeal against the correctness of the election will be accepted by the administrative authorities after the lapse of this date.

This article amends the date for submitting the appeals, considering that it has become one week from the day of election whereas it was 15 days from the day of election in accordance with the abolished law. This article has also introduced a new stipulation, namely that no complaint or appeal regarding the correctness of the election will be accepted by the administrative authorities after the lapse of the date for submitting the appeals.

Renewing Term of Mayor or Village Chief:

Article 13 of the new law stipulates a village mayor or chief shall continue to hold his post for a period of 5 years after the approval of his appointment to this post and that the post shall be considered vacant as of the first day following this period unless a decision is issued by the minister of interior renewing this term for 5 more years beginning with the first day following the end of the preceding term.

A bill has been prepared to add a new paragraph to this article stating that the minister of interior may renew the term of a village mayor or chief more than once.

The abolished law did not permit renewal of the mayor's term more than once whereas it did permit repeated renewal for the post of village chief.

Section Four

Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee

Formation of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 14 of the new law states that the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee shall be formed of the security director or of his deputy, in case of the director's absence, as chairman and of the Ministry of Interior inspector, the prosecution director or his deputy in case of his absence and the two members from the district within

whose jurisdiction falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee. Should one of these two members be absent, the security director shall appoint his replacement from among the members elected in the other districts of the governorate.

The new law has added to the membership of this committee the two members elected from the district within which falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee--two members who are from among the current mayors. In accordance with the abolished law, the committee membership included two members appointed according to seniority and in turn, with one of them coming from the district within which falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee. The abolished law provided for the appointment of the two most senior mayors in each district to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee for a period of 2 years beginning with the first of January, taking into consideration turns in appointing the district's mayors.

Election of Two Members of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 16 of the new law states that two current village mayors from each district shall be elected to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee in the first half of the month of October on the date and in the place set by the security director and that their membership shall be for a period of 2 years beginning with the first of January. Should a member's seat become vacant before the end of the term, the security director shall hold a complementary election and the membership elected shall end with the end of the term of the member he has replaced.

The election committee shall be comprised of the district officer or his deputy as chairman and of two non-candidate mayors selected in the manner set by the executive bylaws as members.

Article 24 of the executive bylaws states that these two mayors shall be selected by the security director and adds that this committee's secretary shall be a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class four.

Article 33 of the executive regulations states that the election shall be held at the district's or subdistrict's headquarters by secret poll, in accordance with what is followed in the election of a village mayor or chief and by relative majority.

Appeals Against Election of Two Members of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 16 of the new law states the candidates [sic] and mayors elected in due process may appeal to the Ministry of Interior against those elected [to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee] or against the election process within 15 days of the election. The signature of the plaintiff shall be authenticated by the documentation authorities. The minister of interior shall issue his decision regarding the members elected to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee within 60 days of the end of the period of appealing, else the passage of this date shall be considered a decision approving the election results. The suspended mayor [presumably the mayor against whom the appeal is submitted] shall not exercise his membership in the committee throughout the period of his suspension.

Article 35 of the executive regulations states that a special book shall be prepared at the Public Administrative Affairs Department to record in it the appeals submitted by the candidate's and the country's mayors who have taken part in the election. As

soon as they are received, these appeals shall be referred to the Public Inspection Department for examination and the outcome shall be presented to the minister of interior to issue a decision on the appeals within 60 days of the end of the period of appealing, else lapse of this date shall be considered a decision approving the outcome of the election.

Section Five

On-Task and Powers of Village Mayor's or Chief's Job:

Article 19 of the new law states that should any cause prevent the village mayor or chief from performing his job, the security director shall delegate the oldest village chief to do so. Should the village chiefs be equal in age, then the security director shall delegate the most senior chief to perform the task temporarily.

It is obvious from this article that the deputy mayor who performs the mayor's task in case of the latter's absence is the oldest village chief. Should the village chiefs be of the same age, then the most senior in the service will be the deputy mayor and the security director issues a decision delegating him to carry out the mayor's duty temporarily. The abolished law stated that a village chief, without any age or seniority restriction, be delegated.

Mayor's Retention of His Original Job:

Article 22 of the new law states that should any civil servant be elected or appointed village mayor, he shall be entitled to retain his job throughout his term as mayor, shall be considered a full-time mayor and shall enjoy all the benefits of his original job.

This provision has been introduced to the new law and has no equal in the abolished law. The goal of this provision, as pointed out by the explanatory memorandum on the law, is to encourage qualified civil servants to run for the post of mayor so as to raise standard of those holding this post. Should a civil servant be appointed to this post, then he will retain his original job and will collect all his dues from this job while devoting full time to the mayor's functions.

Section Six

On Dismissing Village Mayors and Chiefs Administratively and Bringing Them To Trial Before Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Power to Impose Penalties:

Article 23 of the new law states that the security director may penalize, either by warning or by a fine not exceeding the sum of 10 pounds, a village mayor or chief if he neglects or fails to perform the duties and requirements of his job or should he debase himself. The Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee may penalize him by warning, by levying a fine of no more than 100 pounds or by dismissal from his post.

It is evident from this that the new law has doubled the maximum fine that the security director and the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee may impose on the mayor or chief, considering that the abolished law empowered the security director to levy a fine of 5 pounds and the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to levy a fine of 50 pounds. Moreover, the new law does not permit combining dismissal from the post with a fine whereas the abolished law did permit this.

Article 26 of the new law states that the disciplinary decisions issued by the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee shall be conveyed to the minister of interior within 15 days of their issuance so that he may consider them for approval. This article also states that the minister shall have the right to cancel or reduce the fine. This article does not make the stipulation made in the abolished law, namely that these disciplinary decisions be approved within 60 days of the date on which they are brought to the minister's notice or else be considered final.

Defense in Disciplinary Court:

Article 28 of the new law states that the village mayor or chief shall have the right to appoint an attorney to defend him if he is brought before a disciplinary court.

This provision is tantamount to codifying the practice under the abolished law which lacked such a provision.

Section Seven

Final and Transitional Provisions

Mayor's Recompense:

Article 29 of the new law states that a village mayor shall be awarded an annual recompense of 120 pounds. In the abolished law, this recompense amounted to 60 pounds. The explanatory memorandum on the new law has pointed out that increasing this recompense has been in line with the current economic conditions and is meant to make the recompense adequate for the expenses that a village mayor shoulders by virtue of his job.

Validity of Law Regulating Exercise of Political Powers:

Article 30 of the new law states that the provisions of law No 73 of 1956 regulating the exercise of political rights shall continue to be in force whenever they are not in conflict with the provisions of this law whereas the abolished law confined this validity to the provisions of section 4 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights--provisions concerning the crime of (truancy) or other crimes committed upon or because of the election of village mayors and chiefs.

8494

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PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELECTION OF VILLAGE MAYORS, CHIEFS EXPLAINED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 91, Oct 80 pp 75-76

[Article by Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Latif Siddiq: "New Village Mayors and Chiefs Law"]

[Text] Introduction:

We presented in a previous edition⁽¹⁾ a general report on the provisions introduced by law No 58 of 1978 in comparison to the provisions of abolished law No 59 of 1964 concerning village mayors and chiefs. We will deal here in detail with the provisions of three sections of the new law:

Section one: Procedures for Nomination to Posts of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section Two: Procedures for Election of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section Three: Procedural Steps Taken After Appointment of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section One

Procedures for Nomination to Posts of Village Mayor and Chief

Nomination Conditions:

Article 3 of the law states that whoever is appointed to the post of village mayor or chief must meet the following conditions:

1. Be a male Egyptian registered in the village voter lists.
2. Be of good reputation, not be deprived of the exercise of his political rights or have these rights suspended. If he has been previously dismissed on disciplinary action, then a period of 5 years should have passed on the date of approval of the dismissal decision.
3. Be no less than 30 years old.
4. Be able to read and write. The security director may exempt the candidate for the post of village chief from this condition if he is an only candidate.

(1) See #89 of AL-AMN AL-'AMM, April 1980, page 34 and beyond.

5. The ownership of a candidate for the post of village mayor may not be less than 5 feddans within the village jurisdiction or in neighboring villages or he should have a fixed monthly pension of no less than 40 pounds monthly from landed property, not including the cultivable land, or have an income of no less than 40 pounds from all the above vessels.

Insofar as the candidate for the post of village chief is concerned, he is required to have cultivable land, regardless of its area and regardless of whether owned or leased, within the village or in neighboring villages or have a monthly pension or fixed income from landed property of no less than 15 pounds.

The minister of interior may disregard the conditions stipulated in this provision if all the candidates, when there is more than one candidate, fail to meet these conditions, if the post is in a non-agricultural area, if the door of nomination is reopened and if one candidate or more apply.

Article 2 of the law underlines another condition to be met by whoever is appointed village chief, namely that his name be registered in the village segments [qa'imat al-hissah] list. This article stipulates that the village be divided into segments and that each segment have its own chief and a list in which it registers annually the name of its inhabitants who are included in the village voter lists.

If the candidate cannot meet all or some of these conditions on the day in which the door of nomination is opened, then his candidacy will not be accepted. An example is the candidate who hasn't reached the age of 30 on the day the door of nomination is opened but who does so afterwards. The nomination of this candidate is not accepted because he fails to meet one of the nomination conditions on the day in which the door of nomination is opened, namely the condition of being at least 30 years old.

We will point out in the following some observations regarding each of the nomination conditions separately.

1. Condition of Citizenship, Sex and Registration in Village Voter Lists:

It is required that the candidate be Egyptian and male. Therefore, females may not be nominated. The candidate must also be registered in the voter lists of the village for whose post of mayor or chief he is nominated. In implementation of this condition, article 7 of the executive regulations requires that a birth certificate or an official copy of this certificate and a voter certificate or an official certificate issued by the district officer stating that the candidate's name is included in the village voters list be presented.

2. Condition of Good Reputation, of non-denial and non-suspension of exercise of political rights and of passage of 5 years since approval of disciplinary dismissal decision:

The law has set no controls and has defined no reasons for loss of good reputation but has left this up to the administration within the limits of responsibility for public security and order, as long as its assessment is not tarnished with the flaw of the abuse of power.

We will note in the following the most important criteria that can be employed to make sure of the presence of the condition of good reputation?

Characterizing a person as a person of good reputation or of bad reputation is the result of such a person's behavior and actions in society. If it becomes evident from the totality of these actions that they are compatible with his society's traditions and conditions, then the person concerned cannot be described as being of bad reputation. But if the person's actions are incompatible with what people acknowledge as the right conduct, then it can be said that this person is of bad reputation. The criterion in both cases is the conduct of the person himself because the basis of good reputation is the behavior and conduct of the person himself and the good or bad qualities that he displays. Therefore, a person cannot be censured for his brother's crime and cannot be blamed for what others have committed (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 23 October 1976, Dossier No 42/5/20 and 24 November 1976, Dossier No 42/19/41).

It is not essential that a criminal or disciplinary conviction be issued to prove the quality of bad reputation. A person's reputation may be affected by his personal or ethical conduct or by a serious charge, even though no legal or disciplinary action may have been taken due to the lack of sufficient evidence (Administrative Judiciary Court ruling on 6 April 1970 and 15 February 1971).

The law does not define what crimes it considers as crimes violating honor or trust and, consequently, crimes causing the loss of good reputation. The important thing in this regard is society's view of the crime. If under the circumstances in which it is committed, a crime betrays moral weakness, delinquency of character, whims or desires, then it is a crime violating honor or trust and its perpetrator loses his good reputation (Legal opinion of General Assembly of Legal Opinion and Legislative Sections of State Council on 20 February 1968).

As for the crime of a custodian's embezzlement of (impounded property belonging to him), this crime is tantamount to no more than violating the impoundment procedures defined in the civil and commercial litigation law or in the administrative impoundment law, depending on the circumstances. This means that this crime is a violation against the public authorities' procedures which are established in the interest of the impounding party. These procedures require observation of the terms and conditions set by such impoundment. Thus, this crime does not cause its perpetrator to lose his good reputation (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 26 September 1972, Dossier No 45/18/20).

An embezzlement crime perpetrated by a custodian against his wife's property is not considered a crime violating honor and is not proof of bad reputation. Though described by the law as an embezzlement crime, it is not considered adequate on its own to be counted as a crime violating honor (Supreme Administrative Court ruling in case No 492 of 15 January 1972).

What is meant by a suspended sentence is to empower the judge to order suspension of a penalty on which a sentence is issued for a set period (3 years). This period is considered a probation period during which the convicted is instructed not to commit another crime if he wants to escape finally the sentence issued against him and to consider this sentence as if it were nonexistent, else the sentence will be carried out against him, in addition to whatever sentence may be issued for the new crime.

Accordingly, the temporary effect of the suspension order means in fact nothing more than a suspension, in the sense that the sentence issued for the crime continues to be present and to produce all its incriminating consequences, including the branding of the convict of the characteristic of bad reputation if the sentence is issued for a crime violating honor. If the suspension period ends without a sentence being issued meanwhile abolishing the suspension and if, consequently, the sentence is not carried out during this period and is considered as if it were non-existent, then the precedent of this sentence may not be used to characterize the convicted as being a person of bad reputation (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 16 August 1977, Dossier No 42/14/69).

To guarantee the accuracy and soundness of the investigation concerning the presence of the condition of good reputation in the candidates for the post of village mayor or chief, the Ministry of Interior issued circular No 5 of 1977 instructing that this investigation be conducted by a committee formed of the district officer, the directorate's chief of the criminal investigation section and the district's intelligence officer and that the committee use the information of the state security intelligence branch.

In addition to meeting the condition of good reputation, the candidate for the post of village mayor or chief may not be a person denied the exercise of his political rights or whose political rights have been suspended. To explain this condition, it is necessary to point out the cases of denial and suspension of the exercise of political rights.

Article 2 of law No 73 of 1956 concerning regulation of the exercise of political rights states that the following shall be denied the exercise of their political rights:

1. A person convicted of a felony, unless rehabilitated.
2. A person whose property is placed under custodianship by court order and in accordance with the law throughout the period during which this custodianship is valid. In case of confiscation, the denial of rights shall be valid for 5 years as of the date of the sentence.
3. A person convicted for one of the crimes stipulated in the agrarian reform laws or the supply and pricing laws, a person convicted of the crime of charging a sum of money beyond that set by a lease contract, a person convicted of the crime of smuggling currency or funds or of the crime of customs tax evasion, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.
4. A person convicted of stealing or concealing stolen property, of swindling, of issuing a bouncing check, of betraying a trust, of treachery, graft, fraudulent bankruptcy, forgery, use of forged papers, of perjury, of tempting witnesses, of violating honor, corrupting youth, violating public morals, vagrancy or of a crime committed to evade military or national service, as well as a person convicted of any crime stipulated in the provisions covering the above crimes, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.
5. A person sentenced to a prison term for one of the election crimes stipulated in articles 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 of this law, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

6. A civil servant or a public sector worker dismissed from service for reasons of violating honor, unless 5 years have passed since the date of dismissal and unless a final decision has been issued abolishing the dismissal decision and compensating the person concerned.

7. A custodian or a guardian relieved of his duty due to misconduct or of betrayal, unless a period of 5 years has passed since the date of the sentence relieving from custodianship or guardianship.

Article 3 stipulates the political rights of the following persons be also suspended:

1. Persons placed in custody throughout the period of custody.
2. Detained persons with mental disorders throughout the period of detention.
3. Persons who have declared their bankruptcy for a period of 5 years of such declaration, unless rehabilitated before the end of this period.

It is noticed that a person convicted of a felony of any type is denied the exercise of his political rights, unless rehabilitated, i.e. regardless of whether the felony violates or doesn't violate honor. The text is general and, therefore, includes every felony. As for a person sentenced to a prison term, it is required to deprive him of the exercise of his political right that the sentence be issued for one of the crimes listed specifically in provisions 3, 4 and 5 of article 2 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

We must note that the period for judiciary rehabilitation is 3 years for a misdemeanor and 6 years for a felony, beginning as of the date of implementation of the sentence or of amnesty. This period is doubled in case of (repeat offenders and of termination of the penalty due to the lapse of time).

As for the period of rehabilitation by the force of law, it is 12 years for a felony sentence, 6 years for a misdemeanor sentence and 12 years for a misdemeanor violating honor (and in the case of repeated conviction and termination of the penalty due to the lapse of time).

The period of (the invalidation of a sentence due to the lapse of time) is 20 years for a felony, 30 years for a death sentence and 5 years for a misdemeanor, beginning as of the date when the sentence becomes final, unless the sentence issued by the criminal court is in absentia. In this case, the period starts as of the date of the sentence.

Article 7 of the executive regulations of the law on village mayors and chiefs makes it a must that the candidate submit his criminal status record to make sure that he meets the condition concerning non-denial of the exercise of political rights.

3. Condition on Age:

The age of a candidate for the post of village mayor or chief must not be less than 30 years on the day the door is opened for nomination. The document proving the presence of this condition is the birth certificate or an official copy thereof.

There is no maximum age for the candidate. A candidate's old age is no proof of his inability to perform the duties of his post. The law's stipulation regarding dismissal of the mayor or chief when he becomes obviously infirm or when the medical commission decides that he is not fit is a procedure for ending the service and not for appointment. To perform the duties of his post, a village mayor or chief doesn't need so much muscle power as he needs experience, awareness of the village problems and a moral influence among the village inhabitants that enables him to solve these problems. Should it become evident from his delivery of his duties that he is obviously infirm or if the security directorate refers him to the governorate's medical commission and this commission decides that he is physically unfit, the security director may issue a decision referring him to the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to consider his dismissal (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 23 May 1977, Dossier No 42/6/46).

4. Condition of Ability to Read and Write:

A candidate for the post of village mayor or chief is required to be able to read and write. The Ministry of Interior has issued instructions to make sure that this condition is met. The instructions stipulate that an officer (the assistant security director for the post of mayor and the district deputy officer for the post of chief) test the candidate in reading and writing, provided that the dictation piece used in the test consist of no less than 40 words that are free of dictation complexity, that the reading test be on ordinary subjects written clearly and that the test evaluation be either passing or failing.

The law empowers the security director to exempt a candidate for the post of village chief from the requirement of reading and writing if he is a sole candidate.

Exemption from the requirement of the ability to read and write is tied to the following restrictions:

1. This exemption is restricted to the post of village chief and excludes that of mayor.
2. The candidate to the post of chief should be a sole candidate.
3. This exemption is optional and not mandatory.
4. The security director is the authority with the power to grant this exemption.
5. The security director must issue the exemption decision during the period in which the candidacy applications are under review, i.e. during the 10 days following the end of the period of nomination. The exemption decision becomes void after this period because the security director will have then lost his authority to use this power.

It is to be noted that in case an appeal is made concerning the presence of the requirement of reading and writing, the committee reviewing the nomination appeals must re-test the candidate in reading and writing. If the committee decides to reject the appeal without re-testing the candidate, being content with the precedent of his failure in both reading and writing, then the committee's decision will be incorrect because it diminishes what is required [procedurally]. The committee is

required to verify the soundness of the appeal by re-testing the candidate in reading and writing, and this is something which it hasn't done. This requires that the papers be referred to the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to correct the procedures by re-testing the candidate in reading and writing and by then proceeding with the measures stipulated by the law (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 29 January 1977, Dossier 42/9/18).

5. Condition of Cultivable Land Holding, Pension or Fixed Income From Landed Property:

The law makes several stipulations which have been explained at the outset of this article.

Insofar as this condition of candidacy is concerned, we underline the following observations:

A. The candidate to the post of mayor must hold at least 5 feddans in ownership i.e. he must be in control and the owner of this area of land. Control without ownership is not enough. The law permits that this land be within the jurisdiction of the village for whose mayoralty he is a candidate or in the neighboring villages.

B. To make sure that the condition of cultivable land ownership is met, article 7 of the executive regulations concerning the village mayors and chiefs law requires that the certificate of cultivable land ownership or an official copy thereof be presented to prove that the candidate for mayor owns at least 5 feddans, in addition to an official certificate of (actual expenses), i.e. another official document proving that he owns such land in the village or in the neighboring villages.

G. The law provides an alternative to the condition of the candidate's cultivable land ownership, namely that the candidate have a monthly pension or a fixed income of no less than 40 pounds from landed property. To make sure that this condition is met, article 7 of the executive regulations requires the submission of an official certificate proving that the candidate is entitled to a monthly pension from a public treasury or has a steady income of no less than 40 pounds from landed property. Insofar as the landed property is concerned, the law stipulates that it must be something other than cultivable land and must be owned by the candidate.

The law provides an alternative to the condition of cultivable land ownership for the candidate for the post of village chief, namely that he earn a monthly pension or a fixed income from landed property of no less than 15 pounds monthly.

Some people are mistaken when they think that a still active civil servant at the time the door of nominations for the post of mayor is opened meets the condition of being entitled to a monthly pension, considering that he will be entitled to this pension when he is retired. Being potentially entitled to a pension at the time when the door of nomination is opened is not enough. This means that it is not enough for a candidate to complete the period of service that entitles him to a pension after the door of nomination is opened and without having actually completed the service and already earned the right to a pension. The legislator demands that the candidate be actually entitled to the pension at the time when the door of nomination is opened. Being potentially entitled is not enough. Actual entitlement does not arise until the service is completed (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 24 August 1968, Dossier 42/11/34).

6. Condition of Registration in Segment List [qa'imat al-hissah]:

Article 2 of the village mayors and chiefs law underlines another condition that must be met by the candidate to the post of village chief, namely that such a candidate's name be registered in the segment list, considering that the article divides the village into segments, each with its chief and with its list in which it registers annually the names of its inhabitants who are registered in the village voters list. This means that a candidate to the post of the chief of a vacant village segment must be from this segment and his name must be registered in this segment's list.

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the executive regulations concerning the village mayors and chiefs law state the procedures for preparing and amending the segment lists, summed up in the following:

A. Each segment shall have a list in which it registers the names of its inhabitants who are included in the village voters list. This segment list shall be prepared in two copies, one kept by the mayor and the other by the [district] officer.

B. The committee for preparing the segment lists shall be formed under the chairmanship of the village mayor and with the membership of the segment chief, the (village marriage clerk) and whichever literate village voters selected by the officer.

C. The segment lists shall be amended annually in the 2 weeks following the conclusion of the annual review of the voter lists, ending on 31 December. The amendment shall be made in accordance with the village voter list by adding to or omitting from the segment list the names added to or omitted from the village voter list.

D. No amendment shall be introduced to the segment lists during the year, except within the limits set by article 11 of the executive regulations concerning law No 73 of 1956 on regulating the exercise of political rights. Such amendments concern the change of voting place, correction of the voter lists in implementation of the decisions and rulings on appeals pertaining to registration in the voter lists or changes made in accordance with notifications on final rulings or decisions leading to the denial or suspension of the exercise of political rights.

It is to be noted that article 10 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights states that no change may be made in the voter lists after the voters are summoned to an election or a referendum. In implementation of this provision, no changes may be introduced to the village segment lists when the voters are already invited to vote in an election or a referendum because these changes are made in accordance with the contents of the village voter list. Thus, it is not permissible in this case--i.e. after issuance of the decision inviting the voters to take part in the election or referendum--to amend the voter lists.⁽¹⁾

(1) The remaining part of the topic, pertaining to the nomination procedures for the posts of village mayor and chief, will be completed later.

UNIVERSITIES MUST FULFILL SOCIAL NEEDS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Feb 81 p 8

[Interview with Dr Ali Shariatmadari]

[Text]

A thorough and complete revolution is one that brings about a transformation in all aspects of the society. The culture and value system of a society are the determining factors in the line and policies of that society. The Islamic Revolution was a revolution of values, this movement introduced new criteria in all dimensions. Beginning from within man and reaching all organs of the society, the cultural revolution has proven to play a sensitive and noteworthy role. In the educational dimension schools have undergone vast cultural developments and transformations still continue. The universities have been closed for this cause. Several months ago Imam Khomeini appointed a committee to formulate and coordinate the matters of the cultural revolution.

To clarify the viewpoints of this committee and their goal, Pars News Agency has interviewed Dr. Ali Shariatmadari a member of the Cultural Revolution Committee which follows:

Q: What is the overall objective of this committee and what responsibilities do you feel?

A: This point must be clarified that the cultural Revolution is not limited to an educational revolution. The changing of educational aims, the contents of education, educational programs and training of teachers and professors are only a part of the overall goal of

the cultural revolution. However, the staff, due to the priority of university matters and educational centers and in accordance with Imam Khomeini's decree, has concentrated a large part of its activities to bring about fundamental transformation in education at all levels.

In due time, the staff can, with the support of other social organs, bring about a complete transformation in all aspects of life. I must also state that the problems facing our universities are very complicated.

The problem does not consist in holding classes, or the professors and the students. Such problems could be solved at any time and our universities would reopen. The question of university existence must be defined and the responsibilities of universities must be determined.

The curriculum must be based on scientific principles and in line with the country's needs. The role of the university with regard to the government and the people must be determined. The universities must be in the service of the people and this matter cannot be regarded in an uncertain manner. Rather, the daily activities of our universities must be productive in answering the needs of our society. The society needs medical doctors and the universities must train these doctors.

But an increase in the number of physicians will not give any value for the society if their attitude is the same as that of our present doctors. If instead of eight medical universities, we have twenty, but the graduates are not willing to serve in rural areas and all of them want to become specialists and reside in foreign countries or only in our large cities, these universities will not benefit 70 to 80 percent of our people and the fact that these universities are open or closed, will not make any difference for the people.

Medical universities are valuable for the society when the students, from the start of their medical training, are willing to travel to villages and concentrate their training in these regions. In this case, the process of education directly benefits the society.

This also holds true for other universities. Our university specialists must venture into the poorer regions of the country and deal with these great problems. If all these graduates wanted to live in the bigger cities and be employed by this or that ministry, then the universities would have no value for the society.

In the past, the objective was to increase the number of students and higher training centers and the programming was not based on scientific principles. Education facilities were not provided to all

universities and the students, were not accepted on educational criteria. In summary, the results of the activities of the universities, students and the professors, were not given to the society.

The graduates did not work in their own fields of expertise. For this reason, the formation of universities, the programming, the appointment of professors and students, must be carefully studied and before this aim is realized, the opening of the universities has no meaning.

Q: A need is felt for a new set of classification in regards to the cultural revolution. What is the position of the cultural revolution staff concerning this phenomenon?

A: The phrase "cultural revolution" has two meanings, one is "revolution" and the other "cultural." Revolution means that a fundamental transformation in all aspects of life must occur. The political, economic and educational systems must change and relationships between the people and the government must be changed.

There must occur a transformation in our relations with other countries and the role of our people must be different from what it was in the past. In such conditions, we can declare that a revolution has occurred.

But when we speak of culture, we must understand what is meant by culture. Of course, sociologists and anthropologists speak about the meaning of culture and present different views on it.

Sometimes it is said that culture is the life-style of a society, its cooking, clothing, etc., the manner of dealing with nature which encompasses science, or the manner of dealing with beauty which relates to arts and the manner of thought which considers philosophy and ideology. Therefore, we see that culture takes into account all materialistic and intellectual aspects of life and determines the life style of an individual in a society. Then, when considering a cultural

revolution, the meaning must include all these different aspects.

Q: Considering the fact that in the cultural revolution of Iran, the universities have been closed for an indefinite period of time, do you consider the society, or the university, as the determining factor of our cultural revolution?

A: Universities, as a sector of the society, are affected by the society and also have an affect on society. In reality, there exists an organic relationship between universities and the society. When we discuss society, we are in fact discussing the existing system of values in that society.

Due to the fact that, since the advent of Islam, Islamic culture has influenced us in all aspects of life, all social organs must be under this same influence. Universities, as a social organ, obey society and must comprehend the society's culture. In the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the cultural revolution went beyond the philosophical, ethical and artistic boundaries and encompassed the political and economical dimensions of the society.

Taking notice of this fact, universities must also be under the influence of an Islamic culture. And because in such a culture, intellectual incentives are the basis for all activities, the universities must comprehend the values of this culture and their responsibility towards it. In summary, in light of Islamic culture, universities must carry out a complete transformation in their affairs.

Q: What is the view of the cultural revolution staff in regards to political activities in universities?

A: We must first determine the meaning of political activity. We believe that universities are centers for discussion and review of different affairs, which includes politics. In accordance with this belief, freedom must prevail in the university environment. What is meant by discussions is a scientific approach in identifying problems, formulating answers, and forwarding the results to the society. If such is the nature of political

activity, then the universities are an important center for such matters.

However, if political activity is to include opposition to the people's ideas and attacking the leaders of the country, then we can no longer consider this political activity and will not allow it. Nowhere in the world is any social organ allowed to conduct such activities. We believe that students should study political matters and discuss such issues. But as I have said, the nature of "discussions" is important.

Q: In response to the country's vital needs in the fields of science and agriculture, decisions have been made to reopen Technical and Medical Schools. But there is little or no talk about Humanities and Arts. Don't you think that after a while, the prevalence of a sort of technocracy will entangle all levels of our universities, giving no importance to Humanities?

A: The staff has not been idle regarding this matter. We have formed groups of experts and professors of Humanities and have chosen 15 essential fields of Humanities and have merged them with other subjects. We have weekly discussions with professors of Humanities. Our aim is to determine to what extent Humanities has been influenced by Western or Eastern system of values. We must determine the role of Humanities in the present world.

What is Islam's view towards Humanities? How can we employ Islamic doctrine in examining and putting forward new ideas in certain fields of Humanities? Besides, we want to include Humanities in our university curriculum, so that a trained engineer or physician can understand and be familiar with the society's system of values. Therefore, you see that we have been active in this regard and are continuing our research and work in Humanities. We hope that Humanities like other subjects, will be able to meet its responsibilities to the society.

ADOBE CONSTRUCTION INDICATES RETURN TO SIMPLER LIFESTYLE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Feb 81 p 8

[Excerpts]

I bear the hope that, with knowledge and action, with knowledge and purity of soul, with knowledge and pious deed, you will overcome your difficulties.

— "Imam Khomeini"

I wake up thinking about clay. Why is it that we still know so little about this simple material?

Humans have been with it since the dawn of civilization and even earlier than that.

... The coming of industrialism with its spangles has thoroughly blinded the human creature to the soul that is alive in clay. The protective layer industrialized man has developed, has numbed his senses.

Concrete and steel, tools of lazy minds, have stopped the progress of clay which can so beautifully mold imagination into form and space. Vaults and domes, children of clay, are but imitated in concrete and steel, while the opportunity to create new forms with clay has been stopped somewhere in history.

... How is it that the human creature had created the most beautiful structures and spaces out of clay units before the technology of today stopped him at the elastic limit of this material? How is it that since strength of materials have been known and sophisticated calculations have been developed, no architect or engineer dares to build a mud vault of more than three-meter

span? And yet, far bigger spans were built hundreds of years ago and still stand.

... If I can successfully bake a glaze into my house, then after 6,000 years of ceramics sized for the mantlepiece, I will make the revolution of living in ceramic spaces. It will be a true integration of ceramic art into architecture...

In our visits to contemporary art museums and the numerous exhibitions held there, on the occasion of the 2nd anniversary of the victory of the revolution, gallery number 5 attracted our attention very much. Because, in the majority of museums and exhibitions, located in the northern part of the city, we saw a kind of art which is alien to the majority of our masses and has so far failed to attain their recognition.

Maybe they thought that if some villager or worker from the south of the city, set foot upon the elegant halls of the museum, they would somehow take away from the artistic value of the paintings and other items. And this was the kind of "arts" that the taghoot culture introduced into our society, arts alien to the people. But no, we do longer want this sort of art, because we have had a revolution and if we claim that our revolution touches all dimensions of life, then this revolution must also encompass our arts.

Today, in our visits to one of the most exciting museums in Iran, we saw signs indicating the start of a revolution in our arts. We can claim our arts to be popu-

lar when the museums and exhibitions attract and entertain all the different strata of our people.

The art that is presented, must tell of the pains and needs of our own society. The reason gallery No. 5 attracted our attention was because the art presented offered a cure for one of the biggest pains suffered by a hardworking stratum of our people, which for years had suffered the lashes of different dictators ruling Iran.

Yes, this time, the pains of the mostaz'afin have been taken to the museums in the upper part of town. Together we shall take a look at the museum and then speak to one of the officials of the exhibition. The exhibition is called Geltaftan.

Geltaftan is the name of a new system of architecture, which is very new in Iran and the world and the system was introduced by an Iranian engineer.

This system strengthens the resistance of mud houses and this system can be employed for strengthening old houses in rural areas and prevent their devastation due to natural disasters like floods and earthquakes. One of the qualities of this system is the low economic cost. The process has no need for factories, machinery and skilled labor. The exhibition views a number of pictures showing the different stages of the process and the work done on some rural houses. Also a torch is seen, that is simple enough, is the only needed too for the process.

Nader Khalili, who has innovated and constructed the Geltaftan system, was born in Tehran in 1937. He has gained his education and experience in Iran, Turkey and the United States.

For the past six years, riding a motorcycle, he has been doing research and studies in villages of Iran. A summary of his impressions has been written in his book called "Racing Alone".

He has delivered lectures and published articles around the world about habitations for poor people and the transfer of traditional crafts into the modern technology. Another system he has designed is called "Sardgah", by which architecture of traditional ice-reserves can be utilized to create modern cold store and cooling systems. A prototype of this work is presently being developed.

Geltaftan (literally "clay-firing") is an expression made up of the words "Gel" ("g" pronounced like in "get"), meaning clay-mud, and "Taftan", meaning to fire or bake.

Geltaftan is a method of increasing the resistance of existing buildings, especially clay and adobe rural dwellings. It is also a system of constructing new buildings to become traditional, beautiful and low-cost; which are resistant to natural elements, floods and earthquakes.

The design is based on the utilization of the four universal elements of water, earth, air and fire. By this method, existing sun-dried bricks and clay houses are fired and baked in place to become a monolithic brick structure.

The penetrating effect of fire fuses the walls, floors, the roofs and different parts of the building as much as possible. New buildings too can be made of such materials as adobe and clay earth, and then baked into an integral, jointless unit. The interior areas of houses can also be lined with a layer of ceramic glaze, baked together with the structure, creating tilework-like even surfaces.

Geltaftan is a simple, elementary method by which the art of traditional architecture and traditional crafts such as brick baking,

pottery and ceramic work are linked and put to use.

The applications of Geltaftan are numerous. Among the primary and secondary possible applications relevant to the rehabilitation and new construction of the villages in Iran, particularly from the housing viewpoint, three may be envisaged:

- 1) Increasing the stability of existing houses made of adobe and clay.

- 2) Building new houses with adobe and clay as its principal construction materials.

- 3) Prefabrication system.

Secondary applications of Geltaftan such as stabilizing "qanats" (underground irrigation system), producing construction materials, pottery, enamel, etc., are also possible.

After repairing a number of old and worn-out houses of a village, the process of firing and baking was carried out, with the following results, which may speak of a significant development in the future of rural architecture:

- a) The existing vault or dome covered houses made of adobe and clay were cheaply (\$52.- of fuel for a house with two rooms) transformed into brick houses. Not only were the old adobes changed into solid baked bricks, but also the mortar between them acquired the solidity of bricks, adding to the rigidity of the structures.

- b) With the radical change of properties occurring in the firing process, the weak points of adobe and clay — their solubility in water and low resistance to crushing forces — were turned into strong ones. This natural alteration of the material through the action of fire gives it added resistance to rain, snow, floods or earthquakes.

- c) Using a primitive method, with the sole help of home-made torches and local fuel, it was shown that reconstruction and restoration can be achieved in the remotest regions of the country. With a minimal investment in buying the necessary equipment (\$450.- for a torch, a hand pump and some piping), it is possible to bake a whole village.

- d) Once the houses are solidified, they may be finished with

any traditional materials such as mudstraw or stucco, without any need for major alterations in the suitable living space of villagers.

- e) Some areas of a building, such as the bathroom, the toilet room, the kitchen, etc., may be lined with a layer of traditional ceramic enamel. Surfaces treated in this manner will be similar to a uniform tileworks all at once solid, hygienic and attractive. Thus, the success gained in glazing of the experimental rooms has brought forth a turning point in the integration of the architecture and ceramic arts.

- f) With the use of the amount of heat required for baking the materials of the structures, the pest-ridden living areas are thoroughly wiped-out of mice and troublesome insects, and ample obstacles are created against their return.

- g) By erecting temporary thin walls at the door and window openings, every room may be used as a brick kiln, where sun-dried bricks can be baked for use in making walls, landscape, etc. In this way, not only a building will require no manufactured construction materials, but will act as a profitable productive unit itself.

- h) Among the most important results of the implementation of this project in the reconstruction of villages is the "self-help" factor. The "brick-backing" restoration method not only gains spontaneous acceptance by villagers, but, as soon as the first house is baked, it is learnt by them, and put to use by their own hands, since they are naturally and traditionally acquainted with every stage of it. Even in winter, when no agricultural work takes place, the restoration can easily go on. The tests made by the experts of the Building and Housing Research Center of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development — regarding resistance to moisture, pressure and loadbearing — points to the success of Geltaftan.

- i) A proof of this success may be observed in the old kilns of the villages. These kilns were made of adobe and clay, and by the action of fire they have withstood centuries of rain and snow and floods

and earthquakes, unaltered as one-piece bricks.

With the Geltaftan method, every new rural building, whether a mosque, a school, a private house a public bath or a stable, can be made of adobe and clay as its only construction materials, and then baked into a one-piece brick. The finish works of these buildings may be done in the traditional manner, and areas such as bathrooms and toilets can be ceramic enameled and fired.

In almost every region of Iran, the clay earth required for building can be found. In cases where it may not be available, its transportation is feasible and economic, because it is the only material to be transported. Also the cost of this transportation will be considerably less than that of steel, cement or other manufactured materials, all the way from countries who export them.

The results obtained from the application of Geltaftan in the new construction of buildings which are underway are as follows:

a) All the needed buildings are made in the village by the local "memar" (builder), often in an indigenous manner.

b) Importing construction materials such as steel, cement, bricks, tiles, etc., is absolutely unnecessary (this can mean severing every dependence of the village upon

manufactured, non-local products).

c) The cost involved is considerably lower than that of buildings commonly using bricks and steel beams, it is more in line with the low-cost adobe construction. Thus, with the amount of money required for one modern steel and concrete building, it is possible to build a few houses by Geltaftan. The effects of such a dive in prices at the national level can mean a huge difference in total figures.

d) By using the Geltaftan method, original, traditional architecture, together with its innumerable desirable features, can be revived, and our villages can retain their own architectural identities.

e) By making use of local materials and manpower, work is provided in the village, and all the money allocated for construction is spent in the village.

f) Similar to rehabilitation work, in this case also rooms can be used as kilns to produce bricks.

g) In the Geltaftan method, there can never be a shortage of materials, (as it is common in the conventional systems). Clay is abundant, and every kind of fuel can be used. In the extreme case of a temporary shortage of fuel, the building can still be erected and used in the traditional manner, until fuel is once again available.

h) Geltaftan is a combination of rural, traditional arts and crafts, which naturally gains the immediate acceptance of villagers, who learn it rapidly.

With existing plans and designs, it is possible to prefabricate rural houses, which are then transported to their sites. In this way, the Geltaftan factory (which operates just like a brick factory) produces units which are used in the assembly of a house.

Each of these elements is a complete brick room (integrating the walls, the roof and the floor) produced in one piece. The combination of these allows a house, a school or a public building complex to be easily created.

One of the greatest advantages of this method is that such buildings are resistant to earthquakes, because the one-piece rooms, resting on a layer of sand, actually float over the tremor waves. Eventually, this may lead to a new method whereby it can be possible to set new standards of strength of materials in combination with the geometric forms of buildings, in view of better protection against earthquakes.

Another advantage of the prefabrication method is the rapidity of its production of housing modules. In this way villages can be restored and new villages can be built within a short period of time.

BRIEFS

TECHNICAL COOPERATION MINUTES--Baghdad, 5 Mar (INA)--Iraq and Bulgaria signed here today joint minutes for scientific, technical and economic cooperation in the field of construction and building. The joint minutes was signed by Iraqi Housing and Reconstruction Minister Muhammad Fadil and visiting Bulgarian Minister of Construction and Constructional Materials Ivan Sakarev. It covers cooperation in the field of practical research and exchange of expertise in the field of laboratory research and testing of construction materials. The Bulgarian side expressed preparedness to delegate experts and engineers to Iraq where they will work in the construction of roads and bridges, and share in laying blueprints for housing schemes in Iraq. [Text] [JN051927 Baghdad INA in English 1900 GMT 5 Mar 81]

SAUDIS REPORTEDLY HELP IRAQ--Iraq has recently completed several large arms deals, with Saudi help, in order to overcome the Soviet embargo on Iraq. Our Arab affairs correspondent Ehud Ya'ari says that the new deals are based on the supply of Saudi oil in return for the weapons. From Brazil, Iraq is purchasing about 2,000 armored personnel carriers, and from Spain it will purchase transport planes and bombers as well as large quantities of ammunition and light arms. Iraq is seeking to purchase 200 tank transporters from Britain, aid in the overhaul of chieftain tanks that were captured from Iran, and Rapier antiaircraft missiles. From Italy, Iraq is purchasing naval vessels. Our correspondent notes that this effort reflects an Iraq desire to free itself from dependence on the Soviet and to ready itself for the continuation of the war against Iran. [Text] [TA082019 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 8 Mar 81]

CSO: 4820

RAFI LEADER ASSESSES DAYAN'S POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] IN THIS ancient land of miracles, where political corpses have a knack of coming back to life to heckle their eulogizers, Moshe Dayan may be getting ready for his third coming. This is unprecedented, even in Israeli politics. Dayan has known how to preserve his legend of being above the rules that bind other men. He has demonstrated that Humpty Dumpty can put himself together again and lead the king's men back to the castle.

Speculation about the state of his health notwithstanding, Dayan in his mid-60s still basks in the aura of the eternally youthful rebel. No other Israeli politician has been described as "a sex symbol for us Americans" — as actor Peter Sarsus referred to him some time ago. And now it appears that Dayan is all set to embark on a new adventure.

His ex-Labour comrades, outraged by what they consider his effrontery in seeking to take votes away from them, remind one that Dayan sees himself as a lone fox. They argue that he is behaving in character and is determined to poach on their run, like a cunning predator invading a hard-working farmer's grounds.

The priests of Dayan's personality cult, on the other hand, expect to benefit from the tendency to amnesia among the voters. But they will face droves of disenchanted devotees for whom Dayan is the Great Betrayer who turned their tablets of faith into stepping stones for his career.

For them, Dayan is the one who made inconsistency an exact science. For his supporters, his qualities of leadership and super-pragmatism make up for what the critics see as egocentric opportunism and disdain for the suffering of ordinary people. One Dayan-watcher speaks of his "chromepainted charisma."

THE DAYAN camp is banking on Labour skirting the Yom Kippur War guilt issue (because a number of its front-benchers were in power at the time), and on the Likud being kind to Dayan (in the expectation that he will deprive Labour of many votes).

Yet Dayan will not be able to escape criticism that his ministerial record in both defence and foreign affairs was not as glowing as his public relations efforts would have us believe. His impatience with bread-and-butter issues resulted in a defence establishment that was not prepared for the surprise attack in 1973; and when he resigned from the foreign ministry he left many areas outside headline-catching diplomacy in a state of neglect.

Dayan would in effect be asking the nation for another blank cheque, seeking to capitalize on the crisis of faith in the established parties.

But as the election campaign proceeds Dayan will have to face two symbols of his inconsistency which have cost millions of shekels of public money — Yamit and Ophira.

More than any other public figure, it was Dayan who inspired

the creation of these two settlement entities, only to abandon them as a Likud minister.

Although his political record is strewn with the wreckage of other people's careers, Dayan takes it for granted that those he has let down will still come running to him when he calls. The most outstanding case is the ever-loyal Mordechai Ben-Porat, who took Dayan at his word in 1977 and soon found that he had been abandoned to fend for himself.

Ben-Porat's experience will not, apparently, stop him from joining Dayan's list if asked, because he believes that Dayan knows what's good for this country.

Zalman Shoval has also managed to remain a loyal supporter of Dayan. He was part of the original band that formed Rafi and even followed Dayan back into Labour in 1967 for a short while when Rafi formed a union with Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda. He broke with Dayan over his fence-sitting, and in 1968 chose to follow Ben-Gurion and Dayan's cousin Yigael Hurvitz in forming the State List. In 1973 they joined with Eliezer Shostak and Ehud Olmert in the La'am party, which was a founding group of the Likud.

In this framework they achieved power in 1977 as part of Begin's Likud, finding themselves in happy partnership with Dayan, who, having been elected on the Labour ticket, hardly hesitated to cross the political divide and join the Begin cabinet.

AT 50, SHOVAL, who is a banker, has taken on the onerous duty of assembling the vehicle for Dayan's

third coming. Apparently, Hurvitz and Shoval will bring Rafi's assets, and its access to public funding both in the Knesset and the Histadrut, while Dayan will bring his glamour and popularity.

"Moshe says the 10th Knesset will have to cope with some of our most fateful problems, particularly the follow-up of the autonomy scheme and the relationship with Jordan under the Camp David agreement," notes Shoval. "At present neither the Likud nor Labour is offering clear answers on this subject."

Dayan fears Labour could make a deal with Jordan short of peace and thinks Begin has missed the big chance created by the peace treaty to defuse the Palestinian issue.

Shoval speaks of Rafi as providing the organizational basis.

"We know that our electoral potential if we stand alone is 6-8 seats, while polls indicate that a Dayan list could net 'at least' 20 seats."

The new party's social and economic programme would reflect Yigael Hurvitz's thinking. Shoval suggests, adding "the public knows that Yigael was right."

In his forthcoming book Dayan reiterates that he is finished with politics, which leaves another question mark over his credibility.

Would the party simply serve as a one-time vehicle of convenience for Moshe Dayan, turning into a wrecking machine or a constructive mechanism at its master's will?

"Dayan says that we are in a state of national emergency, so there is room for a list based on agreed positions composed of men capable of implementing them," he replied.

"It is possible that some of its members might not wish to serve more than one term in the Knesset. No, it's not simply a vehicle for Dayan, rather it's aimed at being a conveyance of declared positions. It is coming into being in response to Dayan's confession that he did not want to lose sleep over the fact that if he stayed out of politics bad things might happen in Judea and Samaria that would endanger our country."

If the new list wins enough seats to play a real role in the next Knesset, it will choose between the two big parties, depending on where it can have more influence. "We might even opt for the Opposition benches," declares Shoval. "It will be a list advocating a programme on pragmatic lines in the best Ben-Gurionist tradition."

Moshe once told Begin that if Jordan should offer a peace treaty based on territorial compromise, Israel should *not* say there is nothing to talk about."

At the same time Shoval attacks Labour's "readiness for unilateral concessions," adding that "even the Allon plan has been abandoned by them."

He then reminds me that Dayan only stepped into the Likud ministerial limousine after Begin promised not to annex the West Bank.

AS TO THE list's composition, Shoval at this stage is ready to say only that there will be 39 candidates, including Moshe Dayan, Yigael Hurvitz, Zalman Shoval, Yitzhak Peretz and Israel Katz — and probably Mordechai Ben-Porat. Among the others there would be two prominent economists, three senior business executives, a noted political scientist, three women, two generals, a well-known author-historian, representatives of development towns and an Arab.

Wouldn't this be the Democratic Movement for Change in different clothing? "No resemblance whatsoever, apart from the justified disappointment with the Likud and the lack of enthusiasm for Labour. From the start the DMC was a chance collection of people lacking any common ideological background, who got together to pull in the votes. We know that anyone joining us does so on an accepted programme. Most of our candidates were at one time or other part of Rafi, or supported Ben-Gurion."

Also the leadership issue would be clear-cut from the outset. "Yadin is a decent and honest man, but he lacks the kind of personal authority that Dayan enjoys. The list will certainly reflect Dayan's thinking."

DAYAN GAVE some insight into his thinking in a newspaper article last week; in which he clarified what he meant when he called for "a government with a strong hand." He explained: "We aren't doing enough to fight crime. If the police lacks the necessary force, I would recommend using army units." He also wanted "a clear-cut and tough policy on economic matters involving radical measures" — like the closure of El Al.

Dayan was quite revealing when asked whether he thought some people were tired of democracy. He said: "While I am no barometer of the public mood, I think that it's not a matter of tiredness with democracy as a concept but with the lack of effectiveness of Israeli democracy. Under this system there can also emerge highly effective leadership. One cannot say that the U.S. does not have democracy because it has a presidency. There, a small group of people manage matters quite efficiently."

"Nor do I think there are any complaints about the working of executive policy-making in Britain. One may disagree with Mrs. Thatcher's policies but one cannot

ignore that she governs with a clearly-defined policy. I do think it's highly exaggerated to translate the general mood of dissatisfaction in [Israel] as a total negation of the democratic system. Recent governments did not — in the public mind — function effectively and failed to cope with the country's problems."

After explaining that his final decision to run would hinge on who would go along with his platform, Dayan revealed that he would unveil his programme on March 6 at a "forum for political and economic discussions."

He also intimated that he would announce his decision to form his own slate in the first week of April, just before the 9th Knesset dissolves.

Dayan stressed that his "reservations about Labour's platform does not mean support of the Likud." The Likud's problem, according to Dayan, "is not only programmatic but one of performance and implementation of policy."

(Dayan dropped a bombshell at the Tel Aviv Labour Council forum recently when he said "I will not crawl back to Labour," apparently expecting the party he had so ruthlessly abandoned in its hour of need to crawl back to him. Labour supporters see this declaration as yet another indication of how slippery a customer Dayan can be — taking his battle for votes into the heart of its Tel Aviv stronghold.)

Dayan is against Labour's platform because he considers it to be against Israel's interests, "although of course I do not question the good intentions and constructive approach of Shimon Peres, Israel Galili and Haim Bar-Lev." His main objection is to Labour's proposal to reach an accommodation with Jordan in stages; his greatest fear is that the mountain slopes along the West Bank will be handed back to Jordan. This is the fulcrum of Israel's eastern defence line, Dayan argues, which under any agreement must remain under IDF control.

He also takes issue with the Labour plank to pursue negotiations with Jordan without resorting to new elections (as had been the Labour commitment under Golda Meir to the NRP).

Dayan envisages that the main burden of his election campaign clash with Labour will be on that issue. "I would not propose that anyone vote for them on such a platform. I don't buy the (Likud) argument that they want to sell us out to the PLO, but I do contend that their practical policies would be our country's ruin. I will fight that with all my verbal powers. If as a result they will be denied their mandate to govern, I won't regret it. On the contrary, I will be very happy indeed." □

THIRD MAJOR PARTY SEEN AS MISGUIDED ALTERNATIVE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 13

[Article by Yoel Marcus: "Without Dreams of Princes"]

[Text] Something strange is happening to the country on the way to the tenth Knesset: It is left without De Gaulles. The nation, not unlike a magician who is left without rabbits, pigeons, and other creatures to pull out of his hat, stands with open mouth and scratches its head: What to do when Menahem Begin has let you down and the alternative is not so appealing? Who is one going to vote for? Who shall be made leader and guide when the hat is completely empty of tricks? The fact that so many people have not yet decided who to vote for is living proof that there are no more magic leaders left, and that in effect we are on the threshold of a new era.

The yearning for a charismatic-authoritarian leader began in the public consciousness when David Ben Gurion's decline started at the end of the first decade of the state. Since then, for almost two decades, we have nurtured in our consciousness a sort of a succession of idols who at a given time were expected to step into Ben Gurion's shoes and lead with a sure hand and a clear knowledge of goals to be met. But the disappointments were as great as the expectations. Somehow those whom the public imagination considered touched by the divine spirit and capable of bringing salvation, were burned the moment they took hold of the reins, like meteors entering the atmosphere.

The first to be burned was the late Yigal Alon, considered superstar by many, at a time when Moshe Dayan was an unknown general in the early days of the state. Next to be burned like meteors were Pinhas Lavon and Yitzhak Ben Aharon, both because of their questionable character, their sharp tongue and their temper. The idolized Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, who many believed would bring salvation, were burned together. Golda, because there was no political wisdom behind her strength and determination. Dayan, because behind his political conception (or conceptions) there was no determination and consistency. After them and between them a whole generation of generals who were dropped into political life were burned. In many instances their contribution to our political life was insignificant or nil. Yitzhak Rabin, while no one's idol, was handed the party and the state on a silver platter after the Yom Kippur War fiasco in a way no one ever received it, certainly not with as much credit as he was given. He did not know what to do with the assets he inherited, and paved the way for his party's first historical defeat in the elections. After him Ezer Weizman crossed our sky, was

given praise, credit, and hopes. The disappointments he gave his supporters equal their dreams. Having reached the bottom of the magician's hat, the country even tried Begin, who, while not exactly everyone's dream, enjoyed the aura of the founders of the state. Begin, mainly disappointing his own friends, proved himself devoid of leadership, and to this day it is a mystery to me how he commanded, if indeed he did, the Irgun underground. Each disappointment gives rise to a new dream. Thus the Yitzhak Navon dream was born, but Navon himself, visible as he is, made it clear he was not made of the same stuff dreams are made of. Every Erlich had his Hurvitz. And every Hurvitz turned out to be a god who failed. Who for example is going to dream about "men like Buma Shavit," after we saw what he did running El Al?

The greatest public dream was smashed by Yigael Yadin. It is strange, for 20 years Yadin was on the periphery of our political life like a potential De Gaulle. Which commentator or journalist did not sin in making the prophecy that some day we would have to call Yadin to the rescue? He finally came, and brought down the Alignment, whereupon he sank into the quagmire of total inaction, with all the privileges of office.

And now, despite the Yadin and the Begin disappointments, 9 out of every 20 potential voters are still not convinced the Alignment is the best alternative for the present government. This vacuum of undecidedness is giving rise to the assumption that there is room for a "middle party," which, with the right candidates, will accomodate all those who are fed up with the Likud but dislike the Alignment. A similar, though opposite task, was undertaken by the Democratic Movement for Change in the last elections. But this time this new party cannot find a new De Gaulle for good measure. Yigael Yadin can indeed be sorry (personally, at least) he did not stay out of the race as a potential De Gaulle to this day, when we no longer have dreams of princes. At least we would have had someone in whose hands we could entrust the "center party" we hear so much about. It might have gotten the 20 plus seats which such list is now expected to get, but it is doubtful whether its fate would have been different from that of the DMC. I am afraid this is what awaits any "middle party" which might come into existence in the next few months.

The reason is, you cannot rely on an ad hoc party, without a past or an ideology, without a solid base, a patchwork party with only one goal--to seize as many seats as possible from the large parties. Yet there are signs some past "saviors,"--Dyan, Weizman, Hurvitz and others are busy creating a center party. What will be the ideological base of these people in the future, considering the fact they did not get along while serving in the same government? Even if such a party comes into being, it is safe to assume it will crumble soon after the elections, once it has blocked the winning party from having the necessary majority or forced it into the bear hug of the religious parties. After the DMC experience and without dreams of princes, the center party is discredited by definition. It will not be a party and it will not be central, only a mirage, our last one, and a stumbling block on the road of orderly government.

Having no choice next June except to vote for either Begin or Peres, the future battles of the 80s will take place between Dov Ben Meir, Eliyahu Shpeiser, Miki

Bar Zohar, and Aharon Harel on one hand, and Tosef Rom, David Levi, Yoram Aridor, Gid'on Pat and their likes, on the other. The public has to get used to the idea that we are left without De Gaulles and without magic leaders to dream of, and we have to learn how to live and get along without them. Who knows, such acceptance of simple reality without grandiose dreams may indeed be our salvation.

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FORMER DMC ACTIVISTS ASSESS POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Feb 81 p 7

[Article by Robert Rosenberg]

[Text] THEY WERE THE BEST and the brightest in those days of despair and scandal. They promised a return to an atmosphere like that of the earliest days of the state, when nobody was apathetic, nobody was corrupt, nobody was uninvolved.

Some joined on the ground floor, before there was even a name for the phenomenon. Others joined later, when the issue of names sometimes appeared more important than the ideology itself. When the second group joined, some say, the fall began. However, members of the second group now claim that they were the original nucleus.

And when the death was finally announced this week of the Democratic Movement for Change — or shall we call it Dash, or Shinui, or the Democrats or the Free Centre — it evoked few outbursts of emotion.

Who still remembers the DMC's Seven Principles? Or the reasons why Shulamit Aloni never joined? And who cares? One more-or-less serious question remains: Was it murder, manslaughter, or suicide?

"It was as if somebody impregnated 200,000 people, and then forced an abortion that ended up as a hysterectomy. It was a crime," says Asher Tarmon. He is usually a calm man who runs an important, but not huge, Jewish organization that specializes in American Jewry's relations with Israel.

From his office not far from Jerusalem's King David Hotel he can see the American flag atop the U.S. consulate on Rehov Agron.

But his concerns are not American; he has been an Israeli for more than 30 years, and when he joined Shinui, he says, it was the first time he "became involved."

He mentions his early enthusiasm and the bitterness he now feels about all politics.

"If only we had pushed through electoral reform. I felt about that issue, that principle, the way a soldier feels about his first combat. 'If I can only get through this, then everything will be all right,' says the soldier, and that's how we felt, how I felt about electoral reform."

Who will Tarmon vote for now? He doesn't know.

PERRY RODED, a successful Jerusalem businessman, knows who

he would like to vote for; he also knows that he'll have to vote for somebody else.

A few weeks ago Roded wrote a letter to a certain Mr. Allen, in the U.S., urging him to stand for the next Knesset.

"This electoral system," he wrote, "has produced some pretty strange results, the most grotesque being the election of (Flatto-Sharon)... the chances of legislation for electoral reform are practically nonexistent as it would put the majority of the current Knesset members out of a job."

"This is where you come in. If you agreed to run for the Knesset, your name at the head of the list

would be such a drawing card that your election would be a virtual certainty...

"The presence of the leading professional humourist of our generation alongside 119 amateur jokers... the realization that the time has come for electoral reforms," wrote the Jerusalem businessman.

Roded ended his letter — to Woody Allen — by saying that he was being absolutely serious.

But Roded will vote for Shinui in the coming elections; he stresses that he was always a member of Shinui, and didn't fall for Yadin as a knight in shining armour.

"Shinui lives on, returned to its original self," says Roded, describ-

ing the various splits that plagued the party as "purges."

ONE OF THE words that kept popping up this week in conversations about the DMC was "enthusiasm." People described how they had organized neighbours, relatives and colleagues.

They talked about their enthusiasm the way lapsed Catholics or former Mea She'arim residents speak of God. They felt conned, somehow resentful that they had allowed themselves to be sullied by their naivety, innocence and enthusiasm.

Tarmon throws away the brochures that still regularly arrive from both Shinui and Yadin's peo-

ple. Roded, wary of charisma, doesn't read the Shinui brochures but still allows the movement to collect IS3 a month from his bank account. It's not much money, and maybe it would cost more to cancel the standing order. But Roded knows that unless Woody Allen shows up by March (it would take him three months to become a citizen), he'll be voting for Shinui.

WE EXPLAINED to Roded that there was a mystery attached to this story. We weren't sure of the scene of the crime, or what instrument was used, or even what the motives were.

Roded sent us to Mr. Hepner, the owner of a Jerusalem institution where American-style deli is served. Hepner, said Roded, was a Shmuel Tamir man.

Tamir's reputation had us searching at first for his people as the possible perpetrators of the crime. So we eagerly hunted down Hepner behind his counter.

He didn't really want to talk about it all, and forcefully denied he was part of what Roded had called "the well-oiled, politically sophisticated Free Centre people who took over the party."

But Hepner did drop a clue.

"We saw the party as a *tabula rasa*. It was the Shinui people who ruined it. We saw it as an opportunity to preserve Eretz Yisrael. Yes, when they joined it ruined the party."

Even the chronology is blurred. Shinui existed long before the DMC.

Everybody had told us that the DMC was all about domestic issues. Hepner had given us a clue, but he refused to talk about it.

THERE WERE other people we spoke to, people we remembered as eager followers of Yadin. They refused to be mentioned by name and refused to acknowledge that Yadin had brought them into the affair. But then a chance conversation led us to Ruth Borman, well groomed, fortyish, married to a well-known Hadassah University Hospital professor.

She sat in her Abu-Tor living-room and told us she joined when

Yadin initiated the movement. She couldn't remember exactly when she first became disappointed — it must have been when she realized that the DMC had begun to give up its principles so that it could keep its seats in the government. She is still full of praise and respect for some of the leaders of the party. She will vote for Labour in the coming elections — "not for love of Mordechai but hatred of Haman."

She remembers the enthusiasm, but says that her entire lifestyle is one of civic involvement.

For her, the DMC was all about a kind of civic "purity." Hepner's words about Eretz Yisrael reverberate silently when she says that the leadership's power struggles over foreign and defence issues were the virus that ate away at the movement.

As the only person we spoke to who said she was ready to vote — "if the opportunity arises" — for a new party if one appears on the scene, Ruth Borman seemed to confound the theories of the cynics who are disappointed by the DMC story.

Asked about the "abortionist" theory of the DMC, she said that she was ready to be persuaded again, and offered another image. "Yadin had a sapling to plant in fertile ground," she said, reminding us of the public malaise of 1976-1977, when Labour was in ruins and Menahem Begin was still a pariah in the political wilderness, trying one last time to win an election.

ALL THOSE questioned talked about the same process. Immediate, undreamt of success (one even compared it to the establishment of the State, something nobody believed would happen and is now sometimes so disappointing), and just as sudden failure.

Success went to the head of the movement, said one. Another said the movement never really had a head which could be affected by success.

Nobody ever approached Yadin during the last four years to tell him what they thought. The irony of an electorate favouring constituency politics but refraining from contacting its elected representatives is only a minor theme in the affair.

The ultimate irony was expressed by Yadin himself, about six months ago, during one of the periodical splits in his now non-existent party. He was being interviewed by television at the Knesset and was asked whether he felt he had disappointed the 200,000 people who had voted for him.

He puffed twice on his pipe. He was the one who made constituency politics his major goal.

"How am I supposed to know who those 200,000 people are?" he replied.

NEW PARTY TAKES CENTRIST RELIGIOUS POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Mar 81 p 3

[Text]

Not since the period when David Ben-Gurion was prime minister has there been a real effort to reach a consensus on the role of Judaism in the Jewish state — and even Ben-Gurion was ambivalent on the subject — Prof. Ze'ev Falk said yesterday.

He was speaking at a press conference in Jerusalem called by Shorashim (roots), the new political party that sees itself as "a bridge between the religious and non-religious."

Dr. Michael Corinaldi, a practising lawyer and lecturer on family law at Tel Aviv University, is chairman of the movement and No. one on its projected Knesset list. Falk, professor of law at the Hebrew University, is No. two and Dr. Pinhas Rozenbluth, veteran educator and National Religious Party gadfly, is No. three.

Corinaldi said that newspaper descriptions of Shorashim as "an alternative to the National Religious Party" were misleading. It was not a religious party but "a

general Jewish movement" appealing to all voters who wanted to break down the wall between "religious" and "non-religious" ("a false dichotomy") and to base the life of the nation on "the elements of Jewish tradition."

Both Corinaldi and Falk complained of the obstacles for new lists being set by members of "the closed club" (i.e., parties represented in the present Knesset). They attacked the mooted raising of the minimum number of votes required for Knesset representation to 2.5 per cent (from the present 1 per cent) shortly before election day as "undemocratic" and bordering on retroactive legislation.

Corinaldi called it a desperate measure engineered by the NRP in an attempt to prevent its own disintegration (because of Rabbi Haim Druckman's intention of running a separate list).

LIFE IN GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS ANALYZED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 30 Jan, 13 Feb 81

[Article by Yosef Goell]

[30 Jan 81, pp 4-5]

[Text] The prospect of a new government sometime this summer is the overriding fact of life in the settlements of Judea and Samaria, where Gush Emunim is the largest single political force. The [author] toured the area last week, to check with Gush supporters and others on efforts to get as much done as possible before the forthcoming elections.

LAST APRIL, when I first visited the new Gush Emunim settlement at Eilon Moreh, the approach to the isolated outpost was over a potholed road-cum-track that wound through the Arab village of Deir el-Hatab. Earlier this month, when I had occasion again to visit the place, the approach started out from Nablus over the same potholed road but ended in a broad, newly-asphalted highway that swept up through the pine-covered mountainside, by-passing the Arab village entirely.

The road to Eilon Moreh is symbolic of the changes and the tempo that have characterized Israel's settlement efforts in the West Bank in the past three years.

In Eilon Moreh itself the original 40 prefab homes are now occupied (in April there were only 20 families on the site), and the shells of another 36 permanent concrete homes are taking shape on the hill-top above the present temporary site. In Ofra, the oldest of the Gush Emunim settlements, set up under

the Labour government and located on the Ramallah-Jericho road, settlers are preparing to move into the 50 new 78 sq.m. permanent homes nearing completion alongside the present prefab site.

The rise of new permanent homes at various stages of construction was also evident in all the other settlements of the cross-section we chose to visit earlier this month: Gush Emunim's Kedumim in Samaria, and Migdal Oz and Tekoa in Judea, the Herut-affiliated community of Ma'aleh Shomron, halfway from Kfar Sava to Kedumim; and the growing township of Ariel (which is not named after Ariel Sharon, the driving force behind settlement in Samaria and Judea).

Development of the budding occupational and industrial infrastructure to provide on-site jobs for most of the settlers is less impressive. There is a small silk-screen printing plant in Ofra employing about a dozen people, and a metal working plant connected with Defence In-

dustries; the beginnings of electronics and metal working plants at Eilon Moreh, and some talk of a still secret patent for producing electric batteries with a fantastically long life; a computer software plant in Kedumim and a smattering of smaller workshops; a plant making spare parts for the world's leading computer manufacturer at Ariel. But the vast majority of the breadwinners among the settlers still work in their original jobs on the Coastal Plain or in Jerusalem.

MAJOR SOURCES of employment are the yeshivot, religious seminaries and nature study schools in such places as Ofra, Beit El and Kedumim. The new local authorities that have sprung up for the settlements in Judea, Samaria and the "Land of Benjamin" (around Jerusalem) also provide clerical jobs, mostly for women from the member settlements.

Most settlements have by now been linked to the national

electricity grid, with some in the eastern sections of Judea and Samaria receiving their power from the Jerusalem Electric Corporation (at present under Arab control but threatened with take-over by the Israeli Ministry of Energy). Water is piped mainly from across the "Green Line" which marked Israel's former armistice lines with Jordan.

There is a new breathtaking road nearing completion between Tekoa, just at the foot of Mount Herodion in the uplands of the Judean Desert, and Mitzpe Shalem on the shores of the Dead Sea. A small section of Arik Sharon's pet project — the Cross-Samaria Defence Highway — has been completed west of the main Jerusalem-Nablus road, linking up with the narrow winding roads leading down to Kalkilya and Kfar Sava. Huge earthmoving machines are working on the last link in this road, east of the Jerusalem-Nablus highway, that will connect the coast with the settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley via Majdal Bani Fadil and Ma'aleh Ephraim, although the chairman of the Council of Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, Israel (Yesha) Harel, pooh-poohs the pace of work on this latter project.

The most impressive change of all is in population. Exact figures are hard to come by; the closest approximation I could get, from Harel and partly corrected by an on-the-spot check in a cross section of settlements, is 5,000 adults and 10,000 children in about 36 settlements.

NOT ALL the settlers are members of Gush Emunim and its periphery. Arizl, one of the largest settlements, was created mainly by secular, Labour-oriented (but hawkish) employees of the Defence Industries and the Israel Aircraft Industries. Nearby Ma'aleh Shomron is formally affiliated to the Herut settlement movement, although settlers there told me that few among them were indeed members of Herut. "We learned that you can't settle without some strong movement to represent you when they

give out the goodies, so we settled for Herut, because it's the party in power."

Israel Harel volunteers that in Kiryat Arba (the largest of the settlements and established under the aegis of Labour's ostensibly "dovish" minister, the late Yigal Allon) there are many settlers "who came just for the subsidized housing and there are others who are simply rabble."

It would be a fair estimate, however, that at least one-half of the total population identifies with Gush Emunim, which amounts to an appreciably larger number than the Gush spoke of three-and-a-half years ago.

Also impressive is the fact that there have been hardly any defectors from the Gush vanguard of settlers, despite the difficult physical conditions of the early days. "In Ofra, only three families have left over the years, one of them to a 'more pioneering' settlement at Shilo, and two for personal reasons," Harel told us.

And finally, it should be noted that the total number of settlers in the Judea and Samaria areas is significantly larger than the total in the Labour-government-sponsored areas of the Golan, the Rafiah Salient and the Jordan Rift Valley, although the difference in the number of adults is not that large.

THE BIG TEST of Gush Emunim's potential will come in the next few months as the first permanent homes in the various settlements are occupied and the prefabs now inhabited by the original settlers are vacated for new occupancy.

There is reason to believe that the Gush has used up nearly all its manpower reserves except for the relatively small number of Baai Akiva graduates in the *hesder yeshivot*, whence its original supporters came.

Thus, the 15,000 population may with considerable effort be increased to 20,000 or so by mid-year, the cut-off date in everyone's mind in the territories, at which time a Labour government is expected to

replace the Likud and the settlement "godfather" Arik Sharon.

But if the comparison with Labour's previous settlement efforts, in terms of numbers, is flattering to Sharon and the Gush, seeing the results against the figures of the surrounding Arab population would seem to be an exercise in futility. Whether the election day number stands at 15,000 or 20,000 or even 25,000, it would represent several years of supreme ideological, political, budgetary, technological, bureaucratic and human effort and still constitute only about one-third to one-half of the annual natural increase of the Arab population in the areas.

AT THE TIME of writing there are plans calling for the establishment of 10 additional settlements, which should be in place by the summer elections. (The need to complete this phase of Sharon's original master-plan is the main reason why he has been the outstanding opponent of early elections.) Included in this number are: Yakir (1 & 2) near Karnei Shomron on the Nablus-Kfar Sava road; Reihan (4 & 5) in the northwestern corner of Samaria; Mihmash, east of Ramallah; Nili, northwest of Ramallah; Tekoa 2, south of Bethlehem; Mitzpe Govrin, south of Hebron; and Shavei Shomron-2, northwest of Nablus.

It is somewhat doubtful whether there are enough ideologically-motivated people waiting to establish these settlements and flesh out the existing ones. So the main settlement strategy seems to be to attract less idealistic settlers by promises of impressively subsidized housing in surroundings that offer a quality of life hard to find in the overcrowded Coastal Plain.

The standard new homes being built in the existing settlements vary in size from 78 to 90-odd sq.m. Na'aman (Sheldon) Lurie, an immigrant from Newton, Mass., who has been a member of Ofra for the past two years, has been living in one of the original 42 sq.m. two-bedroom prefabs which he rents for IS650 a month, including utilities

and local taxes. He is preparing to move into a 78 sq.m. permanent single-family home for which he is paying IS130,000.

In Tekoa, Eli Bask, a member of the Russian *gar'in* (nucleus group) which founded the settlement together with an American *gar'in*, told me that the 15 permanent homes that are to be built (Tekoa is much younger than Ofra; lots are just being measured, and there isn't yet any sign of building), will cost about IS200,000 each. I heard similar figures in Ariel and in Ma'ale Shomron.

IN ADDITION there are plans to allocate plots for "Build Your Own Home" schemes in nearly all the settlements. The fact that most of them are considered "community settlements" rather than kibbutzim or moshavim means that requirements for equality in housing can be waived.

The recent reports of large-scale deals which Sharon and Housing Minister David Levy are negotiating with private contractors, whereby easy government loans and state-owned lands in urban sites within Israel proper will be allocated in exchange for an undertaking to build thousands of homes in sites in Samaria, refer mostly to the "Build Your Own Home" schemes.

Reports speak of negotiations for the construction of 1,800 single family homes in Karnei Shomron at a cost of about IS300,000. This location is considered especially attractive since it is only 15 km. from Kfar Sava.

Settlers there and in neighbouring Ma'ale Shomron told me that it took them 30-45 minutes to get to work to their old jobs in the Coastal Plain. Settlers in Ofra and Beit El and Tekoa need about the same amount of time to get to work in Jerusalem. This means that a large proportion of their income is spent on transportation.

Negotiations with contractors for the building of 500 homes in Elkana, 500 in Shavei Shomron and several hundred in Givon, near Jerusalem, have also been reported.

WHAT HAS been done and what is planned for the next few months obviously costs large sums of money. It is difficult to fix the exact amounts, since Sharon funnels money to his projects much as the National Religious Party uses the ministries, and Jewish Agency bodies under its control to distribute funds to its religious and economic institutions. Formal budgetary frameworks are only the tip of the iceberg.

A study by Zvi Schuldinger published in *Ha'aretz* last fall concluded that funds channelled to the settlements in Judea and Samaria in a year from the budgets of the Ministries of Housing, Agriculture, Defence, Finance, Education, Interior, Religious Affairs, and Industry, Trade and Tourism, as well as from the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, totalled IS15 billion.

It seems clear, however, that the haggling with private contractors over a barrier agreement indicates that even sums like the above estimate are far from sufficient for the plans already afoot to flesh out the 40-50 settlements with housing for an additional 10,000 or so settlers.

The overriding consideration in all the settlements is the likelihood that the Likud will be replaced by a Labour government in the summer. "Pessimists" among the settlers, usually among the more far-out Gush Emunim ideologues, mumble under their breath about the need to organize resistance to Labour attempts to remove the settlements physically. "Optimists" speak of a more indirect Labour approach that would dry up their funds.

A report from London last week, however, quoted Labour Party chairman Shimon Peres as denying any intention to dismantle or "dry up" the existing settlements in Judea and Samaria. But Peres said that no further settlements would be established by any Labour government in heavily populated Arab areas, and that major Labour support would go to the neglected settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley.

ISRAEL HAREL of Ofra notes that the Council of Jewish Settlements in

Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which he chairs, was established as a political body specifically to defend the political interests of the settlements — not only those established by Gush Emunim but those in non-Gush localities, too.

At present the council's purpose is to apply pressure on Sharon to get things done as quickly as possible. Harel, formerly a newspaperman on *Yedioth Aharonot*, also edits the council's spirited weekly, *Nekuda*. He does not excessively admire the Likud government or Sharon. "The council was established specifically because of the terrible weakness of the government, which is noted primarily for having two left hands. Even Sharon, who has been the prime mover and pusher of settlement, has the terrible habit of not finishing things. If it were not for us many of his initiatives would never have got off the ground."

"They're not serious," he says of the Likud. "They work as if they have a world of time, or at least another four full years, to finish what they've undertaken to do."

Harel is optimistic about the fate of the territories and of the new settlements, regardless of the government in power. "Paradoxically, it may even be better under an Alignment government. Since Sadat is opposed to the 'Jordanian option' of bringing Hussein into any talks and Labour is opposed to the autonomy, there is a good chance that the *status quo* will continue under a Labour government."

"But even if there is real movement on the 'Jordanian option,' I am convinced that we can mobilize sufficient support from the public to prevent the adoption of any decision to relinquish any part of the territories to foreign sovereignty."

The need to mobilize such support, from as broad a popular base as possible, was the rationale for the establishment of the council. It was intended to be the political arm of the settlers. The regional councils are in charge of municipal government and services, and Gush Emunim will continue as an ideological educational movement and the official settlement movement representing its settlements in

the relevant institutions.

There is more to it than that, however. Harel admits that Gush Emunim "has had an organizational accident. Hanan Porat and others from among its central activists have gone over to the newly formed Tehiya Party, and that party has so far proven a failure."

This sentiment is an echo of the debate which raged in the Gush over whether to organize directly as a party or to concentrate on serving as a pressure group in a larger arc of the political spectrum. Harel and the council clearly represent those who have opted for a broader political strategy.

"There are a number of parties in our periphery which we can help or harm. And we're obviously working on them. Hitherto very little was done in Labour itself but we are beginning to have meetings with their people, too."

An inkling of the sort of contacts that are being made is provided by Dov Keren, the chairman of the Labour Party branch in Ariel.

Keren told me that the branch numbered 105 of the 360 adults in Ariel and that 85 per cent of the population belonged to the Histadrut. "Ariel was planned by Labour governments and most of us from the Defence Industries and from the Israel Aircraft Industries first organized to come here in the early '70s, encouraged by then-defence minister Moshe Dayan."

Keren said that in addition to ob-

taining the support of the Labour Party leadership bureau for recognition of the Ariel branch, he has also been in contact with Yisrael Galili, the head of the party's settlement committee, on the inclusion of Ariel in Labour's official settlement map.

"If Ariel is included, why not neighbouring Karnei Shomron and even Elkana, which is much closer to the Green Line?" I asked.

"That's just the point," he answered.

HIS NEIGHBOUR in Ariel, Dr. Aharon Ben-Ami, a lecturer in Middle East politics at Bar-Ilan University, expressed confidence that it would never come to a Labour government seeking to dismantle the settlements in Judea and Samaria.

"I am convinced that no agreement to relinquish the territories either to Jordan's King Hussein or to the Palestinians will be acceptable to either of them without Israel also giving up Jerusalem and going back to the 1967 lines. I don't see the Americans forcing Israel to such a total retreat, and I don't see the Arabs agreeing to anything less."

"If there is any attempt to dismantle the settlements," he added as an afterthought and very gently, "I think there will be much more than mere passive resistance on the part of the settlers."

In this connection, opponents of Gush Emunim and of the entire settlement effort on the West Bank are known to be concerned about the

presence of large arsenals in the hands of the settlers. Every settlement has such an arsenal for security purposes, and nearly all settlers are armed.

One of the nightmare possibilities often raised in the endless debates over the question of the settlements is that extremists among the settlers will resort to arms to resist any attempts to dislodge them.

It is difficult to express a balanced opinion on what is the hottest issue in Israel. I would guess that some of the most extreme Gush settlers would use arms against Israel army units sent to carry out government policy. But it is difficult for me to accept such an argument in regard to most of the settlers I have met, including some of the true believers in the Greater Land of Israel philosophy.

There is always the possibility, however, that the "crazies" might drag the others into a confrontation with the authorities. My impression is that the mainstream among the settlers as represented by Harel's council and the mainstream in Labour as represented by Peres are aware of the dangers and are adopting stances to guard against them.

"We must prepare ourselves psychologically and practically for harder days under a Labour government," Harel says.

And Peres, as noted above, is busy denying that he has any intention to provoke a direct confrontation by dismantling the Judean and Samarian "empires." □

[13 Feb 81, pp 8-9]

[Text] Gush Emunim's combination of religion and nationalism is clearly the dominant element in Judea and Samaria, but there are many people who have settled there for other reasons.

THE LAST TIME I saw Benny Kat-zover, he was the object of adulation by a group of Herutniks from Netanya who had come on a Pessah pilgrimage to Eilon Moreh.

This was shortly after Eilon Moreh was established at its latest site Jebel Kebir, some kilometres east of the Palestinian stronghold of Nablus. The Jebel Kebir site was

chosen after the High Court of Justice had disallowed settlement at Rujeib, several kilometres to the south, because it found no legal basis for the Gush-initiated expropriation of private Arab lands there.

Katzover, a founding member of Gush Emunim and the secretary of Eilon Moreh at the time, was

held forth to busloads of admiring settlers on the heroism of the Gush settlers, the perfidy of the Begin government, and the eventual need to remove the Arabs from Judea and Galilee.

In his presentation, Katzover was the epitome of the Gush Emunim true believer; the sort who had stood up to both the Rabin and

Begin governments and pushed ahead with the establishment of close to two score new settlements in Judea and Samaria, in response to a "higher call" than that of cool political calculation.

This time, I met Benny Katzover in the offices of the Shomron (Samaria) Regional Council, of which he is chairman, and which are located at the original Eilon Moreh site at Kedumim.

Katzover is still very much the true believer; but he is also the routinized bureaucrat. The office in which we met was hung with charts of population rosters of the nine settlements in his bailiwick, and with detailed maps of land use and allocation. He himself is today concerned with such mundane problems as the building of schools and kindergartens, municipal budgets, negotiating with the Public Works Department over the posting of road signs, and the filling in of potholes on those roads, which lead from the narrow waist of the heartland of the "old" Israel several kilometres to the west.

What has happened to Benny Katzover is fairly representative of what has happened to Gush Emunim, the group of graduates of the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement and of Jerusalem's Mercaz Harav Yeshiva who took it upon themselves to compel the governments of Israel to support and provide the wherewithal for their determined settlement of Judea and Samaria.

THERE ARE THOSE, like the spokesmen for Kiryat Arba's Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who insist that the Gush no longer exists and that anyone purporting to speak in its name is misleading the public. Others, like the chairman of the Yesha Council (the body representing the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza) Israel Harel, insist that the Gush does still exist in the shape of the settlement movement Amana, and that its political functions have largely devolved on the Yesha coun-

cil. It still remains as an ideological movement, says Harel.

The truth is that of the original firebrands of the Gush, Hanan Porat of Kibbutz Kfar Etzion is working on the kibbutz and in his spare time is engaged in negotiating the complex issue of land ownership in and around the Etzion bloc; Gershon Shafat is active in the Tehiya Party; Katzover is busy with his regional council; and Rabbi Levinger, voted out of office in the Kiryat Arba he helped to found, is devoting himself to serving as the religious leader of the offshoot of the Kiryat Arba settlers in the heart of neighbouring Hebron.

The metamorphosis of the Gush seems to have resulted from its twin reverses: the High Court decision over Rujitib and the failure of its leaders' hunger strike last year to impel the government to take action on other land expropriations. Some would say that the spirit had departed from the movement. Harel claims that part of the change was due to the "tactical error" of such leaders as Porat and Shafat in shifting their energies to the narrow confines of Tehiya party politics from the broader concerns confronting the settlements in the territories.

SO MUCH media attention has been focused on Gush Emunim that it may well be that the fact of its virtual demise, of its being swallowed up by Yesha, the regional councils and Amana, has gone unnoticed.

My own assessment is that this is very much what has happened and that the Gush has just about used up all its reserves. Further settlement in Judea and Samaria depends largely on the ability of the existing frameworks to mobilize reinforcements very different from the original Gush prototype of a young graduate of Bnei Akiva, or the *hesder* and Mercaz Harav yeshivas.

This type is still in evidence in such Gush strongholds as Ofra, the first of the Samaritan settlements, and neighbouring Beit El. It is even more apparent in Beit El Bet, which revolves around its yeshiva. To the

outsider, the atmosphere in these mainline Gush settlements seems distinctly imbued. Each of them is very much an old boys' club, reminiscent of the kibbutzim that were established around nuclei from imbued Labour Zionist youth movements.

This early Gush prototype includes an emphasis on the trappings of deeper personal religiosity than that which characterized their National Religious Party parents and their Bnei Akiva contemporaries who did not make the crucial move into the Gush and into the settlements. A somewhat incongruous sight is the combination of chest-length, Agudat Yisrael-style beards — unlike the clean-shaven or short-bearded Bnei Akiva graduate — with the regulation knitted *kippa* and short pants in the summer and army fatigues and battle dress in the rugged Samaritan winter.

Orit Ori, the young secretary of the Etzion Bloc kibbutz, Migdal Oz, is typical of the feminine side of this shift to greater religiosity. When I interviewed her she was dressed in a long Mother Hubbard and had her hair covered. She told me she was a daughter of one of the earliest of the Kibbutz Hadati foundations, Sa'ad, where such dress would have been frowned upon by a more revolutionary generation of religious pioneering women.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS among some of the elite elements of the NRP younger generation — the change from unhappiness over the reality of a secular, "goyish" Israel to super-patriotic pioneering, and from relatively easy-going Orthodoxy to greater personal religiosity, have been matched in the U.S. The result has been an impressive mixture of new American Orthodox olim in many of the Gush settlements.

Na'aman Lourie of Ofra, formerly Sheldon Lourie of Newton, Mass, is representative of this stream in the human melange in the Gush settlements. The son of a synagogue beadle, he came on aliya in 1967 at

the age of 19 in response to the trauma of the waiting period that preceded the outbreak of the Six Day War. He went through the succeeding 10 years touching many of the typical bases of olim of this period: ulpan, kibbutz, Bar-Ilan University, and management of a take-home food emporium in Jerusalem's Ramat Eshkol.

The last of these experiences qualified him to manage Ofra's kitchen, which serves 80-120 diners daily from the Nature Protection Society's field school, the Judaic Studies Institute and the weekend seminars the settlement runs for supporters from town.

Lourie would seem to be a typical low-key member of the Gush Emunim periphery. He enjoys being at Ofra, partly because he feels he is participating in the "holy task" of settling Samaria, but even more because of the unique quality of life it affords him. Quality of life for Lourie means "none of the city's hustle and bustle, a slower pace of living, safety and the good life for my wife and my three children, and membership in a like-minded religious community which permits me to relax in the evenings by studying Tora."

Many of these sentiments were echoed by Moshe Schneider, an erstwhile Jerusalem painter, and much older than the average settler. Schneider moved to Ofra with his wife and six children a year-and-a-half ago.

YET ANOTHER shape in the human pattern of the Gush settlements is provided by David Kapah, son of a noted Jerusalem Yemenite rabbi, who himself was a religious educator for many years in the capital. In Ofra he has established a silk-screen printing plant which employs 12 workers.

"I knew absolutely nothing about silk-screen printing when I came here, and I'm still learning. But we're already making a go of it," Rapah told us on a tour of the plant.

The large number of observant olim among the Gush settlers, especially from the U.S., would seem to bear out the impression

gleaned in conversations with local Gush spokesmen that hopes for further expansion of the settlements are based more on expectations of tapping this reservoir abroad than on attracting many more such reinforcements from Bnei Akiva and yeshiva graduates from Israel itself.

The expectation of financial help from American Orthodox sources and from South African Jewry is also central to the planning now going on in Yesha circles to enable the settlements to weather the "ice age" of the coming Labour government.

There are recent reports of emissaries being sent to raise money from hawkish elements in the affluent South African Jewish community. As for manpower, plans for establishing the "city" of Efrat, across the road from the Etzion bloc, are based entirely on the mobilization of American immigrant settlers.

The old boys' club scent that exudes from Gush settlements bothers some of its more sensitive supporters. In a recent issue of Yesha's impressively well-edited weekly, *Nekuda*, one sympathetic adherent warns against the emphasis placed on the symbols, philosophy and teachings of the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. The fostering of such an inbred atmosphere, he warns, could turn off large numbers of potential adherents among Israel's secular majority.

The Yesha Council, or at least some of its cooler and more pragmatic heads, like Israel Harel, are aware of this problem. In the Council's activities and in the columns of *Nekuda* there are persistent attempts to harness the Labour-oriented settlements in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift Valley to a common effort to protect all the over-the-Green-Line settlements against possible attempts by a future Labour government to have them removed.

WHILE GUSH EMUNIM and its latter-day form of religiously-inspired, super-patriotic pioneering is certainly the dominant element in the Israeli settlements in Judea and

Samaria, it is not the whole story. In Ariel, one of the largest of the settlements in western Samaria, I spoke with two couples who would seem to be representative of the different motivations that have attracted very definitely non-Gush types to the settlements.

Dr. Aharon Ben-Ami and his wife Zivia, he a sociologist of Bar-Ilan University and she an editor and writer for *Ma'ariv*, are long-time members of the secular wing of the Greater Land of Israel movement.

"The fact that we came to Ariel only two years ago," Zivia told me, "was not a matter of a late conversion to the cause, but of the need to solve a host of personal problems before we could move out here. Now that we're here, we see that it was a very wise move. Some things are difficult, like the time involved in commuting to town. What is worse for me is the sneering I come up against from some of my colleagues when they hear I live in Samaria. And *Ma'ariv* is said to be to be hawkishly nationalistic."

Ben-Ami counts himself and Zivia among those who have come to Ariel for ideological reasons. "There are others, however, who have come for the better quality of life up here in the mountains. Then there are those who have found it a solution to their housing problems."

As old-timers in Ariel, the Ben-Amis are among those slated to move into the first 60 cottages, to be completed in a few months time. Roads and earthmoving for an additional 110 homes in the "Build Your Home" programme have already been completed.

"Aren't you rather leery of spending your own money on a home in an area that may be abandoned under a Labour government?" I ask.

Ben-Ami is the one to reply:

"There will never be a situation in which a partial Israeli withdrawal will be accepted by the Arabs. 'Partial' means getting out of Ariel but not out of Jerusalem. I believe that a Labour government will never be confronted with a realistic option of having to withdraw from only part of the territories and I don't believe

the U.S. will really pressure Israel for a total withdrawal. I feel secure here."

THE EVENING that I visited Ariel, the town secretariat was crowded with representatives of families qualifying to move into permanent homes, waiting to notarize their applications for allocation, by lottery, of the first cottages. It was a scene typical of the early stages of many a development town, although here, it appeared to me, the population was almost entirely veteran Israeli, much of it also ex-kibbutz, rather than new immigrant.

I was "privileged" to witness an example of a typical Israeli rip-off associated with such occasions. The notary public who had come from town for the purpose of conducting the bureaucratic rite was charging each family a "cut rate" of "only IS100" for his assembly-line services. Not bad for an evening's work.

While the Ben-Amis may be characteristic of the convinced Greater Land of Israel movement people among the secular settlers, Dov and Zilla Keren, who were the first settlers in Ariel, are more representative of those old-time Israelis, many of them employees of the defence industries and of the Israel Aircraft Industries, who responded to the call of former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan for the settlement at selected sites in Samaria.

Dov himself works for Mekorot, formerly in Haifa now in Tel Aviv, and is part of that second-and third-generation Israel that is so heavily represented at Ariel. He is chairman of the local Labour Party branch and a candidate for the party's central committee.

He and his wife agree that she was the major factor pushing for the family's settling in a place like Ariel. In the event, they were the first family there, living in pristine isolation for a week before other settlers joined them. Zilla speaks of her own motivation as being primarily the desire to emulate the "real Zionism" of her parents, one of the founding families of the Emeq Hefer moshav of Even Yehuda.

"It seemed to me that my parents had been among those who built this country. I was always proud of them but also jealous, because when I grew up and set up my own family everything seemed to have been done already. Ariel is a chance for me and my family to continue that tradition of being profoundly involved in building and settling the country."

I HEARD similar sentiments from nearly all the settlers I spoke to, with Dov and Dalia Warman of the relatively new settlement of Ma'ale Shomron perhaps being the most characteristic.

I came to Ma'ale Shomron on a particularly rainy day. In between the drops I tried to find someone to talk to. The first four doors of the settlement's 40 prefabricated houses I knocked on produced only children to stare at me. I later discovered that in many families, both husband and wife worked in their former jobs on the Israel side of the Green Line, 15 km. distant, and the children were either in a day-long kindergarten or "key kids."

Dov and Dalia, who are in their early thirties, declare that Ma'ale Shomron, even in its raw state, is a paradise for children. Dalia also says she feels much safer in Ma'ale Shomron than she did in Petah Tikva "where I always locked the door day and night against robbers."

Dov drives back and forth to his job in Bnei Brak every day, about 35-45 minutes each way depending on the weather and the traffic. (Israel Harel estimated that many families like the Warmans spend more than one third of their income on commuting).

"We lived in a typical apartment in Petah Tikva and I felt as if I weren't alive," Dov recalls. "I had the nagging feeling that something was very definitely lacking in my life. I wanted to create something new."

Echoing the Kerens of Ariel, Dov says, "My parents, who immigrated after independence and lived under terrible conditions in the early years, felt that they personally had built this country. I felt nothing. People

my age have by and large attained their initial material goals. We all have our apartments, furnishings, fridges, TVs and cars. But leaving it at just that gives a flat feeling that there must be more to life. What I wanted was a challenge.

"Without *shwiz*ing about it, I can honestly claim that in the past two years, Dalia and I have done something fantastic. Together with the other families here we have built a new community in Israel. What we have accomplished in this short time is nothing short of remarkable. And there is much more to come.

"The last time I was on reserve duty, some of my mates said '*Kol hakavod*' Warman. You've really brought it off. When they pull you down you'll be a millionaire from the compensation you'll get."

"Now, that's nasty. It's a terrible thought to believe that anyone could come to live here with compensation in mind. But I must say there are only a few cynics like that. The other fellows and my old friends in Petah Tikva are generally admiring of what we did. Many of them say that they'd like to do it too, but I doubt that more than a few will actually have the gumption to do it. But it's the biggest thing that ever happened to us and neither of us regrets having made the decision."

Dalia agrees enthusiastically, and so do their two children.

Comments like these, which I also heard in many settlements in the Golan, in the Jordan Rift and in Rafiah and Yamit are, I believe, an indication of the yearning of many younger Israelis to return to a less cynical, less material and more spiritually satisfying existence than that offered by the urban Israel of today.

MA'ALE SHOMRON is also interesting as an experiment in which a conscious decision has been taken to accept both religious and non-religious families. About one third of the families there are observant, but Dov notes that "a thing like this can't work if you have extremists on either side."

The main potential problems are public behaviour on Shabbat and

the question of schooling. In regard to the former, the arrangement is that people are free to do as they like in their homes, but there is an attempt to prevent any "desecration" of the sabbath in public. Members who intend using their cars on a particular Shabbat park them outside the perimeter fence.

The local kindergarten and school belong to the State-Religious trend, but boys from secular homes are not required to wear *tzitzit* and need only put on a *kippa* for Bible and Mishna classes.

So far, Dov and Dalia say, the system has worked without any trouble, mainly because there has been a lot of good will on both sides. Also, Dov adds, "most of the secular families are from observant homes and they all share a desire to give their own children a greater exposure to Jewish traditions."

There is a similar arrangement in force in the Judean Desert settlement of Tekoa, whose 22 families are equally divided between obser-

vant and secular, the founders being two immigrant groups, one religious Americans, the other Russians.

Binyamin Ricardo of Beit Horon, which is also a "mixed" settlement (Kfar Edumim is the fourth one), wrote in a recent issue of *Nekuda* that the whole point of such arrangements is to bring around the "less religious" partners gradually and without undue pressure to the religious point of view. He studiously refrains from speaking of "religious and secular" and prefers "religious and less religious" as a basis for the "proselytizing" potential he sees in such mixing. He writes:

"The reasons that justified the self-isolation of religious communities in the big cities and other areas of Israel do not exist in the new settlements of Judea and Samaria. Here, the religious population is not a minority. It constitutes a majority, even in the mixed settlement, and thus has no need to protect itself. It should instead radiate out to the others." □

UMM AL-FAHM RESIDENTS VIEW RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Feb 81 p 3

[Text] UMM EL-FAHM. — Young Arab women in slacks are back on the streets of this town of 20,000 following the arrest of religious extremists who allegedly plotted against the security of the state — and took a dim view of local modernism.

"Before the arrests, there was a big religious revival in town," a young man who grew up in Umm el-Fahm said yesterday. "No modern girl could walk in the street, and instead of music at weddings, holy men would preach religious sermons."

"All these restrictions have vanished completely, and personally, I am very happy," he added.

The man was prepared to condemn the young, bearded men — most, but not all from well-to-do families in this, the largest Israeli Arab town — for their harassment of non-traditional residents. But he declined to verify allegations that the extremists had banded together to carry out terrorist activities.

"Just because they are very religious, doesn't mean they are anti-Israeli," he said. "Of course they were influenced by events in Iran and Syria — but not to the point where they became terrorists."

Security forces recently arrested dozens of young men from Israeli Arab villages in the "Triangle" east of Netanya. They had allegedly

formed religious cadres last year that were linked with the PLO and the Jaffa car bombing gang, and they planned terrorist actions in Israel.

Secret caches of arms, documents, maps, and photographs have been found by the security forces in the town.

The young man said he grew up with many of those now in custody. But while he chose to attend a Jewish high school in a nearby city, and then work in Tel Aviv, the others gradually drifted towards extremism after they had graduated from high school and college.

"They all walked around with beards, but now you hardly see a man with a beard in the street — all those who wore one were either arrested, or they shaved it off," he said.

The religious cadres, he added, were a minority in the Triangle villages and towns. Most of the men in the area travel daily to Tel Aviv to work at construction sites and restaurants.

As the young man spoke, in the new petrol station at the entrance to Umm el-Fahm, tender after tender of men returning from work passed by on their way up the hill towards the town.

There is construction work in progress throughout Umm el-Fahm. A drive yesterday through the picturesque town's winding and steep streets and past new cars parked outside spacious villas revealed a

community that, on the surface, has slipped easily into the 1980s.

Arab women go unveiled in public, with most clad in long skirts and wearing kerchiefs on their heads in much the same way religious Jewish women are attired. The children playing soccer in the muddy courtyards wore shoes and were well-dressed.

In the main square, at least a dozen taxis that make the Umm el-Fahm-Hadera run were doing a brisk business, filling up with passengers by the minute.

Extremists aside, despite the town's example of Israeli Arabs' "good life" — scenes as shiny as the new petrol pumps at its entrance — a moderate undercurrent of dissatisfaction is voiced by Arab youth there.

Said one: "I feel myself to be Israeli, but I'm missing out on a few rights."

Talking out a Hebrew-language newspaper he pointed to the classified ads, and the small print listing IDF service as a prerequisite for a job.

"I'd be willing to join the army if they promised I wouldn't be involved in armed action against other Arabs," he said.

This, he added, might make life a bit more pleasant for Israeli Arabs who are constantly asked to present their identification cards to police and open packages for inspection on the streets of Jewish cities.

LEVINSON'S ECONOMIC PLANS VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 13

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "Sapir with a Calculator"]

[Text] Mr Shim'on Peres, chairman of the Labor Party and its candidate for prime minister if it wins the election, refused to conform in a televised interview he would appoint Mr Ya'akov Levinson as his finance minister. But in fact, it seems, the decision has been made: The second session of the party conference which took place this week in Tel Aviv has confirmed it. His place among the speakers and the attention he was given by the listeners showed that both those on the dais and in the audience looked upon Levinson as one of the stars of the show, who deserves a major role in the Alignment government, if and when it is formed.

Mr Levinson did not let us down. Anyone who weighed his words could tell that he gave us clear indications regarding his basic economic philosophy, which would guide him as finance minister, that is, as the head of the economic policy. What was interesting in this expose of principles of faith was the absence of macro-economic terms. It was a lecture about the basic values of the labor movement, the centrality of the human factor, the justification for economic incentives etc. Even the inflation was mentioned as tied to such economic terms as stability and trust. But from this exclusion one may derive the inclusion: Levinson did not deal in macro-economics, since he is not at home with it. If he is appointed to head the economic team of an Alignment government, he will try to proceed according to a model dating back to the 50s and associated with the late Pinhas Sapir.

Mr Levinson will bring to the job the experience of an unusually successful banker, who turned Bank Hapoalim, a dormant sectarian institution, into a financial giant in both Israeli and international terms. Besides his personal skill and uncommon energy, he was helped by following and getting involved in the affairs of his clients. A long time before the Mizrahi Bank invented the slogan saying that it stands with its clients 24 hours a day, the presence of Bank Hapoalim in its clients' affairs was routine.

This applies to the so-called labor economy, namely, Tnuvah, Hamashbir, Kur, Solel Boneh, and what not, where Levinson became an institution, as well as the private sector which turned to Bank Hapoalim for credit or other assistance, and found out the lenders were interested in its clients' affairs, and whenever necessary even

became involved in them. It is only natural for people to try to repeat their successes, and so Mr Levinson as finance minister is likely to try to implement the system which made him so incredibly successful (not an exaggerated term in this context) as head of Bank Hapoalim.

In broad terms, one may regard the future of the Israeli economy as based upon the success of, say, 1000 companies which will export an average of 10 million dollars a year. The heads of these companies will supply ideas, knowhow, organization and marketing, while the Israeli public, represented by the treasury, will take care of the material resources--incentives in Mr Levinson's words--and the person-power. The treasury will also supply guidance, auxiliary services, will stand by the client, and probably also inside its business, and will monitor the operation. Thus, in broad terms of course, one may expect the economic policy to unfold.

The concept, again, is not new, though the goals have changed. The late Sapir looked for jobs for mass immigration, while Levinson is looking for an improved economical existence in a competitive world. More than Sapir, and in accordance with the experience gained after 20 years of working in the labor movement and in Bank Hapoalim, Levinson is aware of the instability of the Israeli market. It is no accident he has spent most of his energy in recent year to internationalize the bank. Israel will find its economic growth in foreign markets, or will see its economy stagnate, and the breaking into those markets and becoming entrenched in them is the task of the above mentioned 1000 companies.

It was said about the late Sapir, that he knew every industrialist. His admirers said he knew every cog in every machine, and whatever was not stored in his phenomenal memory was written down in a small book he carried in his pocket. If Sapir only had 100 companies while Levinson has 1000, Levinson also has a calculator, which extends the reach of the national manager, the director general of Israel Ltd., ad infinitum. A clear goal, a philosophy of involvement, a focusing of the national economic effort on a relatively small number of realizable objectives--this, it seems, is Levinson's doctrine in a nutshell.

This is a highly ambitious doctrine. The late Sapir found it very difficult to steer a relatively primitive economy with his 100 firms, which worked mostly for an unpretentious domestic market. Anyone who tries to run, even with a calculator, an economy of 1000 companies which market their best products in highly demanding foreign markets, will find out his problems are multiplied not ten fold, but rather to the tenth degree. Levinson must be aware of this, as he is aware of the need to impose taxes, to negotiate with Mr Meshel, and even with Etan Rosenman, to take care of housing for young couples, and to feed the military moloch. It seems that in regard to these matters Levinson expects to act according to circumstances. It is anyone's guess how he is going to accomplish his goals in our economic and social turmoil.

The liberal economic theory is the result of conscious acceptance of the principle of reaching economic decisions in countless foci. In the meantime the opposite theories have been put into effect, those which are based on various degrees of centralization. The liberalism of our time is the result of doubt: The planned economies are a resounding failure, and the return to decentralization of economic

decision making is not so much an approval of the 200 year old theory, but rather a disillusionment with economic centralism.

But reality raises questions about what can actually be achieved in terms of national economic steering, through the liberal approach. The last 3 years in Israel are not exactly an economic success story. The timing of the Levinson message is propitious, and it is safe to assume it will be accepted by his party, and if it wins it will become the base for its economic policy. We will then find out if it is possible to run a national economy of 3.5 million people as if Israel were one large conglomerate.

9565

CSO: 4805

LAVI' ENGINE CONTRACT TO GO TO BEIT SHEMESH ENGINES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Feb 81 p 2

[Text]

If the government decides to build the Lavie fighter, the engines for the planes will be produced at Beit Shemesh Engines, and not the Israel Aircraft Industries, it was confirmed yesterday.

This decision was taken by Defence Minister Menahem Begin at a meeting with Defence Ministry heads on Friday.

For the past few months the government has deliberated about granting Beit Shemesh the contract. Former Defence Minister Ezer Weizman had favoured the idea, but after his resignation the IAI argues that only it had the infrastructure and technology to undertake the project. To give the contract to Beit

Shemesh would cost the government unnecessary duplication, IAI said.

However, on Friday Begin adopted the recommendations of a special Defence Ministry committee chaired by Director-General Yosef Ma'ayan which supported Weizman's earlier recommendation.

At this stage, the decision will not mean an increase in any direct government investment in Beit Shemesh, both because the future of the Lavie is far from certain, and because of a proviso that before government money is pumped into the company the government should acquire a majority of its shares.

CSO: 4820

DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRAL SINAI FORCE VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 14

[Article by Uzi Benziman: "American Force in Sinai? Israel Begins to Negotiate with New Government in Washington Re-Implementation of Clause Mandated by Peace Treaty with Egypt to Determine Stationing of Neutral Force in the Peninsula; Reagan Declared Policy Seeks Military Presence in the Area, Which is Sure to Displease Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] We shall find out in a few weeks whether U.S. President Ronald Reagan is seriously planning to station American troops in the Middle East. Israel is about to start talks with the new government to test the degree of readiness to keep the American commitment attached to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty to establish a multi-national force to oversee the limitation of forces in the Sinai. When Israel withdrew to the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line, the UN Security Council did not fulfil its assigned role of overseeing the military arrangements in the Sinai. The U.S. did not honor its commitment either, as understood by Israel, which was expressed by President Carter in a letter to the prime minister dated 26 March 1979, according to which the U.S. was going to establish a multi-national force in lieu of the UN force which failed to materialize.

At the time the U.S. excused its failure to keep its commitment by arguing that it referred to the final rather than the partial withdrawal. Washington recognized its obligation to establish some sort of a military force to oversee Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and after much bargaining it formed the "Sinai Support Mission", a force of several dozens of American observers to whom Israel and Egypt can turn for mediation.

But even according to the evasive American interpretation, there is no doubt that in anticipation of the completion of the IDF withdrawal from the eastern section of the Sinai, scheduled for April 1982, there is a need to establish a neutral military force to oversee the military arrangements which will be put into effect upon the completion of the evacuation of the peninsula. This need arises out of Section 6 of the military enclosure to the peace treaty which mandates a role of policing and supervision to the force and to UN observers. In President Carter's letter to Mr Begin, which was based on the assumption that the UN was not going to cooperate with Israel and Egypt in implementing the treaty, it was stated in this regard: "The United States believes that the principle in the treaty which deals

with the stationing of permanent UN personnel in this area of the forces limitation can and should be done by the UN Security Council. The U.S. will make its best effort to obtain the necessary action from the Security Council. If the Security Council does not make the arrangements stipulated in the treaty, the President will be ready to take the necessary steps to insure the establishment and maintaining of a multi-national force which is suitable and acceptable." (translator's note: check original letter).

Determent Policy

Last year, during the talks regarding stationing of neutral forces at the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line, the American Government announced that if it cannot establish a multi-national force (as substitute for a UN supervisory force), a strictly American force will be stationed in the Sinai to fulfil the role assigned to UN forces in the treaty. Since Carter and his advisers argued that this commitment does not refer to interim withdrawal but only to the final one, the Reagan administration will have to face the challenge of establishing a supervisory American force which will fulfil the commitments of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

Experienced diplomats in Jerusalem are careful in referring to the challenge the treaty presents Ronald Reagan with. There is no enthusiasm shown regarding this question, and its implications as a touchstone for the credibility of the new administration. The Jerusalem diplomats prefer not to draw public attention to the Israeli probes taking place in Washington at the moment (it is to be assumed that the question of establishing an American supervisory force in the Sinai occupied an important place in the talks between Ambassador Efraim Evron and Alexander Haig two days ago).

Even without going into the details of the talks concerning this question, it is safe to assume that Reagan will have to decide whether to take the bull by the horns and establish the American supervisory force in the Sinai as a way of implementing his statements about stationing American troops in the Middle East. Washington's obligation to "deliver the goods" by stationing a military supervisory force in the Sinai appears to fit in President Reagan's policy, which seeks station American military units in the area for deterring the Soviet Union as well, and also to demonstrate American concern and control of vital interests around the globe and to intimidate demented regimes like Khomeyni so as to avoid another hostages incident.

Establishing American bases in the Middle East is part of a long range military plan, initiated by the Carter administration, to introduce rapid deployment units which can go into action at a short notice far away from home. The American supervisory force in the Sinai gives Reagan a good opportunity to begin realizing his intention. The stationing of the force is mandated in the treaty signed by the President of the United States. Honoring this commitment is an official action on the part of the U.S. in keeping with its own obligation, and at the same time it serves the purpose of Reagan's international policy.

Taking Saudi Feelings into Account

Circumstances seem to be suitable for the American Government when it comes to a decision whether to respond to Israeli expectations to establish an American super-

visory force. Both interested countries--Israel and Egypt--are in favor of such American action. Israel for its part has taken some kind of American presence for granted from the beginning as a vital support for making the treaty credible. Egypt, on the other hand, has realized that the withdrawal of the IDF from the Si-ai is predicated on the clause concerning a neutral force, and since it has its own plans of military cooperation with the U.S. The events in Chad, and Kaddafi's expansionist plans which may threaten the Sudan, give Egypt and the U.S. added reason for U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

Against such considerations stand American interests in Saudi Arabia. As in the past, so in the Reagan administration, Israeli-American relations vie with U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. Reagan's early days in office demonstrated this conflict of interests. While Reagan and his people, even after their election, keep making pro-Israeli statements, there is a tendency to accept the Saudi request to fit the F-15 planes with offense equipment (for bombs and additional fuel); While the Reagan people talk about Israel as a strategic asset, Washington signals West Germany to sell advanced tanks to Riyadh. To remove any doubt, the new administration makes clear statements about the desert oil country. Alexander Haig says that if he were in office in 1968 he would have sold advanced planes to Saudi Arabia, and that the U.S.'s desire to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf should take into account the sensitivity of Saudi Arabia.

The new administration's relationship to Riyadh is influenced by a group of people who surround Reagan, several of whom are businessmen who have done business with Saudi Arabia for years. This group may be more sensitive than its predecessors to the dependency of the American economy on Saudi oil money. In addition to this consideration there are other considerations which also affected President Carter: The pressure of European countries and of Japan on the U.S. not to spoil its relations with the Saudi court, as well as the clear recognition on part of the U.S. that it had to take into account the whims of the Saudi oil princes regarding rise in prices, reduced production, or a major financial maneuver, which could cause tremors in the economies of the West.

As in the past, so under the new administration, the traditional commitment of the U.S. toward Israel and its real interest in the existence of a stable and secure Israel in the Middle East clashes with its dependency on Saudi oil and money. A veteran diplomat said this week in Jerusalem that it is in Israel's interest not to bring about a confrontation of these two parallel interests, and to continue to isolate any question in Israel-U.S. relations from the essential confrontation which may result from Washington's special relations with Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia's negative attitude toward the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, its central position in the Arab Rejectionist Front (witness Islamic Conference last week calling for holy war against Israel), its geographical proximity to the Sinai, will in a few weeks confront the U.S. commitment to establish a neutral force to oversee the military arrangements in the Sinai, as well as Israel's and Egypt's interest that this commitment is carried out, and the opportunity such a force will give the Reagan administration to lend credibility to its statements about a firm international policy.

SOVIET IMMIGRANTS FACE STRESS, INSECURITY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 20 Feb 81 pp 6,7

[Article by Yakov M. Rabkin: "Double Standards"]

[Text]

A LITTLE OVER 10 years ago I was walking the frozen pavements of Leningrad. The highjackers' trial was being staged at the City Court on the banks of the Fontanka river. Little could I imagine either its outcome or its consequences.

The trial was clearly a critical point in the Soviet Jews' struggle for emigration. "If you do not let us go we shall fight until you do," was the slogan of the then few Soviet Jews who declared their home to be Israel rather than the USSR, the country of their birth and culture. They had to be crushed if Jewish activism was to be brought to an end.

Today, the consequences of the Leningrad trial are clearer. Far from stifling the emigration movement, it added fuel to the flames. In the ensuing years, 250,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate, the majority of them — 65 per cent — settling in Israel. During the 1970s, 45 per cent of all immigrants to Israel came from the USSR, compared with 13 per cent from North America. Thus in practical terms, Soviet Zionist achievement is quite impressive, particularly since Soviet Jewry numbers only one-third of that of North America.

In the meantime, the term "Soviet Jew" has come to evoke quite different feelings from what it did 10 years ago. A Soviet Jew, or a "Rusian" as, for the first time in his life, he is referred to in Israel, is

often portrayed as an ungrateful profiteer, eager to cash in on his immigrant privileges while simultaneously complaining about the inadequacies of Israeli life. Not unlike the general Israeli perception of olim, this does contain an element of reality. "We Israelis love aliya," a veteran Israeli remarked. "It's the olim we can't stand."

More serious disillusion with the Soviet Jews has been expressed in the Israeli media, including *The Post*. The source of this is *neshva*, or the dropout phenomenon. As the absolute numbers of Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union have fluctuated, the percentage of the émigrés settling in Israel steadily declined from 95 per cent in 1971 to 25 per cent in 1980. Why have these numbers shocked the Israeli media and the country's political circles?

Historian Eli Bar-Navi, of Tel Aviv University, estimates that only 2 per cent of all olim have come here out of idealism. In other words, most were pushed from their native lands and only 2 per cent were "pulled" by Israel, whether by her intrinsic value or by the various challenges she offers to newcomers.

This may be a high figure compared with immigration to other less idealistic countries. After all, contented people rarely move abroad. Between the "pull" and the "push" a wide grey area remains. Nevertheless, it is clear that

olim from the U.S. or Switzerland would fall into the "pull" group, while the German Jews who came here during the 1930s were obviously "pushed" by what went on in their country.

Having established these two categories, one can ask which of the two Soviet Jews would fit into. The answer should provide a reference point for "judging" Soviet Jews, this time not by the Leningrad court but by Israeli public opinion.

DESPITE official propaganda negating Jewish nationhood, the Soviet Jew has not perceived any danger of physical repression. What has frustrated him is the impasse to which his Jewishness has brought him: culturally assimilated, he still cannot cast off the "irrelevant" label Jewish in all his official documents. It is assigned to anyone of Jewish parentage, sometimes even if only one parent is Jewish.

Religious freedom has been an important consideration for only a minority of the Soviet Jewish émigrés; the lack of prospects for their children and the solidly entrenched second-class-citizen status have been far more important. Seeing little hope of becoming fully assimilated and a prospect of downward social mobility, many Soviet Jews decide to try their luck abroad, and it is within this group that the choice is made either to go

on aliya or to settle in the free lands of the Diaspora. The choice is made in long, agonizing discussions at the dinner table; its implementation awaits the moment when the Jew actually leaves the Soviet Union.

HAVING ESTABLISHED that emigration for the Soviet Jew is a matter of choice rather than of escaping danger, let us look at the conditions the Soviet Jew faces if he decides to leave his country and settle in Israel.

Whereas his motives for aliya may not be entirely different from those of a Jew from the free world, the circumstances of his aliya differ quite a bit. After the difficulties involved in leaving the USSR, and the accompanying anxiety and uncertainty, the émigré arrives in Israel. This is where the differences begin.

The Soviet Jew has never seen the country. He has not visited it either as a private tourist or on one of the promotional tours sponsored by the Jewish Agency. He has never seen a *shaliach* (though the usefulness of these emissaries is far from obvious), nor talked with Israelis or with compatriots who have tried Israel and returned to their Diaspora homes. He is also aware that, having left his country, there is no way back. Soviet exit visas are one-way.

How many Western Jews would have opted for aliya under these initial conditions?

BUT RATHER than answer rhetorical questions, let us see what the Israeli reality means for the Soviet *oleh* and for his Western counterpart.

The security of knowing that he can always return to his native land is perhaps the most important psychological factor that differentiates the experience of the Western from that of the Soviet *oleh*. And it is largely responsible for the way they react to the problem of integrating into Israeli society.

Western olim often find the new country more abrasive than do the Soviet immigrants. It is the latter, however, who get the feeling of being trapped in Israel. It is no accident that it was a Soviet and not a

Western *oleh* who jumped to his death at a Haifa absorption centre.

The Soviet's perception of the difficulties of absorption is incomparably more acute, and rightly so, since the very fact of coming to Israel curtailed his chances of going anywhere else in the free world.

Once in Israel he is no longer considered a refugee by Western countries where he might eventually wish to settle should his experience in Israel prove too discouraging. Conversely, once admitted to a Western country, he acquires freedom of choice, and can give Israel a try, like any Western Jew.

Defining one's official status in Israel is an important consideration. While, by virtue of the Law of Return, the Soviet Jew, stripped of his Soviet citizenship, automatically becomes an Israeli citizen on arrival here, the Western Jew can take his time and test the ground as a tourist, a student or a temporary resident.

Besides providing a sense of security, the fact that one can always return to one's home base has many other advantages. For most Western olim, the umbilical cord to the Diaspora is never severed. American olim, for example, rarely use the Israeli mail to send letters "home" but get friends going to the States to mail their letters there. The Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel provides a similar mail service for its members.

I mention this apparently trivial detail because it underlines a significant difference in the meaning of aliya for the Western and the Soviet Jew. The latter, once having left his country, is cut off from it forever. He has to rely on the slow and unpredictably censored postal flow between Israel and the Soviet Union, where he has left relatives and friends. For all practical purposes, his link with the old country is severed brutally and irreversibly.

THE AMERICAN JEW comes from a land which commands respect and envy in Israeli society, exercises an inordinate influence and remains Israel's last ally in an increasingly hostile world. The widespread adulation of everything

American stands out in sharp contrast to the denigration of and condescension towards everything Soviet. The Israelis' urge to affirm themselves as "Westerners" in the midst of "Orientals" has many adverse repercussions. One is that we regard the Soviet Union as a desperately backward country, an attitude one would be hard put to find in the U.S. and, *a fortiori*, in Western Europe.

This spills over not only into the average Israeli's underestimation of Soviet technological and military capabilities, but into disdain for the training and experience the 150,000 Soviet olim have brought with them during the past decade.

The American is also less linguistically isolated than the Soviet Jew, whose language is rarely understood and even more rarely used in Israel. Not only is English widely used here; he has been absolutely free to learn Hebrew before coming on aliya.

While Soviet, mostly Russian-speaking, Jews constituted no less than 45 per cent of olim to Israel during the 1970s, little Russian is to be found on the signboards either in the ostensibly international Jewish Agency or in the Ministry of Absorption.

ONE MAY also wonder why the Russian instructions on the Hebrew examination paper for newcomers at the Hebrew University differ so drastically in quality and clarity from the corresponding English, French and Spanish versions.

All this clearly complicates the Soviet *oleh's* life. Moreover, Israel's English-language media, both printed and electronic, are of incomparably better quality than their Russian counterparts. Kol Israel's Russian-language broadcasts project a much more idealized image of Israel than do the broadcasts in English or French, and certainly than those in Hebrew.

This further emphasizes the need for the Soviet *oleh* to detach himself from his linguistic milieu, which

cannot but increase his sense of insecurity in the new country.

On the positive side, however, the same insecurity makes Soviet olim conspicuously better students at *ulpanim* than their Western classmates, though his comparative excellence involves much stress and psychological discomfort.

ANOTHER FACTOR contributing to stress and insecurity is money. It is reasonable to assume that few Western Jews come on aliya with less than \$150, which is the total amount in liquid assets the Soviet Jew is allowed to take with him from his native land. This, incidentally, explains why the Soviet émigrés are involved in the unedifying petty trade in Rome which was so picturesquely exposed on these pages several months ago. It also makes the Soviet olim totally dependent on the bureaucratically-dispersed loans of the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Absorption.

Let me expand my earlier question: How many Western Jews would have opted for aliya under these conditions?

Much has gone wrong during the 10 years of Soviet aliya. The cardinal mistake of both Israelis and the Soviet Jews was that they expected too much of each other.

Israelis expected the Soviet Jews to become loyal and grateful citizens after decades of anti-Jewish repression in the USSR. On their side, Israel-bound Soviet Jews thought they would feel needed and wanted in the new country.

In planning to come to Israel, the Soviet Jew was not thinking of customs and absorption privileges, about which little was known in the Soviet Union when the emigration movement was gathering momentum there.

I personally doubt whether these very relative economic advantages ever accounted for much in any Jew's decision to make aliya. But they have incontestably spoiled the attitude of Israelis towards new immigrants.

ONCE IN Israel, Soviet olim discovered a very different land

from what they had imagined (the Russian-language broadcasts of Kol Israel had contributed to their over-expectations). Insecurity breeds aggressiveness, and the Soviet olim's behaviour pattern did not differ substantially from that of other uprooted populations determined to make it in the new land. After all, today every fourth physician and every fifth scientist in Israel is a graduate of a Soviet university.

The roots of the two kinds of over-expectation are different, and what concerns me most are the expectations Israeli and many Western Jews have had of their Soviet brethren.

In the West, the heroic image of Soviet Jews has helped to mobilize world public opinion around the emigration issue. The effect has been the release of a quarter of a million Jews from the USSR. In Israel, as the post-Six Day War society was plunged into its new self-oriented materialistic future, a need for an ideal, a continuation of the old romantic Zionism, was felt, and Soviet Jewish activism came at the right time.

Those refuseniks who chained themselves at public places in Moscow and staged hunger strikes in the obscurity of the Ural prisons were heroes indeed. So are those who have to resort to similar forms of protest today in order to obtain their exit visas. But these heroes lose a good deal of their Zionist fervour in the merciless clash with Israeli life. Idealism and romantic images of Israel are somewhat easier to hold on to in the Diaspora, particularly when actively defying the hated Soviet regime.

THIS HAS BEEN forgotten by the leaders of all the political parties in this country, as well as by the media. Just as Zionism usually flourishes better prior to aliya, the Soviet Jew is much more attractive while he is still fighting to get his exit visa.

An article in *The Jerusalem Post* by Hanna Zemer, the editor of *Davar*, illustrated this point very well. She admitted quite openly how badly Israelis feel about the Soviet Jews and how her own opinion was

changed for the better when she met them... in Moscow.

The kind of people Zemer met and described in her article were heroes. Cramped into a small room, they studied Hebrew, constantly watched and harassed by the authorities, they met foreigners, complained about their fate and showed a strong will to achieve their goal.

These are the people whose very defiance of the regime crucially depends on what is said about them in the free world. But if the media build the image of the *average* Soviet Jew around these heroes, the public is bound to be disappointed, for they are hardly representative of the rank and file of the Soviet Jewish population.

The rank and file are afraid to meet foreigners, let alone an Israeli journalist. They do not study Hebrew, and even if they dream about learning it and leaving the country, it often takes them years to summon up the courage to apply for an exit visa.

Zemer concludes: "...these Jews come to Jerusalem, or to Kfar Sava or to Kiryat Yam, not to New York, not to Montreal, not to Sydney. I wish they were here already. I wish I could hear them complaining. I wish they could already say this place is a disappointment."

The Jews she is writing about, a minority within a minority of those who dare to leave the USSR, are likely to come to Israel and to experience the disappointment she predicts. But, as I have already pointed out, while disappointed American or Swiss olim can painlessly return to their native countries, disappointed Soviet Jews are pretty well trapped here. Even if they succeed in obtaining a visa for another country, there is the problem of repayment of the government loan on which their initial absorption depended. Some even perceive themselves as little more than cannon fodder, "Israelis in spite of themselves."

This situation certainly contributes to the fact (of which Zionist leaders are so proud) that the retention rate among Soviet olim is so much higher than among immigrant

Western Jews. And yet, there is widespread concern about the dropout, or *neshira*, phenomenon.

ON FEW OTHER issues do the Labour opposition and the Likud government agree as they do on the question of the *neshira* in Vienna. Rather than working on the drastic improvement of absorption, the government has resorted to attempts at symptomatic treatment. This usually consists of demands on the Diaspora communities to curtail their assistance to Jews who decide to settle in the West or pressure on Western governments not to regard Soviet emigrants as refugees. There have also been suggestions that direct flights from the USSR to Israel should be organized, so that there is no longer any opportunity of choosing the country of settlement.

In an attempt to curb the growth in the number of *neshirim*, the Israel government wants to make it clear to Soviet Jewish émigrés that it will not allow the Israeli visa to be changed for a "visa of convenience" in Vienna. So far, the united efforts of the Diaspora Jews have succeeded in blocking this policy, which raises serious humanitarian questions.

The over-dramatization of *neshira* points at the existence of a double standard being applied to Diaspora Jews. Somehow, the fact that in 1979 only 40 per cent of Soviet Jewish émigrés settled in Israel seems to provoke more anxiety than the substantially lower figures of the Israel-bound among, say, South African, or Argentinian Jewish emigrants. Let us also recall how, only two years ago, half-empty El Al planes were taking off from Teheran leaving behind Jews who preferred the uncertainties of "fundamentalist" Iran to the outstretched hand of the Jewish state.

The attraction of Israel for Diaspora Jewry (as well as for Israeli-born Jews) is apparently the issue. The recently rediscovered

jerida may have some of the same roots as the *neshira* of the Soviet and other Jewish migrant groups; the challenge of continuing the Israeli experience in its present form is less attractive than the old challenge of building the state.

Immigration from all over the world has plummeted in recent years. While the *neshira* of Soviet Jews increased in the years 1976-1980 from 20 to almost 80 per cent of all émigrés, their proportion of the total aliya fluctuated in the same years only between 37 and 47 per cent. This means that Soviet Jews continue to supply the bulk of olim, and that the dramatic rise in *neshira* is only a reflection of the aliya trend worldwide. Should it, then, be decried as "ingratitude" on the part of the Soviet Jews? Does the hard fact that the Soviet government would not allow Jews to emigrate unless they declared Israel as their destination justify this indignation?

THE TIME HAS COME to face reality without ideological blinkers. The Soviet aliya, aliya from the largest Jewish Diaspora outside the U.S., has been a very limited success. It is a sad fact of the last decade of Jewish history that petty political rivalries and the deterioration of the social fabric within Israel have crushed the aliya momentum in Soviet Jewry. The jealousy of ordinary Israelis, the cruel indifference of the political leadership of this country, and the deplorable impotence of the Diaspora leaders have been the main factors in frustrating the promised aliya from the USSR.

These factors have been particularly harmful in view of the shallow and naive character of Soviet Zionism, a Zionism without Zionist organizations.

The former Prisoners of Zion who so valiantly thrust open the gates of the Soviet Union for other Jews 10 years ago did not suffer in vain. But it hurts to see what has become of the image of the Soviet Jew in Israel. □

HEBRON JEWS DISCUSS RELATIONS WITH ARABS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 27 Feb 81 p 6

[Article by Uosef Goell: "Hebron's Faithful"]

[Text]

IT TURNED FOGGY south of Bethlehem. By the time we reached Hebron and Kiryat Arba, the rain was coming down in sheets. The grey-haired reservist standing guard at Beit Hadassah in "Jewish" Hebron was soaked and shivering in his sandbagged post.

"Every day I'm here is one day too many. And I still have three weeks to go," he said, raindrops falling off the tip of his nose.

In Beit Hadassah itself, which we reached by climbing down a steep flight of stone stairs and passing an incongruous Donald Duck sliding pond in the courtyard, it was warm. The cavernous building, which was a hospital before the 1929 massacre of the Jewish community and which for the past two years has served as home for one of the spearheads of Gush Emunim's keepers of the faith, is kept at a comfortable temperature, even for a Hebron winter, by a non-stop kitchen.

The kitchen feeds the 70 women and children who occupied the building a week after Pessah two years ago, in an attempt to compel the Begin government to support purposeful Jewish settlement in, and not just alongside, Arab Hebron. A bank of chugging washing machines and laundry dryers add their heat to the long corridor that serves as common room, dining room and rainy-day playground for the Beit Hadassah commune.

IF KIRYAT ARBA, the solid Jewish urban development which hugs Arab Hebron on its eastern flank, is "True-Believer land," Beit Hadassah is its Holy of Holies. And as is often true when it comes to uncompromising true-believership, women are in the front ranks.

The Rabbanit Miriam Levinger undoubtedly qualifies as the very tip of this spearhead. She received us in the corridor-common room, cradling her weeks-old baby, her eleventh, in her arms, and periodically interrupting our interview to attend to her two-year-old.

The 70 women and children, she noted, are really seven families and a handful of women volunteers. Each "family," with about 10 children per mother, occupies one of the large rooms flanking the corridor. All eat together at plain wooden tables in the common room.

The family rooms are filled with beds, some of which are stacked against the walls during the day to make room for the children and their mothers when they need to get away from the communal hubbub.

The upstairs rooms and the building next door are occupied by a yeshiva, whose members are fed by Hebron's "Hadassah ladies" (apologies to the traditional bearers of that title, who deeply resent any identification with this Gush Emunim outpost).

MIRIAM LEVINGER and her husband, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were among the first of the Jewish settlers in Hebron after the Six Day War. In 1969 they were among those who sought to force the hand of the Government of National Unity, by occupying the Park Hotel (owned by the Kawasme family of Hebron, which numbers among its sons the currently exiled mayor) as a prelude to officially-backed Jewish resettlement of the town.

Under the aegis of the late Yigal Allon, the Labour government evolved a compromise under which Kiryat Arba was established. According to Mrs. Levinger, a promise was given that it would develop into a part of Hebron. Instead, she complains, lands for the expansion of Kiryat Arba were expropriated towards the north and the east, so that it grew away from Hebron.

Rabbi Levinger, who serves as Kiryat Arba's spiritual head in, given his yekke background, the standard dour true-believer type. His approach to winning over the unbeliever is to repeat his slogans and arguments again and again. His wife is that unusual combination of a far-out true believer with a sense of humour and with a fine feel for the impact of her arguments on "infidel" ears.

"I was interviewed some time ago by a BBC man and I could tell I wasn't reaching him. I've lost you,

haven't I? I asked him after the third sentence, and he admitted it. But we took off along another tack, and I think I got through to him."

What Miriam Levinger is trying to get through is two messages. One is that of "the legitimate and inalienable rights" of the Jewish people to settle and live throughout the Promised Land. (The slogans and phraseology in the literature put out by the supporters of the Beit Hadassah group are vaguely but embarrassingly reminiscent of PLO propaganda. Hebron is referred to as "the second holiest city of the Jewish people," paralleling the Arab claim to Jerusalem as "the third holiest city in Islam.")

IN ADDITION to the nationalist-cum-religious point as to the right and *mitzva* of settling throughout the length and breadth of the land, Miriam Levinger is also trying to make a personal point about Jewish fear and courage.

She speaks of her girlhood in the south Bronx, already notorious as one of New York's terror areas.

"My father was a well-known cantor and composer of cantorial music, and we lived at Southern Boulevard and 163rd Street," says the former Miriam Beinhorn, who came to Israel at the age of 19 in 1956, "and we children were taught to be afraid."

"Fearing *goyim* is despicable. And this is one of the messages I'm trying to get across here. There are those among us who can't help being afraid, here too. I don't push them. But I push and help those who would like to overcome their fears."

"I admit that at times I've even caught myself acting otherwise, but I corrected it. When my son was 16 years old, he once came back by a late bus and walked across several kilometres of open fields through a solidly Arab area to our home in Kiryat Arba. I started to scold him, but then I realized that that would be *galuti*, a continuation of our Diaspora conditioning to fear."

Miriam Levinger says she walks through the Arab *saviv* unarmed

and unafraid. Friends and admirers say she is armed, with a pistol in her bag, and that the Arabs know it and are scared to death of making any trouble for her. She claims that ever since she and her women occupied Beit Hadassah, the number of Arab nationalist demonstrations and attacks on Jews in Hebron has diminished, and that their incidence is much lower than in other towns, despite the reputation Hebron's Arabs have for extremism.

It is not clear whether that reputation is deserved. The fear which Hebron traditionally inspires in the hearts of Jews, and which Miriam Levinger is trying to overcome, stems less from the nationalist nature of the town's Arab population than from the large "wild" Beduin component in that population. Arab Hebron is not noted for nationalist intellectual rabble-rousers, as are more modern Nablus or Ramallah; because of its proximity to the desert it is more of a wild frontier town. It would certainly qualify as the least modern and most fundamentalist Moslem of the West Bank's Arab cities.

WHAT IS CLEAR is that two years after penetrating into the heart of Arab Hebron, the women of Beit Hadassah continue to live behind a barricade of army gun-emplacements and reservist patrols.

Meir Indor, who holds the "Hebron portfolio" in Kiryat Arba's Gush Emunim establishment, and who accompanied us on the visit to Beit Hadassah, feels that this is as it should be. One of the points he is trying to get across is that Gush Emunim settlers should not be expected to defend themselves, but that Israel's commitment to the possession of all of Judea and Samaria should express itself in the posting of sufficient military strength to fulfil all the settlers' defence needs.

"I am opposed to the Yesha Council maintaining its own defence committee," he says, referring to the new political group the Gush settlements have set up to coordinate lobbying for the settle-

ments' interests. "Security is something the army should take care of and we should be very careful not to let the army and the military government off the hook on that."

Indor, who has been in Kiryat Arba with his wife and two small daughters for the past four-and-a-half years, is in charge of the "Hebron Committee's" public relations, both in Israel and abroad. He recently took the message of the need for Jewish settlement in Hebron to the U.S., where he was active in setting up the Hebron Council, a fund to finance the cause of Jewish Hebron, and in enlisting the aid of the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement there.

Indor says there are now about 600 families in Kiryat Arba and no empty apartments. Driving through Kiryat Arba is a very different experience from visiting Beit Hadassah. If one ignores the continuous security fence around it, it is possible to imagine that it is one of the new suburbs of Jerusalem.

A few years ago many of the apartments in Kiryat Arba were empty, but this is no longer true. The apartments have either three or four rooms and most, Indor says, are owned rather than rented. He rents his own three-room, 86-sq.m., flat for IS110 a month. The purchase of apartments was also highly subsidized by the Housing Ministry. Indor admits that many settlers were originally attracted by the inexpensive housing but adds, "anyone who came here just for that wouldn't last long."

He is especially proud of the mixed nature of the population.

"Fifty-five per cent are Sephardim and 100 of the 600 families are new olim, mostly from the U.S. but also from the Soviet Union. About 60 per cent are religious and the rest very definitely secular."

"Secular families drive on Shabbat and there is mixed dancing — boys and girls, not Arabs and Jews — in the centre on Shabbat eve."

The general atmosphere in the town is observant, however, with

several hundred yeshiva students setting this tone. In addition to the yeshivas there is the "Hatoras Seminary" run by the Gush. This organizes three-day lectures and field trips for groups of schoolchildren from "Old Israel," with the aim of inculcating in them a love for the land that combines the ideas of the Nature Protection Society with Torah tradition.

DESPITE all these references to the Gush, Inodor insists that it no longer exists in the dramatic form it took in the 1970s.

"The Gush leadership has not convened for quite some time, and I think it would be fair to say that this quiescence is the result of an internal spiritual confusion as to what to do next."

He explains that there are three main streams of thought among Gush activists in regard to its future course. The common denominator is that the Gush continues to be what its name implies: an elite spearhead for the revival of faith. The question is: which faith and what tactics?

One stream, reacting to what Inodor calls "the virulent hate against

us and the entire settlement drive in the territories, especially as evinced on television," is urging a pause in settlement activities and a concentration instead on an educational campaign in "Old Israel."

"After all," he points out, "our purpose is not to turn Israelis into enemies of the Land of Israel."

Others say that the hate expressed on TV does not truly reflect public opinion, and that a recent poll which showed 63 per cent of Israelis supporting further settlement in the territories is closer to the truth. This stream argues that the continuing creation of settlements *fait accompli* is what is needed to persuade the people that there has been no end to the dedication of those truly devoted to the cause of Eretz Yisrael.

And then, Inodor adds, there is a third stream which believes that now that its initial presence in the territories has been established, the Gush should undertake an entirely new mission: it should undertake a drive among the entire people for *Amare Mikdash*, a return to religious faith and not just to a religious version of pioneering Israeli Zionism. □

HAIFA AVOIDS COAL UNLOADING

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Mar 81 p 6

[Text]

HAIFA. — The National Planning Commission's decision on Tuesday to veto any coal unloading in Haifa — even on a temporary basis, as requested by the Electric Corporation, has stirred up heated public controversy here.

The corporation's new managing director, Eytan Jacobson, who until now has tried to keep a low profile, has taken a strong stand against the ruling, which he called "hasty" and "appallingly wrong." It is only the result of misinformation and bad calculations, he claimed.

"Not only that, but this will cost the country over \$40 million. For the sake of such a sum the government once wanted to close down El Al. How come it is willing to open its purse wide now?" he said in an interview with Kol Yisrael.

Mayor Arye Gurel, on the other hand, greeted the commission's decision as "a definite proof of public responsibility and concern for the health of our 400,000 citizens." In a cable to commission chairman and Interior Ministry director-general Haim Kubersky, Gurel expressed his satisfaction for his strong stand against the proposal.

The Electric Corporation had originally asked to have all coal for its new power station being completed in Hadera unloaded at Haifa port. Three years ago, however, the commission ruled against the

proposal and ordered the corporation to seek alternative solutions.

Last July construction was started of an off-shore pier in Hadera large enough to allow the easy unloading of over three million tons of coal a year. All work on this project, however, was stopped four months ago, when a violent storm almost sank the two barges doing the work off shore, with all 85 on board.

The Hadera pier will now not be ready until April 1982, but the power station's first unit is scheduled to be put into operation this July. Consequently the Electric Corporation again asked to use Haifa port facilities for unloading its coal, at least until the pier is completed. The eight-month temporary agreement would also show local and government authorities that the entire operation was safe and did not endanger anyone's health or worsen local pollution, corporation experts explained.

If no alternative place is found until July to unload the coal, the power station will start burning oil. The difference in the price of oil over coal, Jacobson stressed, will add up to over \$40m.

"It is deplorable that the commission ruled the way it did. We never thought it would decide on the whole issue on Tuesday. We thought only the temporary unloading in Haifa was at stake. That is why we did not prepare our case as well as we could have done — because if we had, the outcome would have been different," he claimed.

THOUSAND OF DUNAMS SEIZED ON WEST BANK

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Feb 81 pp 1, 9

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — A total of 24,000 dunams have been seized in the past four months for the establishment and consolidation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, a senior source in the defence establishment said yesterday.

The Knesset Finance Committee earlier this week allocated IS\$50 million for the establishment of six new settlements and for building 400 additional homes in existing West Bank localities. They will be ready for occupation by June 30, Knesset election day.

The moves are part of a drive to increase the West Bank's Jewish population by 8,000, which would bring the total to 25,000 by the end of 1981, authoritative sources said.

The source maintained that more than 20,000 of the 24,000 dunams are state owned, and the government merely exercised its right to use them. Another 4,000 dunams at Gush Etzion were Jewish-owned before 1948. Senior sources in the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department said only small, isolated tracts were Arab-owned. They will be used for roads and public utilities.

The seizures reported were: 5,000 dunams at Yakir B (previously called Elkana B), 4,480 at Gush Etzion, 4,000 at Gittit, another 4,000 at Ma'on and Carmel, 2,350 at Tekoa B, 2,000 for Mizpe Guvrin, 600 for Nili, 450 at Nebi Samwil, another 450 at Kedumim, 180 at Giva Hadasha, 150 for Givon, 100 at Migdal Oz, 100 for Michmash and 35 for Efrat.

Arabs have already contested the government's claim to ownership of lands for the settlement expected to rise at Mizpe Guvrin (northwest of Hebron). Other village mukhtars were recently shown the lands the government plans to use for Yakir B (between Elkana and Ariel) and for Nili (southeast of Ben-Gurion Airport), but no protests have been registered, a defence establishment source reported.

Nor have protests been registered against the land seizures for Tekoa B (in the Judean Desert) or Michmash (in the upper ridge of the Jordan Valley east of Ramallah).

Speaking to reporters yesterday, WZO Settlement Department head Mattityahu Drobliss maintained that the authorities should concentrate on consolidating existing settlements rather than building new ones. He explained that the latest allocation will be used to enlarge isolated settlements such as Eilon Moreh, Shilo and Neveh Tsuf to 100 units each, and other small settlements from 30 or 40 to 60 families each.

The houses will be ready by election day, although most of the 3,000 people expected to move there will arrive after the school term, in July and August, he predicted.

The WZO will improve the infrastructure at each settlement, and by the end of the year all will be connected to the electric grid, he continued. It also wants to increase job openings at each site because at present 70 per cent of the settlers commute to work, he said.

Meanwhile, he reported, the Housing Ministry is building 1,200 to 1,500 housing units to increase the urban Jewish population in the West Bank by 5,000.

Drobless, a member of Prime Minister Menahem Begin's Herut Party, said that 18,500 Jews now live in the West Bank, compared with some 5,000 when the Likud came to power in 1977.

He added that from 1967 to 1977, the Alignment established only 72 settlements throughout the country, an average of 7.2 settlements a year. The Likud has established 165 settlements, averaging about 40 a year, he said, adding that 35 of the new Galilee settlements are only small "lookouts."

CSO: 4820

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL SEEN IN SHORT SUPPLY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] TEL AVIV. — There is a dire shortage of scientific personnel willing to go into industry, Gurion Meltzer, head of the electric and electronics group of Koor, said yesterday. "In my group alone, I can provide employment for 100 competent persons with top scientific skills."

Meltzer was speaking at a press conference called by the Israeli Industry Centre for R & D, which with other bodies, such as the Industry Ministry, is sponsoring a meeting of those active in the field of R & D in Jerusalem.

Meltzer noted that although it was difficult to determine exact figures, "the salary of an engineer with an academic degree ranges from IS6,000 to IS13,000 gross; for a technician from IS5,000 to IS12,000 gross; while ordinary workers made from IS1,200 to IS4,000.

(These figures are before taxes; they also do not include all the fringe benefits.)

"It is only by keeping one pace ahead of the rest of the world in R & D," Meltzer said, "that we can expect to keep our present markets and to conquer new ones."

This viewpoint was stressed by Eli Hurvitz, general manager of Teva Pharmaceuticals, who pointed out that "our only chance to expand exports is to develop new formulas — which cost enormous sums."

Prof. Arich Lavie, chief scientist in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, said that the solution to providing the country with the

industrial scientific skills it needed, lay in passing a law encouraging progress in this field. Such a law would soon be submitted to the Knesset by Industry Minister Gideon Patt, he said.

Lavie pointed out that the proposed law contained four main provisions. The first is the long-term financing of R&D projects, since they often lasted from three to ten years "and at present financing is often on an annual basis." The second provision is giving incentives to scientists in institutions of higher learning to switch to industry by granting them special tax benefits. He proposed that a scientist who spent his sabbatical year in Israel working in industry, would be exempt from taxes, "just as if he was working abroad" during this year.

Granting tax relief to industry, so firms could channel their money into R & D and setting up special R & D investment companies which would finance projects, were the other two provisions.

"During the present fiscal year, industrial exports (excluding diamonds) will reach \$3.25 billion," Lavie said, adding that "\$1b. of this will be in products developed in Israel." (Last year, such R & D products were \$740m.)

At present, some 3,000 persons with academic degrees are working in the field of R & D, plus another 2,500 technicians and another thousand persons with special skills.

Lavie said he expected that by 1983 Israel would have 4,700 scientists, 4,000 technicians and 1,800 persons with special skills.

ALTERNATIVE SITE PLANNED FOR ELAT AIRPORT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] TEL AVIV. — Government officials have begun a detailed examination of two alternative sites for Eilat's airport. The examination follows a directed to the Etzion air force base, which is not to enlarge the present airfield, which cuts through the town.

The present airport is too small for planes carrying 180 passengers, for example. These aircraft are directed to the Etzion air force base in the nearby Moon Valley in Sinai. However, Israel will have to vacate the base by April 1982 in accordance with the peace treaty with Egypt. The Egyptians had agreed that Etzion be used for civilian flights, but a spokesman for the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism said yesterday that the government nevertheless wanted a suitable airport of its own.

Two alternatives are under consideration, one four kilometres north of Eilat, and the other 11 kilometres from town.

Teams of experts will now examine the soil and consider how the runways should be built. They will also plan the airbases which would lead to them.

Officials said they expected the reports by April, when the Ministerial Economic Committee

will decide between the alternatives.

It will take eight to ten months to build the airport, so that it would be ready by the time the Israel Defence Forces withdraw from Etzion, the officials said.

The new project will cost \$30m. to \$50m., depending on its size and the facilities it will provide, senior government sources said. Part of the cost will be covered by selling the land on which Eilat's present airport is situated. That airport will not be enlarged because the planes' noise and vibration affects the nearby hotel area.

Meanwhile, the government has found a way to enable the British company, Dan Air, to fly passengers to Eilat.

~~Dan Air wanted to fly Boeing 727-200s there with 180 passengers, and Israel decided that because the plane was too big for Eilat it should land at Etzion. However, the British government opposed the plan because Etzion is in territory that will revert to the Egyptians.~~

According to the new arrangement the Boeing 727-200s could land and take off at Eilat with all the seats taken, but to reduce the load at take-off the planes will not carry enough fuel for a non-stop flight to Europe. They will land at Ben-Gurion Airport for refuelling, a government source told *The Post*.

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS VERSUS RAKAH--Rakah, the New Communist Party, has charged fundamentalist Moslems with violent attempts to halt its political activity. Il-Ittihad, the Rakah magazine, reported yesterday that in the past year Moslem fundamentalists burned the communist club here, set fire to a vehicle owned by the party, attacked a family because of its identification with the party and beat members of the party's youth movement who used to sell the party papers. The newspaper also charged the fundamentalists with opening fire on a vehicle carrying a dance troupe to protest its appearance at a wedding in the Triangle. Several troupe members were wounded, the newspaper said. Il-Ittihad also reported that a cache of arms was uncovered in a deserted house in Umm el-Fahm by local youths who informed the police. Several members of the fundamentalist movement were arrested by security forces recently. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Mar 81 p 3]

ADVANCED MERKAVA TO BE PRODUCED--The second model of the Merkava tank will soon be in production, and the third model, now in the advanced experimental stage, will be ready around 1985. Tat-Aluf Ben-Zion Ben-Bassat, head of the IDF Ordnance Corps, gave this progress report in an interview with Kol Yisrael's "Weekly Column" programme Friday evening. The second model will have better fire control to increase chances of hitting the target on the first shot. There will be further improvements in the third model, and both second and third models will have better equipment for night fighting. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Feb 81 p 2]

CSO: 4820

'DIWANIYAH' PRAISED AS NATIVE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 21-27 Feb 81 p 29

[Article: "The 'Diwaniyah,' that Kuwaiti Institution"]

[Excerpt] The "diwaniyah" [reception hall], as the word is used in Kuwait, is the room in a house, or attached to it, in which the man of the house receives his male visitors in the evening, where they discuss events of the day. Most of the time the diwaniyah is handed down from father to son among people who are financially able to keep it going.

The meaning of diwaniyah, in the strictly social sense, has expanded during the parliamentary election campaign in Kuwait, to include a big, beautiful, luxurious tent where the candidate, sitting on the floor with his shoes off, receives the voters of his district, who question him and debate with him. Usually the session is not to the candidate's advantage.

According to its meaning outside the election environment, the diwaniyah constitutes an institution through which people form bonds with each other, during which friendships are formed all the time and political and economic alliances are formed sometimes. Interestingly enough, the young Kuwaiti man has not abandoned this firmly established Kuwaiti institution. For him it is a part of his family inheritance, which must remain intact. Through it, as for his father and grandfather before him, he carries out all his interpersonal relationships with neighbors, friends, and countrymen.

Like everything that has been revived or renewed in Kuwait, the diwaniyah after having been [merely] a unique meeting place, is now agreed to be the best place for friends to meet and for constructive dialogue. It has been the focal point of social life and now is tantamount to an ancient forum which is supported [by all].

In the past, the diwaniyah played a leading role in building the concept of democracy as a native practice fostered by the family sessions. This could be the reason behind the Kuwaiti's unreserved way of expressing his frank opinion, which is marvelled at by citizens of other Arab countries.

The government in Kuwait is comfortable with the diwaniyah, because in its opinion it is a political focal point through which the political and intellectual climate of Kuwait can be gauged, in this tiny country where most people know each other.

The current "election diwaniyah," which has been dubbed the "democracy tent" by the Kuwaiti newspaper, AL-QABAS, is now found in all the electoral districts. Outside are the shoes of the voters who have removed them to go in and debate with the persistent candidates each night during specific hours. Usually dinner is served, and sometimes there are music and dancing.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOOD PLANNED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2

[Text] Kuwait's United Company for Agricultural Production (UCAP) has set a target of covering domestic needs of foodstuff in the near future. From a very modest starting output of 352 tonnes of vegetables, clover and fodder in 1977, the company managed to put on the market 13,307 tonnes in 1980.

"We have an arable area of land about 10 million square metres in Salibiyah of which 37 per cent could be cultivated last season," said Mohammed Al-Roumi, the chairman of UCAP which incorporates four agricultural and livestock subsidiaries in addition to the Credit and Savings Bank.

Honey

"The company has the potentialities of cultivating the whole area as soon as the 22 million gallons of water necessary for irrigation are available," he added.

Another experimental field of production explored by UCAP is honey. A piece of land has been planted with flowers and surrounded by a large number of beehives. "The preliminary output of 99 kilograms of honey has encouraged us to expand the baby project," Al-Roumi said.

Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa attended the opening session yesterday of "Isma" regional raw materials meeting.

The three-day panel opened here under the chairmanship of Abdul Baqi Al-Nouri managing director of the Petrol-Chemical Industries Company, who is also vice chairman of the Middle East Executive Committee of "Isma."

The panel is the first to be held in the Middle East or outside Europe, the report added.

"Fertilisers are very different from most other chemicals. They play a crucial role in food production," Al-Khalifa told the opening session.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

FRENCH LOAN--Kuwait Interantional Investment Cpmpany will co-lead with Banque De Lindochine Et Che Suez and Banque Nationale De Paris in a 600 million French francs loan issued in favour of Caisse Des Depot Et Consignatious, a KIIC press release said yesterday.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Feb 81 p 2]

GABON PRESIDENT--President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, currently in Kuwait, visited the Amir yesterday and held a round of official negotiations. Minister of Amiri Diwan affairs said that the negotiations between the Amir and President Bongo centred on bilateral relations and methods of consolidating them in various fields. The discussions further dealt with Arab-African relations in an atmosphere of understanding and friendship. [Excerpt] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Feb 81 p 2]

BRITISH INSURANCE SHARES--The Kuwait Investment Office in London has purchased 525,000 shares of the British General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, raising its stake to 14.7 million shares or 10 per cent of the ordinary equity, it was disclosed last week. General Accident's shares were quoted at the end of the week at 302 pence (\$7.03), 11 pence above the midway point between the 1980-81 high of 370 pence and the low of 212 pence. The Kuwait Investment Office, acting for the Kuwaiti government, holds about 5 per cent of the shares of Britain's major insurance companies, according to sources in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance quoted by the ASSOCIATED PRESS. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MFMO in English 16 Feb 81 p 13]

KFAED LOANS--In 1979-80 the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development KFAED concluded 20 loan agreements totalling 71.93 million Kuwaiti Dinars, a press report released recently in Kuwait said. Four loan agreements amounting to \$7.2 million are in final stages, the report said, adding that the fund is also studying 22 projects in 21 states. During the same period, KFAED processed 24 projects for developing countries. The fund's loans are repayable within periods ranging between 9 and a half years and 36 years. Loans extended to Arab states constituted 41.5 per cent of the fund's total lending during the same year and interest rates ranged between 1.5 and 5.5 per cent with varying periods of grace. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 7 Feb 81 p 12]

SOLAR ENERGY EXPERIMENTS--Solar energy is expected to be put to practical use in Kuwait this year. The two fields most likely to be the starting point are government housing and agriculture. The Ardiyah housing project will soon be equipped with solar energy to be used in providing the residents with hot and cold water, according to Public Housing Authority sources. The layout of the Ardiyah residential area providing for open spaces in the midst of each group of houses will allow the solar energy equipment to be installed in these spaces. In the field of agriculture experiments are still being jointly conducted by the Agriculture Administration and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) for using the solar energy in cooling the greenhouses of the protected plantation. A source at the Agricultural Administration said that this step is part of a major plan worked out by the ministry to develop agricultural production in Kuwait by overcoming environmental obstacles. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2]

KIIC GOLD BOND DEAL--Kuwait International Investment Co. (KIIC) announced today that the firm is co-managing a bond issue on behalf of Refinemet International N.V. indexed to 100,000 ounces of gold. The issue is lead managed by Drexel Burnham Lambert and Co-managed by Credit Commercial De France, Banque De L'Union Europeenne and Kuwait International Investment Co. The bonds are indexed to the market price of gold and offer investors the advantage of gold without actually possessing non interest bearing bullion which would cost money in terms of storage, insurance and assay. Interest will be payable annually in February and the coupon is expected to be in the 3 to 4 per cent range. Both principal and interest will be denominated and payable in gold at the option of the investor to the extent such payments are in multiples of one hundred ounces. The bonds will be listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The pricing formula will be determined on Feb 9 and pricing will take place on Feb 11. The price of the bonds will not be in excess of 103 percent of the market price prevailing on Feb 11, 1981. Refinemet International N.V. is a US based Metals Company 61 percent owned by Empain-Schneider group. The gold-indexed bonds are guaranteed by Refinemet International Co. and R.M.I. Refinery Inc., and will be secured at all times by gold or gold denominated collateral in excess of the gold obligation of the issuer.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Feb 81 p 2]

FUND FOR TANZANIA PROJECT--Dar Es Salaam: The Kuwait Fund has reported to have agreed to help finance a gigantic transport project in Tanzania which is considered to be an essential infrastructure for the implementation of the Mufindi Pulp and the Stiegler Gorge hydro-electric power project. An accord has reached here between the government of Tanzania and the visiting five-man delegation of Kuwait Fund led by its Director General Abdulatif Yussuf Al-Hamad. [as published] Hamad later called on Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and assured him of all possible financial assistance from Kuwait Fund for Tanzanian projects. The aid offered by Kuwait fund would be spent on a large railways and port communication network together with the purchase of urgently-needed spare parts, essential equipment and rolling stock. A spokesman for Tanzanian Ministry of Industries said that the Kuwait Fund authorities have also agreed to provide more funds for Mwanza Textile Mill. Kuwait has already provided financial assistance amounting to shs. 280 million for Mwanza Textile Mill and the Mufindi Pulp project.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 11 Feb 81 p 3]

AL-HUMAYDI ADDRESSES SCHOOL GROUP

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 7 Feb 81 pp 1, 13

[Text]

MAJOR Khweldi Hamedl, Urban Militia Commander has given a lecture to students from Tripoli and Zawyat Addahmani Secondary Schools for Boys on the prospects of the forming of a people's army which will be to counter attack against any foreign forces.

In this meeting held at Tripoli People's Hall, Major Hamedl spoke about the historical role played by the students in inciting the Libyan society for revolution and change its structure. The 1964 students uprising he said, represents the main elements of the revolution to bring down the monarchy system.

Important lesson on nationalism and pan-Arab unity were from the students uprising which took place before the outbreak of the revolution.

This is particularly clear in the upheaval led by the revolutionary student Muammar Gathafi on October 5 in Sabha which called for Arab unity and denounced succession.

BEATEN

He pointed out that before the revolution, students were killed and beaten up by the authority, following the revolution in the Jamahiriya, students began to play a pioneering role in their country which fulfilled the dictum

"authority wealth and arms are in the hands of the people".

He spoke of the importance of the student's role in the present stage being the active element in building the sound society due to their extensive revolutionary culture and ability to absorb and analyse.

He also touched upon the people's army stressing that it links the past with the present, because the concept of setting up the armed people is inspired from the struggle of fathers and forefathers through their liberation war against the Italian fascist forces.

SOCIETY

Major Khweldl stressed the idea of transforming schools into military barracks which means providing the society with educational specialisation while training every student militarily to reach the required combat standard in order to be ready when need be. The commander of the urban militias

explained the concept of the armed people, saying that the country's resources are as ambitious for others and the principles of the great Al-Fateh revolution is the source of anger and hostility of colonialists and enemies of Islam and freedom.

BOMBS

Major Khweldi Hamedl pointed out that when bombs go off, they do not segregate civilians from soldiers, men from women, children from elderly, and therefore, all Libyans should train on arms to defend themselves, their country and principles.

Major Khweldl emphasized the necessity of support for and solidarity with Chad until the time when the freedom of this sister African country is made certain. This is the aim for which the great Al-Fateh revolution is struggling.

He said that it is time that France and those behind her realized that the over powering winds of freedom which have swept the forests of

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE GROWS WITH TURKEY

London 8 DAYS in English 14 Feb 81 p 48

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] TURKEY'S State Planning Organisation forecasts that the 1981 trade deficit will increase to \$5.5bn, 25 per cent over 1980 figures, according to a report published in January. However, the organisation also announced that Turkey hopes to bridge part of the trade gap with a 20 per cent increase in expatriate remittances, and in view of the gloom the projections generated, news of Turkish companies winning contracts in Libya have come as a great relief.

Libya is an important trading partner for Turkey because of the large contracts Turkish companies are winning there, and also as a reserve source of oil. Turkey currently imports 3-4m tonnes of Libyan oil a year, but at times of crisis, such as the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, Libya would have been the one country Turkey could have approached for an increase in supplies.

In the event, Turkey did not need to approach Libya as Iranian and Iraqi supplies were resumed after a few weeks. But in 1974, during Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Libya came up with the extra oil needed to keep the Turkish army in occupation.

At the moment, Libya is of paramount importance as a source of foreign currency earnings for Turkey's ailing economy. In 1980 Turkish companies won \$1.6bn worth of contracts in Libya. The latest of these was won by Tokas, an affiliate of Saracoglu Holdings, is worth \$68m and is for building 848 homes and 11 clinics in various Libyan towns.

The other large contract was awarded to Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya, for building the first phase of Misurata port. This Turkish company, which built the first phase of

Tripoli port, won the contract in the face of strong competition from Japanese, South Korean and West German companies.

'The reason we win contracts in Libya is because we are also a Muslim country, which works to our advantage,' said one Turkish businessman. 'But our workmanship is also good and we finish contracts on time. This is just as important. The other important reason is that we are cheaper than other companies because our labour force is cheap.'

There are about 14,000 Turkish workers in Libya, employed by 26 Turkish firms. To attract remittances from these workers and others in Europe, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Turgut Ozal introduced a scheme in January under which workers abroad can bring their foreign currency savings into Turkey and keep them in foreign currency deposit accounts for six months to two years.

The latest protocol, signed in December by the Turkish-Libyan joint economic committee which was set up in 1978, shows that links between Turkey and Libya are getting increasingly strong. This protocol seeks to improve communications between the two countries by increasing Turkish Airline flights to Libya and by establishing direct telephone links.

These clauses were in addition to the normal trade agreements covering exports from Turkey such as grain, olive oil and other agricultural products, as well as manufactured goods produced by state-run economic enterprises. In 1980 Turkish exports to Libya reached the \$500m mark: in 1979 the figure was \$130m and in 1978, \$80m.

Besides the widely publicised trade relations, there are also the less publicised military agreements between the two countries. General Evran, Turkish head of state since the military takeover in September 1980, visited Libya in September 1978 while he was chief of staff, and signed a military and defence cooperation agreement, under which

Libyan airforce cadets are trained in Ankara.

Political problems in Turkey meant that an agreement to set up a joint light arms industry, dating from the same time, was shelved: but according to Turkish military sources there is now no reason this industry should not be set up soon.

CS0: 4820

LIBYA

BRIEFS

WAREHOUSE CONTRACTS--The Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy has signed a contract with an international specialist firm to establish general warehouses in Tripoli, Tajoura, Al-Aziziyah, Bani Walid, Tarhouna, Marzek and Obari. The total area of these warehouses is estimated at 176425 square metres, represents the first stage of a project covering the various parts of the Jamahiriya with general warehouses. The contract is given according to the recommendations and resolutions of the Basic People's Congresses. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 14 Feb 81 p 5]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

KUWAITI LOAN TO OMAN--A loan agreement was signed yesterday between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). According to the agreement, the fund will make a loan of KD 4 million to help finance Sohar gas line project. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Sultanate by Salim Mohamed Al-Kusaibe, ambassador of Oman in Kuwait, and on behalf of KFAED by Abdul Rahman Salem Al-Ateeq, chairman of the Fund's Board of Directors and minister of finance. The aim of the project is to supply natural gas for the copper smelter in Russeil, power generating units and other consumers on the Omani Batinah coast. The project consists of a steel pipe having a nominal diameter of 16 inches connecting the Yibai gas pipeline at Mrerat to Sohar for a distance of approximately 227 kilometres and other necessary facilities and services. Total cost of the project is estimated at KD 11 million of which 35 per cent is covered by the Fund. Execution has commenced in 1979 and is expected to be completed next year. The loan will be for a period of 16 years including a two-year period of grace, amortised in 28 semi-annual instalments, the first of which will be due in June 1983 and the last in December 1996. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2]

CSO: 4820

CENTRAL REGION ANNOUNCES MINISTRY SETUP

Khartoum AL-SAHFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Ministries Proposed for Central Region; Health, Education, Finance, Agriculture, and Regional Affairs"]

[Text] It has been decided to propose the creation of five regional ministries in the Central Region, by adding a new ministry to the number of ministries proposed in the regional government organization. That will be done by splitting the Ministry of Public Services into two ministries, the first for educational and guidance affairs, and the second for health and social welfare. This was in view of the enormity of educational and health services in the Central Region.

This was done in a meeting that Mr 'Abd al-Rahim Mahmud, governor of the Central Region, held the day before yesterday in Wad Madani, with the heads of the technical committees, which carried out the studies pertaining to structuring the regional government in the Central Region. The meeting replaced the regional ministries, by proposing the creation of five ministries: Ministry of Regional and Administrative Affairs, Finance and Economy, Agriculture, Education and Guidance, and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. This change abolished the ministry proposed for housing, water and public utilities. This will become a major bureau, under the supervision of the minister of regional affairs, who, according to the proposed structure, will hold the rank of central minister and deputy to the governor. A deputy minister will assist him in running ministry affairs.

The structure proposed for the regional ministry includes establishing two organizations, one called the Council of Regional Planning, and the second for legal advice. Both will be directly under the governor of the region.

On the other hand, 'Abd al-Rahim Mahmud will chair a broader meeting next Saturday, in his office in Wad Madani, which will include the acting provincial governors, the executive directors, and the first assistant governors of al-Jazirah, Blue Nile and White Nile provinces. The purpose is to consider the structure of the regional government and the local popular government.

The governor of the Central Region, the day before yesterday, directed the acting provincial governors that they must begin at once to close the accounts of their provinces, preparatory to the start of the new stage.

7005
CSO: 4802

OIL PIPELINE DEVELOPMENT REPORTED

Khartoum AL-SAHFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Program to Develop Oil Pipeline To Be Completed in February"]

[Text] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Talab, technical director for the oil pipeline, told AL-SAHFAH that the project to develop the line would reach final completion the end of next February. This development will make possible the shipment of all petroleum derivatives through the line, including gasoline, benzine, white gas and naptha fuels. Capacity will reach 100 cubic meters per hour (about 80 tons per hour). His Excellency said that the development project might include technical and engineering changes in the design of some machinery and requirements pertaining to the line.

On the other hand, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Talab explained to AL-SAHFAH that the pipeline had successfully completed pumping benzine. So far, it has been possible to ship about 12,500,000 gallons, through the pipeline, by means of the pumping test, which ran between 28 November and 17 December 1980.

It is worth pointing out that the project to develop the pipeline has been under way since July 1980, through several Austrian and West German firms, under the supervision of a French company.

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PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AL-JAZIRAH REVIEWED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 pp 6-7

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture, Dr 'Umar al-Amin, by Muhammad Ahmad Mabruk: "Minister of Agriculture Explains to AL-SAHAFAH Reasons for Decline in Al-Jazirah Productivity. Minister Draws Up Comprehensive Program for Implementation; Ministry to Solve Project Problems. New Production Relations; Radical Solutions for Farmers' Problems"]

[Text] The effects of "old age" have begun to appear in the huge al-Jazirah project. Its yield has fallen off considerably, which necessitates a pause to carry out numerous studies and search for the project's revitalization, so that it can take its place in driving our national economy as one of the important mainstays, and as one of the larger projects in the world.

We published a comprehensive field report before, in which we met with the project's administration, farmers and their federation. There was a consensus about a number of causes for the decline of project productivity. Today, we meet the minister of agriculture, Dr 'Umar al-Amin, with whom we discuss project problems, and the solutions which have been and will be taken for these problems.

[Question] We asked the minister of agriculture about the causes of the project's declining productivity.

[Answer] Project productivity has fallen off, especially last season, to a degree that has not been seen since 1957, a year of world economic conditions, which led to a poor return from foreign currency. This has caused the state to suffer financial losses, due to the decline in its share of production profit, from direct and indirect taxes. There was also a decline in the farmers' profit, which caused the farmers to accumulate debts. Production in the project has declined in proportion to the deterioration of production factors, such as poor means of irrigation, and unavailability of machinery. What we have is old and has not been reconditioned for a long time. There are also problems stemming from agricultural changes, represented by increasing crops and their acreage, without proportionally increasing production factors, in addition to escalating production costs, with the rising costs of imports, rising administration costs and the project's inflated management. The farmers' issues are represented by poor production returns, the profit-sharing system, and the system of mutual accounting.

[Question] The minister of agriculture explained the solutions that the ministry will implement to solve the project's problems.

[Answer] There have been several studies made and conferences held about the project's problems, and how to solve them, in which numerous foreign consulting firms participated. However, the situation continued as it was, until June of this year, when work to solve the project's production issues began in earnest. The president issued several decrees to the People's Assembly. The president stated that the project's problems were becoming increasingly critical, to such a degree that partial solutions were of no use. The president pointed out the state's policy toward rebuilding the project and the production infrastructure, by implementing an integrated program to refurbish the project.

This would involve two programs: the first, to expedite renewal and maintenance of equipment and machinery, means of transportation, shipping and communications, building storage facilities, improving irrigation networks. This would be done through a loan from the World Bank and the European Common Market, amounting to \$33,500,000. In fact, it has been credited, and work began in June 1980, and will be completed in December 1981. The second program is to fully rejuvenate the project, through a program costing \$200 million, by means of a similar loan. Foreign consulting firms are currently drawing up a study for this project.

[Question] We asked the minister about the stages required to implement the first urgent program.

[Answer] The immediate program includes the procurement of 163 tractors of different kinds for the project. Equipment for the Ministry of Irrigation includes 20 motorized graders, 14 heavy caterpillar tractors, 30 light-weight locomotives for al-Jazirah's railroad, 23 fuel tankers, 72 trucks, 75 "pickup" trucks, 138 fuel storage-tanks, and 119 warehouses, in addition to workshop equipment and spare parts. The immediate program is aimed at rectifying the project to meet current production demands.

[Question] Before the minister of agriculture clarifies the steps taken concerning production relationships, we should say that the method adhered to was the method that the colonialists laid down, and which has continued up to now. The profit was divided among the farmers with no concern for the gap between the producer and the weakness of production, with respect to the farmers, which generated a condition of indifference among the farmers. They greatly neglected the cotton crop, and concentrated their efforts on other crops, from which the farmer's return was commensurate with his actual production. This was one of the basic reasons leading to the decline of the project's cotton productivity. This non-system of joint accountability was greatly prejudicial to the farmers' rights.

[Answer] Perhaps the subject of production relationships and the decrees which the president issued concerning them, was a very important factor in raising the project's productivity. That was done by abolishing the system of sharing, and joint accounting, and substituting a system of individual accounting, as was done in the revolutionary al-Rahad pilot project, which returns net production profit to the farmer. The new system of production relationships requires that a fee for

water and land is deducted, and paid to the state, to cover the irrigation and administrative costs, and the ground rent. The state offers agricultural services, such as preparing the land and other agricultural operations, fertilizers and insecticides of various types, provided that the cost is deducted from each farmer individually, so that a farmer is not hurt by circumstances surrounding some other farmer.

A change has been made in the cotton marketing system, by purchasing the cotton from the farmer when it is delivered to the gin. This ensures that the farmer gets rapid receipt of his profit from cotton, after the production costs have been deducted. To solve the current financial problems, the farmers' debts were suspended by a presidential decree, and a 10-year schedule of payments set up, so that the debt payments will not swallow up these profits, which the farmers will realize from the new system of production relationships, and the improvement in project performance.

In order to achieve stability for the farmer, a new system of agricultural credit and insurance has been established, to guarantee financing of agricultural processes for all crops. Implementation of that will be in the mid-term program to rejuvenate the project.

[Question] We asked the minister about solutions which will be adopted to solve the project's administrative issues, which have caused very large deficits in the budget, and hamper the performance of its mission.

[Answer] The rate of inflation, with respect to the project's management structure, and the rise of administrative expenses, are developing in a way that ensures the work's efficient progress. At the same time, we are limiting the administrative costs, by rebuilding the project's management structure.

[Question] Concerning the agricultural cycle, we asked the minister about the "composition" of the crops planted in the project, and whether they were the most suitable?

[Answer] The present agricultural cycle came about as a result of research and studies, which established that no more than one million of its total two million feddans could be planted, because the irrigation system could not serve more than this amount at any one time. Three summer crops and one winter crop, wheat, are planted, but after the project has been rebuilt, the present agricultural cycle will be reviewed, so as to introduce livestock into the marginal lands, on which fodder will be planted for the farmers' livestock. In some areas, there will be concentration on livestock, by allocating more acreage for fodder for the farmers' animals. There is a program to introduce livestock into the agricultural cycle of all the projects. That will be implemented gradually.

[Question] We asked the minister about solutions to the problems of insufficient labor required to harvest the cotton.

[Answer] This is a problem which will be dealt with through mechanization. That will be implemented in a 3-year program to mechanize the harvesting of medium-staple

cotton in al-Rahad, al-Suki and New Halfa, and short-staple in al-Qadharif, the Blue Nile projects and the Nuba hills. Experiments in harvesting by machines have been successful. Fifty harvesters have been acquired for the al-Rahad project, which is sufficient to harvest a third of its acreage, as well as 27 machines for the Blue Nile project as a first stage. In fact, their work will begin in January, and it will relieve the cotton picking problems. In the next 2 years, harvesters will be introduced into the New Halfa and al-Suki projects. As for long-staple cotton, it has been proven that it cannot be picked by machine, but must be done manually. There is a project to harvest sugar cane mechanically, as is the case in Kinanah. Harvesters will be used for sorghum and sesame. We hope to obtain a great deal of benefit from machinery in agricultural operations, within 3 years time, as a solution to the problem of labor shortfalls.

We note from talking with the minister of agriculture, officials responsible for the project's management, and the Farmers' Federation, that in fact the soil suffers from exhaustion and poor fertility, despite the extensive use of fertilizers. The latter is considered a danger to the soil's composition and its profitability, due to the earth's loss of organic material. We should mention that certain excellent types of sorghum have become extinct. "May" sorghum, for example, is no longer grown, after having been planted for scores of years. "Fatritah" sorghum and other types, more usable in poor soil land, have been substituted.

These are some prominent examples of how the project's crops have been affected by soil exhaustion, the effects of which began to appear since the beginning of the 60's, when cotton productivity began to continuously decline. This was when the project was under the Ministry of Finance.

Cotton Plant Diseases

Cotton diseases have developed and increase year after year, having found a suitable environment, until they can withstand countermeasures. These disease countermeasures were increased, including the use of chemicals, until the diseases developed an immunity against them, because of their repeated use. The experience of last season is a good example. The use of these chemicals produce harmful effects on the environment, soil, water, and consequently, on animals and man. The minister of agriculture comments:

"It is well known that the use of chemicals, especially weed and disease killers, has an effect on polluting the environment, because these chemicals are toxic. However, this is not a big effect. The use of insecticides is a practice followed the world over."

It is well known also that the cost of fighting these diseases is rising rapidly, due to world market conditions. It goes up side by side with the price of oil, which is the basic element used for these chemicals. That has a direct effect on the cost of production; the costs increase, but cotton is unable to fetch a price commensurate with the rise in these costs. Expanding the disease countermeasures is followed by huge costs, since it necessitates more equipment and manpower, because the project is so large.

Fighting Nature

Constant irrigation, and the loss of organic matter in the soil causes it to become hard. As the plowing becomes deeper, the hardness increases, choking off the plants' growth, and causing irrigation to become difficult and superficial. This is the case in the Jazirah project. Plant cycles suffer, especially cotton. This is frequently accompanied by chemicals, represented by fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. Since 1944, the land has been plowed deeper and deeper, to attempt to overcome the soil's hardness. This attempt to "conquer" the soil occurs when it loses some of its basic elements. The project management has continued, since that time, to make every conceivable effort in heavy plowing, without giving the land an opportunity to rest from this effort. This is one agricultural method in the developed world; another is to plant crops which are abundantly fertile, such as legumes, so as not to "fight nature," but rather, to benefit from its basic elements. Its balance should not be upset, in order to ensure a large return, with less expenditure to overcome the land. There is no better evidence for that than the great success achieved in the United States, in terms of "natural agriculture," and in China, where they abandoned the use of fertilizers for a system of interval cultivation. The land is planted in adjoining rows of two plants that differ in kind of nourishment required. This is just one aspect of important agricultural developments, through which the farmer is bound more closely to the land.

Previously, the Clothing King

Cotton is no longer "clothing king" in the world. Man-made fibers and petrochemical fabrics have dominated the world market, and have considerably lessened the demand for cotton, due to the excellence and inexpensiveness of its competing commodities. On the other hand, cotton's productivity has directly expanded in producing countries. One feddan produces eight kantaras in Egypt, and more than that in the United States and other areas of the world. Sudan is no longer dominant in producing cotton in the world. It enters the market with less production each year. With regard to that, Dr 'Umar al-Amin says:

"Concerning long-staple cotton, Sudan and Egypt are still prime-movers in the world market, and world prices for it are influenced by production in Egypt and Sudan. As for medium and short-staple cotton, we have no influence there."

The last few years have seen a sudden, abrupt upturn in a number of areas that have a direct effect on the Jazirah project. Undertaking huge growth projects attracted manpower, and achieved settlement for the citizens in these areas. The inhabitants, either within or outside of cheap labor areas, no longer needed al-Jazirah, after the Khashm al-Qirbah project was established. Then came the growth projects: al-Rahad, Kinanah, 'Aslayyah and other large agricultural projects and industries. The Jazirah project began to suffer from a lapse of effort; every year, there was a labor shortfall. If workers were found, their wages went sky-high. Each season saw a repeated inability to harvest the crops. The cotton bolls gradually fall under animals' hooves early in the season. Police and army patrols are useless against them; this is an area of two million feddans.

Regarding the big change that took place in the whole country, the Jazirah citizens especially benefited, more than others. The project did not benefit from the spread of education among farmers' sons, who were assumed to be the farmers of the future. They got out of agriculture, even those who had not been educated, and went to another more profitable and less arduous trade. Then came the wave of emigration to the oil nations; unfortunately, no farmers will return.

Education has not been directed toward the service of agriculture, so that it follows the progress happening in the world, except in a serious experiment on a few feddans, called the sons of the farmers' projects. The experiment died in its infancy, without showing any yield.

Machines are being developed in the project, and their use is increasing, without the farmer being a part of this development. When the need to use machines increased more and more, due to the labor shortage, the project went in the direction of expanding its workshops and management and technical structure, instead of distributing the machines to the farmers, so that they could operate them, bear the cost of operating them and be in charge of them. That way, the farmers could run the agricultural operations themselves, instead of other workers running the operations for them. The Farmers' Federation started limited attempts to have the farmers own the machines, on a very narrow scope. It began with some of the more capable farmers and ended with them. A group of machine owners has appeared, which has become a new factor in putting pressure on the farmer, through their bad service and the rising cost of renting their equipment, thus exploiting the pressing need for them.

The project's policy to maintain specific agricultural "traditions" has continued. This was done by successful experiments to grow vegetables for export, but they became limited, because of the rising cost of production and fluctuating quality. Efforts were discontinued, in order to reduce the cost. Later, results in marketing our crops proved the success of groundnuts, which have achieved high productivity and a superior price on the world market. However, in addition to the groundnut crop's ability to fertilize the land, all that did not help to expand its cultivation, in the sense that cotton was, despite the fact it does not require the fertilizer, chemicals or manual labor for harvesting that cotton does.

Livestock, Rejected Wealth

Expanding cultivation of crops, and adding new crops, at the expense of the remaining grazing land for animals, has restricted their movement and has put a heavy burden on the livestock owner, who is a farmer at the same time. Numbers have declined considerably. It is well known that the Jazirah area, once rich in vast animal resources, is changing with settlement, because their owners are settled and not nomadic. However, this distinction has dealt a heavy blow to the livestock, because of their restricted movement, on the one hand, and the cultivation of grazing land on the other. All that remains is left over after cultivation, and is only sufficient for limited numbers.

The owners, who are the farmers, are forced to graze them in the cotton, and the animals attack it. However, to feed them in any other way would cost the farmers

more than their profit from cotton. Instead of a logical solution to this problem, the project management resorts to calling the police, and the people's armed forces, to protect the cotton crop from the animals' attack. They chase them, and the owners pay a fine for what they eat. Then the animals reenter the cotton fields once more.

With regard to not settling the animals and difficulties with breeding them, it has become burdensome to the farmers to maintain large herds, because the cost of feed has become very high. There is no longer enough sorghum for humans, and it has disappeared as an important part of animal feed. The price of birdseed has risen, while quantities have decreased, due to its small production as an adjunct to cotton productivity, and the rise in cost of producing it. That is reflected in the prices for livestock and their by-products. It has become a source of new concern for farmers; there are, therefore, losses concerned with animals, due to their poor production, small numbers and the damage they do to agriculture.

There is another problem. There are seasonal workers who pick the cotton. They come from vast grazing areas, and own huge herds of animals. They cross the two Niles every season, outnumber the local Jazirah animals, and must be fed until the picking season ends. There is nothing but the cotton itself. They attack it at night, and it only takes a few nights until all the year's efforts to grow cotton are gone. Perhaps this is more like a waterwheel, giving and taking from the lake.

Perhaps we should mention that this project, despite its vast size, only has a single poultry farm, with only 6000 chickens. There are one or two poultry specialists, for artificial insemination. The farm is under the supervision of the project's department of social welfare. This is all that is devoted to animal husbandry, even though a tiny percentage of the project's land could meet the needs of the local market for chicken, eggs and meat.

It should be clearly noted that the people "despise" breeding animals, and the new generations of citizens are no longer interested in the Jazirah land. They have lost their enthusiasm for breeding animals and have lost confidence in it as an abundant source of wealth.

Instead of looking at animals as parasites of agriculture, logic demands that we should derive benefit from livestock as an aid to agriculture, something that returns the organic elements of fertilization to the soil. We should consider them as a valuable source of wealth, whose offspring could be improved and whose by-products could be developed. We would benefit from settlement, which is preferable. Not having settlement was a factor in the failure of the milk and meat projects, which were established in the western part of the country. Settlement should not become a confinement for animals, and a cause of their becoming extinct, because like agriculture, livestock is a rich source of production, with guaranteed profit, for at least two reasons.

We import their by-products from countries similar to ours, such as Kenya, or we give the citizens of al-Jazirah dried milk and other by-products that we import from Western Europe, while we take over grazing lands and chase out the animals.

The question of managing the project needs to be comprehensively dealt with, as the minister of agriculture said. Perhaps this treatment should take into consideration that managing this project from one center makes the centralized management of the project a bloated, inflated body, remote from most of the project lands. This causes most of this management to be confined inside their offices. There is little overseeing, which causes the problems to get out of hand and become difficult to resolve. The management does not recognize the factors and problems until after they have spread and become bigger, because oversight of the fine details is impossible for the centralized project. Without this overseeing of small details, there will be no success, no matter what marvelous and large production inputs there may be. This is because they--and this has been proven--are being wasted every season.

Without the effective participation of the farmers in project management, their understanding of and experience with management will be superficial. Meaningful participation is not just farmers' "representation" on the board of directors and the committees, because true participation is in management of the fields, inspection, and in every department, right on up to the top of the project.

True participation is not even the farmers themselves carrying out the work of cultivation, whether by machine or manual efforts. Farmers should not be turned into "contractors," with agricultural machinery owners, the project management and the workshops carrying out the agricultural processes in lieu of them. Even though cultivation is being done by machines in most of its stages, has the farmer's role become to watch the machine, while it does the work?

There is certainly a bigger role for farmers' organizations, and the republican, revolutionary and popular organizations in the project, sharing in running the cultivation operations, effectively supervising them, and making the farmers and workers aware of the most modern means of agriculture, so that farmers' organizations do not become just a liability.

It should be made clear that it is necessary to have reliable, easy communication between project areas, especially after the telephone system, which had been doing this important job, became defunct. Scores of kilometers of wire and poles have vanished, converted into house roofs. The authorities responsible for protecting it were unable to--to say nothing of the behavior of those who have stolen the equipment. Is the costly wireless communications system, which the project management procured, going to be used as a substitute for the telephone system?

What if the Jazirah project management were to reduce the cotton acreage to one-quarter the size, for example, confine it to areas capable of producing it, saved three-fourths of the costs expended for cotton, and concentrated efforts on the areas planted. Productivity would rise, to yield the same production that the entire presently-cultivated areas yield, or perhaps increase. A feddan, last season, produced one and one-half kantaras, despite the fact that it could yield eight kantaras, if its cultivation was improved, as is the case in Egypt for example. Consequently, we could do away with much of the labor now required for the very complex cotton operations.

Moreover, benefit could be derived from the remaining acreage to grow other crops, such as groundnuts, whose great worth and guaranteed profit have been proved, especially since world markets today need all kinds of food. Most of the need for cotton cloth has been replaced, causing great unprofitability and stripping the land of its fertility and wealth of natural fertilizers that the groundnut plant restores to the soil. But, the groundnut does not require the labor, whether by the farmer's hand or by machine, nor does it need what cotton does, in terms of fertilizers and chemicals that harm the soil and the natural environment.

It would also be possible to use vast areas, which are now planted in cotton, to expand the livestock areas, to exploit animals commercially, improve their breed and their by-products, so as to satisfy the market's needs and to truly compete in world markets, as another "crop" added to the project's crops.

After having proven the success of growing vegetables for export, what if the project management were to improve their quality and increase their quantity, in order to compete with others in world markets, and to satisfy domestic market demands. What if it were to allocate areas to grow different types of fruit in gardens, which could be the largest gardens in the world, because the project does not lack any essential element. It could be an important part of the world's fruit markets. The project does not lack anything, and these things only cost a small fraction of the cost of cotton, and could be twice as profitable.

This is the fruit of field investigations, which AL-SAHAFAH tasked us to do. They included the project management, the Ministry of Agriculture, the farmers and their federation. We considered that the project's problems were not born today, but are the product of a series of accumulated matters, which began with the very start of the project, and whose effects have surfaced during the last 15 years.

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